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This is a study of scientific realism, and of the extent to which it is undermined by 
objections that have been raised by advocates of various forms of antirealism.  I seek to 
develop and present a version of scientific realism that improves on past formulations, 
and then to show that standard antirealist arguments against it do not succeed. In this 
paper, I will first present my formulation of scientific realism, which conceives of 
theories as model-based and as fundamentally non-linguistic.  I advocate an epistemic 
position that accords with indirect realism, and I review and assess the threat posed by 
theses of underdetermination. Next, I review and discuss three important views: the 
antirealist constructivist view of Thomas Kuhn, the realist view of Norwood Hanson, and 
the antirealist constructive empiricist view of Bas van Fraassen. I find merits and flaws in 
all three views. In the course of those discussions, I develop the theme that antirealists’ 
arguments generally depend on assumptions that are open to question, especially from the 
perspective of the version of realism I advocate. I further argue that these antirealist 
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CHAPTER ONE: REALISM, ABDUCTION, AND UNDERDETERMINATION 
 
Formulating a Realist Thesis 
 
Realism is a topic that permeates across many areas of philosophical 
investigation, including morality, color, mathematics, fiction, possible worlds, and 
science. What I will discuss in this paper only addresses philosophy of science and will 
have little to no bearing on those other interesting fields of study. When I speak of 
'realism' throughout the remainder of this paper, it will be shorthand for 'scientific 
realism.' – The first order of business is to formulate a clear thesis of scientific realism; 
and this is not easy to do, for there are a variety of positions within this camp. Brock and 
Mares (2007:2) suggest all forms of realism share at least these two basic sub-theses: (i) 
the existence thesis that there exists facts or entities distinctive of the particular domain 
(in our case, the scientific domain); and (ii) the independence thesis that the existence and 
nature of these facts/entities is “in some important sense objective and mind-
independent” (ibid.). This is a good start, though I observe that many, if not most, forms 
of scientific antirealism also share these two sub-theses, so more discrimination is 
required. Both the existence and independence theses are metaphysical in nature. 
Epistemological concerns comprise a good deal of the discussion in scientific realism, 
and so, a further refinement in this direction is needed. Brock and Mares propose two 
additional sub-theses: (iii) the confidence thesis that “although it may in some 
circumstances be difficult, we are always capable of coming to know about the existence 
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and nature of the domain we are realists about. That domain is epistemically accessible to 
us...” (ibid.); and (iv) the insecurity thesis that “It is possible to be in ignorance or error 
about the domain we are realists about. In order to avoid such mistakes, one must make 
appropriate contact with the domain in question, and there is no guarantee that anyone 
will succeed in doing that” (2007:6). These two sub-theses are separable and non-
exclusive; that is, some realists may adopt one or the other or both. I would disagree that 
"always capable of coming to know" and "there is no guarantee" are generally 
reconcilable.1 I also point out that the insecurity thesis is rarely a feature of scientific 
realism.2 Finally, I observe again, both sub-theses are also shared by most forms of 
scientific antirealism. In the scientific realism debate, I suggest, the central dispute 
regards the choice of proper domain of discourse for science (whether the class of all 
entities of the physical universe or just observable entities or just sense-data, and so on), 
but once chosen, realist and antirealist accounts alike generally satisfy three or more of 
the above four sub-theses. Nevertheless, I commend Brock and Mares in moving the 
attempt at a formulation in a generally good direction.  
 
Another approach is to begin with scientific antirealism and limn the outlines of 
realism by contrast. One category of antirealism is prefix fictionalism according to which 
statements that prima facie appear to be asserting the existence of a fact or entity or 
asserting the truth of a certain scientific law are to be, instead, construed as though the 
following was prefixed to the statement: 'according to such-and-such theory...' (ibid 28). 
                                                 
1 Of course, there are feats we are capable of doing but which we fail to achieve. However, the realist 
cannot tolerate the case of always capable but never achieving, for it opens the door to antirealism again 
and arguably undermines the basis of the alleged capability. 
2 Dr.Creath points out that Putnam is a realist who accepts the insecurity thesis.  
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In other words, as van Fraassen (1980:35) puts it, to the claims of, e.g., Rutherford's 
atomic theory (which appear to assert things like 'atoms exist'), the fictionalist will 
construe these claims as: "the observable world is nevertheless exactly as if Rutherford's 
theory were true..."3 Thus, the fictionalist treats the prima facie claimed entities to be, 
rather, useful fictions. Another standard antirealist position is instrumentalism. 
Instrumentalism and fictionalism are often equated, since instrumentalists treat prima 
facie claims of existence as merely a means to a non-realist end and both positions 
evaluate theories by measure of usefulness. However, one4 could dispute this equation, 
arguing that the instrumentalist differs from fictionalist in the instrumentalist’s construing 
the prima facie existence claims literally, but then opting only to accept such claims and 
not believe them, where 'acceptance' only obligates one to regard the claim as empirically 
adequate but not (necessarily) true, and 'belief' obligates one to regard the claim as true. 
The distinction between belief and acceptance is one famously advocated by van 
Fraassen (1980:12). However, van Fraassen would quarrel with this distinction as a basis 
for defining instrumentalism. van Fraassen rejects instrumentalism (as he differently 
defines it) on the grounds that it does not give a literal construal of existence claims. This 
clash in terminology may be the basis for some confusion among authors, many of whom 
regard van Fraassen as an instrumentalist while van Fraassen himself explicitly denies he 
is an instrumentalist. We could use constructive empiricism for the position that a 
scientific theory is to be construed literally but only accepted and not believed, and 
genuine instrumentalism for the position that withholds existence claims and merely 
treats the theory for its outward effects. A third standard type of antirealism is 
                                                 
3  This is not van Fraassen’s position, just his well put characterization of fictionalism. 
4  Brock and Mares (2007:29) 
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constructivism, e.g. the sort propounded by Kuhn. This position holds that prima facie 
claims of the existence of, e.g., unobservable entities are to be construed literally and 
believed; however, the referents of the referring terms in these claims are understood not 
to be things in the world, but rather, items within a (social) construction.  
 
So, to sum up this non-exhaustive but classic set of antirealist positions, an 
antirealist may treat prima facie existence claims: (a) as proper to construe non-literally 
and to be believed; or, (b) as proper to construe literally but only to be accepted, not 
believed; or, (c) as proper only to treat instrumentally (without regard for content); or, (d) 
as proper to construe literally and to be believed, while ruling-out anything other than 
items in a (social) construction as the referents for terms. Of course, there are other 
important forms of antirealism left off this list (notably, structuralism), but this list serves 
as an adequate indication of the negative space in which realism may occupy. – van 
Fraassen has devised a formulation of realism against this sort of antirealist foil, as 
follows:  
 
Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the 
world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that 
it is true. (1980:8) 
 
Here, van Fraassen emphasizes that the realist construes certain prima facie existence 
claims literally, holds these as capable (in principle) of being fully believed, and regards 
the referents for terms to be items in the actual world. We can read van Fraassen as 
implying that the realist subscribes to the existence and independence theses. In stressing 
5 
that the realist only “aims” at truth, van Fraassen is distinguishing the genuine realist 
from the naive realist who believes that any empirically successful theory is therefore 
true. So, van Fraassen’s formulation for genuine realism is weaker than the confidence 
thesis, but stronger than the insecurity thesis. 
 
Of course, it is never wise for one holding a particular position to accept the 
formulation of one's position as given by the opposing and hostile camp. The above 
antirealist positions were all presented with a linguistic orientation, where science is 
understood to manufacture statements and where antirealists differ from one another in 
the way they treat those statements. This linguistic orientation is one dominating 20th 
century philosophy, and van Fraassen would certainly be correct in the way his 
formulation indeed describes the bulk of 20th century realists, who similarly adopted the 
linguistic orientation. Echoing van Fraassen formulation, Brock and Mares divide 
scientific realists into two camps: those who believe “the purpose of science is to provide 
us with true [or approximately true] postulates of laws and entities” (135) and those who 
more modestly hold the same, save just the entities, not laws, mentioned in the postulates 
are worthy of belief.5 This formulation, like van Fraassen's, also holds that realism 
amounts to the sort of attitude one adopts towards a certain class of sentences. 
 
Another commonly agreed aspect of realism, much discussed by van Fraassen 
(and Brock and Mares), is its advocacy and use of abductive reasoning. However, there is 
wide divergence, even among realists, over how to define abductive reasoning. It is 
                                                 
5 Dr. Creath notes this is the position of Nancy Cartwright  
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usually understood as some form of inference to the best explanation (IBE), and 
explanations are linguistic artifacts. van Fraassen spends a third of his book, The 
Scientific Image, discussing the concept of explanation in order to counter realism, which 
indicates he regards abduction as essential to the realist position. Hanson, a proponent of 
realism, makes abduction (understood roughly as IBE, but which he calls ‘retroduction’) 
a centerpiece of his pro-realist arguments. The no miracles argument, advanced in one 
form or another by major realists (such as Smart, Putnam, Boyd, and Worrall), is 
regarded by most as abductive in character. Suffice to say, abduction should be included 
in the formulation of the realist position. To this end, we may modify ‘...involves the 
belief that it is true’ in van Fraassen’s above formulation of realism to read ‘involves 
abductive inference to the belief that it is true.’ One notable exception to this rule is 
Popper who respected only deduction as the lone, legitimate form of inference. – 
Conversely, it has also become a hallmark of antirealist positions to reconstrue, reduce, or 
discredit abduction, preferring instead to stick to probabilistic reasoning as the distinctive 
inferential method of science. The motivation for this will become clear when we study 
antirealist epistemological and metaphysical commitments.   
 
I suggest that the realist need not adopt the linguistic orientation mentioned above 
to differentiate himself from his rivals (and even from other fellow realists). This would 
require, if subscription to abduction is retained, a non-linguistic rendering of abduction, 
which entails a departure from explanation. Work has already been done in this direction 
by those who view abduction as a kind of model-based reasoning. I propose to conceive 
of models as non-linguistic artifacts. If we denote as target the thing being modeled, then 
7 
a crude notion of this sort of inference could be: Insofar as the model bears some 
similarity to the target, we have reason to believe the target is similar in further ways not 
yet observed to the model. I emphasize this is my own suggestion, and I do not pretend 
this version of model-based reasoning represents any other viewpoint. Entreating the 
reader’s patience and charity in the use of my idiosyncratic reading of abduction as this 
sort of model-based reasoning, then I will press forward with framing a new formulation. 
But first, we should look at one more key ingredient to this debate, viz. 
underdetermination.  
 
Antirealists have developed a wide variety of arguments to combat realism, but 
among the oldest and most potent are the ones which attempt to undermine credence, 
built on the basis of evidence E, in a belief B about the world on the grounds that this 
self-same evidence E would lend identical inferential support to some other beliefs H, I, 
J,..., which are all incompatible with B.  This basic argument, in one form or another, has 
been the fountainhead of skepticism for millennia, and it has underwritten the less-than-
skeptical scientific antirealism. So taken for granted is this argument that many prominent 
antirealists (like van Fraassen6) hardly bother to mention it, let alone defend it, while yet 
constructing their polemics on the back of it. In its more mature form, 
underdetermination argues that, for any given theory T which is both consistent with and 
relevant for a body of evidence E, there exists an infinite number of other theories, 
incompatible with T, which are equally consistent with and relevant for E.  One would be 
safe in generally characterizing the scientific realism/antirealism debate in terms of either 
                                                 
6 van Fraassen certain makes explicit and extensive use of underdetermination, but he almost never 
mentions it by name or characterizes it or mounts a particular defense. 
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party’s response to underdetermination, with realists denying or downplaying the severity 
or inescapability of the threat and with antirealists emphasizing the threat (to realists) and 
motivated to find means of escape by re-assigning our commitments from the world to 
something more local, accessible and knowable (and presumably safe from the 
underdetermination threat). If this characterization is correct, then I urge that we modify 
the above language-oriented formulation of realism as follows (with the newer 
modification italicized):  
 
Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the 
world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves abductive 
inference to the belief that it is true, such that it provides grounds for 
coping effectively with underdetermination in preserving confidence in 
that belief. (language-oriented formulation of realism (LR)) 
 
Of course, there will be exceptions among realists who give little consideration to 
abduction or underdetermination. However, I am intending my formulation of the 
language-oriented version of the formulation of scientific realism to be more normative 
than descriptive, especially with respect to underdetermination. My opinion is, foremost, 
that any realist argument which fails to confront underdetermination is not worth its salt. 
The attempt to cope by way of abduction is, I submit, a fair description of what many 
realists have historically done.  
 
van Fraassen himself offers an alternative to the language-oriented formulation of realism 
based on his ‘semantic view of theories’ in terms of models. While he is sometimes less 
than clear about which sorts of things are to count as models, he certainly is clear that it 
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could include non-linguistic artifacts. He also is quite straightforward in equating with 
truth the isomorphic correspondence between the structure of a model and the target in 
the world (1980:197). A scientific theory, on the semantic view, is fundamentally not a set 
of sentences (i.e., theorems), but rather, a theory is a collection of models. van Fraassen 
lauds this approach as superior, for (a) the fact that a model is obtainable already 
guarantees its consistency; (b) the same set of models could be described in any number 
of radically different ways by any number of different languages, each language with its 
own limitations (1980:44). Of course, van Fraassen goes on to fold the semantic view of 
theories into his antirealist account, but in delivering this basic starting point, he presents 
the possibility and virtues to the realist of an alternative formulation of realism.  
 
Let's understand by taking a model seriously both (i) using the model for the 
purpose of telling us something about its target, and (ii) regarding the model-target 
relationship as one of similarity or resemblance. The alternative, non-language-oriented 
formulation of realism can now be given:  
 
Science aims to give us a set of models of the world; and evaluating the 
worth of a model involves abductive inference to the conclusion that it 
indeed resembles the target, such that it provides grounds for coping 
effectively with underdetermination in preserving confidence in that 
conclusion.7 (NLR) 
 
                                                 
7 Dr. Creath notes that NLR allows room for an antirealist like van Fraassen to pass as a realist. I respond 
that insofar as van Fraassen holds that models can tell us about parts of the observable world that are 
empirically remote to us, he would indeed count as a realist. van Fraassen, however, attempts to utilize 
underdetermination to limit our judgments of resemblance just to empirical substructure, whereas if we 
effectively cope with underdetermination, then such an antirealist move would be blocked.  
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As with the language-oriented formulation, this one commits us to the existence and 
independence theses and falls somewhere in between the confidence and insecurity 
theses. This formulation also gives a non-language-oriented equivalent of literal construal 
and belief. I note that evaluating the worth of a model entails taking the model seriously. 
 
Now that we have two formulations of realism and the beginning of an 
understanding of the variety of issues within the realism/antirealism debate, I propose to 
provide a fuller sketch of the sort of position NLR would have to be to satisfy the terms 
of the formulation, I will also expound upon some related issues and defend NLR. 
 
Abductive Inference, a Beginning 
 
It is something of a controversy whether or not abduction is legitimate or whether 
there is any other type of inference beyond deduction and induction. Realists generally 
favor some version of abduction (Worrall would be an example of a realist who thinks 
abduction (as IBE) is illegitimate), and antirealists generally resist ratifying abduction, 
even if they agree that something like abduction has currency with practicing scientists. 
 
Let’s consider how abduction may be differentiated from deduction and induction. 
Think of deduction as inferring from the state of affairs in the domain described by the 
premises to that same state of affairs, or a part of it, described now by the conclusion, in 
which all that is entailed in the premises and conclusion is open to view. As I used to 
explain to my introductory logic students after illustrating by Venn-diagram just the 
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premises of a valid syllogism (and dramatically capping the marker and placing it down 
on my desk), 'Without adding anything further, what I've just now done is also illustrate 
the truth of the conclusion.'   
 
Induction (generally and crudely), however, infers from a revealed portion, 
described by the premises, of an otherwise opaque domain, to the opaque part. From the 
part of a set that is open to view, we make a guess about the part of that same set but that 
is closed from view. In some cases of induction, the portion that is open to view may be 
general aspects of the whole of the domain while the hidden part is an unknown 
particular piece of that original whole. In other cases, the open-to-view part is a known 
subset of the whole, and we infer to a hidden and unknown different subset of the same 
domain. Usually, people have in mind the case of inferring from the open-to-view and 
known subset to general aspects of the whole domain. It makes no sense, inductively, to 
talk about inferring from some known portion of a domain to an entirely different 
domain. 
 
Because inductive inference is always to a portion closed from the reach of the 
premises, the inference contains a risk of failure. As Peirce pointed out in calling 
inductive inferences ampliative, this is a good thing because, despite the risk, it enables 
an enlargement of our corpus.  
 
I contend that an important limitation on induction is that induction cannot 
introduce new conceptual categories. Like blind men puzzling out what is an elephant 
12 
(assuming they had no prior concept), no iteration of inductive inference could ever put 
the disparate pieces together into a completely new, unified concept, despite induction's 
report on the correlation or suggestion of a common cause. Categories of both entities 
and relations and the character of these (stability, repetition, and so on) must be set in 
place as a precondition on induction. Inductivists usually hide this in the small print.  
 
Before introducing abduction, we should first elaborate some on structures and 
models. The idea of structure is a very general one, and sociologists, crystallographers, 
engineers, business management people, mathematicians, and others make good use of 
the term, though each field has additional ideas pertaining to structure, specific to their 
respective discipline. Very generally, structure is used to denote a set of relations holding 
between a set of things.8 It is the set of relations that constitutes the structure, so that the 
same structure can be duplicated among different sets of things. For the present 
consideration, one sort of structure of interest is the structure embodied in (parts of) the 
world. Homomorphisms may obtain between structures of many sorts. I’m not using 
homomorphism in its usual sense, tied to mappings of algebraic structures. I’m concerned 
to utilize homomorphism to capture the notion of resemblance, conceived generally as a 
mapping between two structures A and B, such that structural relations in A are 
consistently mapped to structural relations in B. Let's call operational resemblance a 
homomorphism that is rich enough so that an operation on the elements of the structure A 
                                                 
8 Note that structure, as I use it here, denotes structures with specific, determinate relations obtaining 
between elements, to be contrasted with syntactic structures as of the sort advocated by structuralists.  
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consistently maps onto an operation on the elements of the structure B. An M-model9 is a 
structure which bears an operational resemblance to another structure. Let's call the other 
structure the target of the M-model.  So, an M-model is always a model of something. 
Note that two M-models may each bear a different operational resemblance to the same 
target. An M-model is not the same thing as a logical model which is more general. An 
M-model may serve to satisfy a set of statements, but its purpose with respect to 
abduction is relative to another structure, not relative to statements. An M-model is a 
distinct structure that may be embodied in a number of different things, some concrete 
and some not. M-model structures are independent of us and whether or not we think 
about them. I have in mind, for the purpose of clarifying my position in the 
realism/antirealism debate, that the target structure is embodied in a (part of) the world, 
and the M-model structure is embodied either in some sort of mental space or also in a 
part of the world.10 
 
We can't always know whether a structure is an M-model or know to what degree 
the M-model operationally resembles the target. In order to ground such judgments, I 
propose to understand abduction as a type of inference from the structure taken to be an 
M-model and the available evidence to taking the target structure to be thus and so.11 
Abduction, on this view, is not an inference to a theory or to a representation. Abduction 
                                                 
9 I chose this terminology, thinking of the ‘M’ standing for mimetic. In this paper I will frequently just use 
'model' to mean 'M-model.' 
10 Many thanks to Dr.Armendt for some long discussions helping me get clarity on the ideas discussed in 
this paragraph. 
11 I phrase the conclusion portion of the inference in such a way as to make room for the interpretation of a 
practical inference. 
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is ampliative in that it infers to a conclusion not contained in the premises, where 
'premises' is understood to be the information embodied in the M-model together with the 
evidence. A characteristic mark of abduction is that it can yield judgments about features 
of the world that are unfamiliar or remote from us, meaning that an M-model may predict 
in the target a feature for which very little inductive support exists. If the prediction bears 
out, then the model is regarded a fruitful one.12 
 
So, in terms of domains, abduction might be thought of as an inference from one 
domain that is open-to-view to another, distinct domain possibly closed-from-view except 
in the intersection. I intend the common elements in the intersection to count as the 
current evidence, but the evidence that the open-domain receives here about the other 
domain is (i) regarded differently than it would be in the case of induction (i.e. not as 
grounds for a pattern to be extended), and (ii) is expressed entirely in terms of elements 
of the open-domain (so, the remainder of the closed-domain may be composed of 
different stuff). Whereas induction proceeds on the assumption of uniformity and stability 
within the domain such that, e.g., the entire domain will probably continue the pattern of 
the revealed portion, abduction advances on the notion that elements in the open-domain 
can operationally resemble elements in the closed-domain.  
 
                                                 
12   I emphasize that my usage and special treatment of the word and development of the concept are not 
intended to describe the common usage and understanding of the concept of a 'model,' even among 
scientists. I'm hatching and evolving a position that not everyone agrees with but which, I argue, will 
present a coherent view of models as representational structures, a view that attends to the 
epistemological position of the model-maker to the world. 
15 
In the case of induction, our confidence about the nature of the concealed portion 
is increased as the revealed portion is increased. With abduction, our confidence about 
the structure in the closed domain is increased (a) the more of the M-model that coincides 
with the evidence at the intersection under all available circumstances, and (b) the greater 
the number of common elements in the intersection of the domains (e.g., by increasing 
precision or by taking actions that increase the presence of such elements). Though, there 
are important qualifications to this confidence which I will present shortly. 
 
In our having control over the M-model structure, we are afforded, I suggest, the 
capacity to introduce new conceptual categories, and this move is welcome in the pursuit 
of determining resemblance to the target. If induction is conceived as the search for 
patterns (which are extended into the concealed portion of the domain), then abduction 
may be conceived as a sort of world-building activity. However, the ‘world’ of the model 
is purposefully abridged and stereotypical. The goal of science is not to describe the 
biography of each and every boson and quark. On the other hand, it may be a (lofty) goal 
to capture each and every aspect of a target.13  
 
Some care should be taken to distinguish between (a) properties the model 
possesses independently of context and application and (b) properties the model has by 
virtue of context and application. van Fraassen argues that there are no (important) 
properties a model/representation has independently of context (so that it fails even to be 
                                                 
13 I discuss aspect towards the end of this chapter, in the discussion of underdetermination. Roughly, I understand 
aspect to be a subset of elements in an individual model which bear a relation to something else in the wider, 
world-model.  
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a representation outside the appropriate context), but I will argue in the chapter on van 
Fraassen that his view is both unorthodox and mistaken. As well, I contend that a model 
is not an analogy, though there may be some overlap between the two ideas. While a 
model may be embodied in, e.g., balsa wood, whereas the target is not similarly 
embodied, the embodiment is not taken to be identical with the model. An analogy, on my 
understanding, includes essentially both the part that relates to the target and the part that 
does not, and the part that is unrelated to the target is important to the overall character of 
the analogy.14 In the case of a model, if we included the embodiment, then it might 
greatly detract from the resemblance it has would otherwise have to the target. Perhaps, 
this trial and error method leads us to discriminate carefully the model from its 
embodiment.15  
 
A Rough Example and Some Initial Objections 
 
Let's take an uncomplicated example, where both the model and target are open to 
view.   Suppose I'm a Wright brother. I'd like to know which wing design is best before 
climbing into an airplane and risking my life (or embarrassing myself by not getting off 
the ground). I build small-scale wing models and measure their lift and stability (I recall 
reading the brothers did this by mounting wings on articulated metal arms with weighted 
counterbalances and spinning these about a pole). Then, I would build medium-scale 
models of airplanes, test-flying those in real conditions. Finally, after much testing, I'd 
                                                 
14 E.g., the ‘bear’ part of ‘I’m angry as a bear’ 
15 A point along these lines was made by BonJour (2007) with respect to Locke’s indirect realism and the 
distinction between primary and secondary qualities. 
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put myself in a full-scale airplane. If my testing demonstrated intermediate abductive 
success (the wing-models showed themselves operationally resembling the medium-scale 
airplanes), then on the basis of iterated abduction16, I have grounds to conclude my full-
scale airplane should fly just as the model did. I would further abductively conclude that 
the rejected models of wing-design showing poor performance likewise correctly predict 
a full-scale airplane of similar poor performance. Very roughly, my verbal reasoning 
would be something like: Just as the model has features F1, F2, etc. which behaved by 
measures a, b, c, etc., so I infer that the target's features F1, F2, etc. will behave by 
measures Ma, Mb, Mc, etc. (where M is some coefficient that adjusts for the difference (if 
any) in scale). – To emphasize the difference between induction and abduction, one could 
make the case that, while the inductive inference is weak, there may be strong abductive 
inference (a) from facts about models to facts about airplanes which are really a different 
species of thing than the models, and (b) from the fact of successful prediction from one 
part of the model to the expectation that another, less-explored part of the model will 
therefore successfully predict behavior in the target17. The history of science is rich with 
accounts of scientists who formulate stories of how the world might really be, stories 
with great internal integrity and cohesion and built from familiar relations but applied in 
unfamiliar ways (as Einstein imagined 'riding on a beam of light'). I suggest this kind of 
thinking is abductive in character.  
 
                                                 
16  (akin to transitivity, such that if A resembles B (by some aspect z) and if B resembles C (by aspect z), then A 
resembles C (by aspect z) –  though, I am not asserting true transitivity) 
17 (e.g., if I've found a sketch of Margaret Thatcher to successfully resemble her in respect of her hair, nose, eyes, etc., 
and then I discover the sketch portrays her having a small mole, abductively I now have good reason to expect a 
mole on the real Margaret Thatcher.)  
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Returning to the Wright brothers, suppose they start-up an airline company and 
hire a marketing executive to help them sell their new flying service to the world. This 
marketing person paints logos and splashy designs on various scale-models of airplanes 
in different dioramic settings and presents them to focus-marketing groups for feedback. 
This person is not interested in the aerodynamic aspects of the model, but rather in the 
artistic/marketing relevant aspects. It is no less a model, though, than the one used by the 
Wright brothers, and the abductive value is no less either. (Though, obviously, the 
marketing person is using induction to conclude the larger population will respond as the 
focus group did). 
 
The key points here are (i) that the defining relationship between model and target 
is essentially one of (operational) resemblance, (ii) the model, target, and relationship 
between them are all fundamentally non-linguistic, (iii) the model's working in a certain 
way was necessary for me to draw conclusions from it, and (iv) insofar as the model 
evidences similarity to the target, we have reason to believe the target is similar (in ways 
not yet observed) to the model. 
 
But, are these points correct? Objections can be raised. (a) "'Resemblance' is a 
vague and relative notion. What is resemblance in one context will fail to be in another. 
We would have to agree on some standard of resemblance and that requires convention 
and pragmatics." I have at least two responses to this: (a1) While I'd agree that there are 
such things as convention-based and context-relative instances of 'resemblance' (where 
you and I agree to say 'x resembles y' for no other reason than we've agreed to speak this 
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way), the model-theoretic idea of context-independent homomorphism is defensible. (a2) 
I will argue that abductive models are epistemologically fundamental, so states-of-affairs 
in the world, like contexts, cannot be a requirement on models if models are prior to 
knowing about contexts.  
 
Another objection: (b) "Many models that we use to predict larger-scale and more 
complex phenomena nevertheless bear no resemblance to them. E.g., I could use a system 
of weights and gears to model economic phenomena, but there is certainly nothing about 
the weights, etc. that resembles the complex social phenomenon of an economy." I have 
two responses to this challenging critique: (b1) I completely agree with the critique, if the 
point is that no resemblance entails no abduction. In the example, we could think of the 
weights and gears as just an awkward calculating machine or a didactic illustration, but 
not a model in the abductive sense. (b2) Or, depending on how we draw inferences from 
it, one might make the case that, indeed, we are making abductive sorts of inferences, in 
which case the weight-gear system is standing proxy for a truly world-resembling M-
model. Or, another possibility is that the weight-gear system is a second-order model, the 
first-order model being the one properly aiming at world-resemblance, of people 
exchanging money in an economy.18 But, the essential feature of an abductive model is its 
resembling its target. By this criteria, abduction fails if the ‘model’ is a statistical chart or 
a set of equations or a collection of statements, and so on.19 
 
                                                 
18 Higher-order models are discussed in Appendix I, Note 1. 
19 Though, it may be understood these things point to a true M-model. 
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Another objection: (c) “You are making unwarranted metaphysical assumptions in 
your use of resemblance. In fact, resemblance can only proceed by way of a (linguistic) 
conceptual framework which carves up both world and model in the same way. Outside 
this framework, no independent sense can be made of ‘resemblance.’” This is a most 
powerful challenge. For the most part, I agree wholeheartedly. My example above and the 
normal way we think about resemblance does require a conceptual framework. But, 
there's the problem of a foundation, of starting somewhere, of ground-zero. We aren't 
born with a conceptual framework (and, even if we were, we could hold it suspect until 
foundational grounds are provided). The account I'm attempting to develop contends that 
the conceptual framework itself can only have emerged by way of fundamentally non-
linguistic abduction (and that much of the scaffolding of that framework is itself an M-
model), and this argues for (by indispensability) an inferential path to judgments of 
resemblance outside and prior to conceptual frameworks. This is not to deny anything of 
the powers and import of deduction or induction, except the fact they fail to provide the 
foundational inference needed to establish a basic world-theory.  In the next subsection, I 
present the rough plan for this inferential path to judgments of resemblance.20 
 
Inferring to Resemblance: Blackboxes, Elimination, and the Form of the Idea of the 
World 
 
So far, no grounds have yet been given to infer that a constructed model bears 
resemblance to a target. If anything, the suggestion of underdetermination would appear 
                                                 
20     If the reader desires a more serious and detailed illustration of abduction that involves ground-zero 
epistemology, please see Appendix I, Note 1.  
21 
to undermine any attempt to draw such a conclusion. I also have ignored the obvious 
skeptical objections, such as the objection that it could well be the case that anything 
counted as evidence is not the result of some extant thing or process (i.e., there really is 
no target) or the objection that the pool of possible models may well really be just a pool 
of falsehoods (some of which are empirically successful). Skeptical objections are 
legitimate and, even, welcome, but they are indiscriminate between realists and 
antirealists. If the skeptics are correct, it would make science illusory. The dispute 
between realists and antirealists, however, begins with the assumption, however 
unwarranted, that science is not illusory, that the world exists, that there are grounds to 
hold that other minds exist, that languages exist, and so on. It is by a parliamentary 
decision between realists and antirealists, not by a philosophical demonstration, that we 
assume some minimal basis on which science becomes feasible despite skeptical 
possibilities. Thus, when I ignore the obvious skeptical objections it is by appeal to the 
parliamentary agreement, between all disputants of the realist debate, to ignore the global 
skeptic.  
 
As to the grounds for concluding resemblance, it is important to emphasize that 
the process is one of elimination. Inferring that I am entitled a degree confidence that 
some present model resembles its target involves first showing the competitor models 
under review all failed to survive a test. The anti-global-skepticism premise also plays a 
role in capping the upper-limit of worse-case-scenarios for (i) how large the pool of 
possible competitors could be and (ii) how wrong we could be in the face of enduring 
empirical success. Finally, it needs to be argued that the remaining pool of possibilities is 
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being reduced in such a way that weeding-out yields remaining possibilities along a 
narrower and narrower spectrum. I will touch on these shortly, in discussing 
underdetermination. First, though, it is instructive to look at an important piece of work 
in computer science from Edward Moore.  
 
In 1956, Moore published a short but momentous paper, Gedanken-Experiments 
on Sequential Machines, wherein he proves some results relevant to abduction as 
conceived here. He considers an experimental situation in which we are guessing at the 
nature of a blackbox discrete-state machine which we can only test by feeding it inputs 
and examining outputs. Moore gives as an example of the situation he has in mind the 
case of capturing during wartime a cryptographic device which can't be opened for fear of 
self-destruction or boobytrap; Moore also notes that, while the analogy is imperfect 
between his gedanken-experiment and the situation of the scientist seeking to learn the 
nature of a system which he cannot view directly, his results may be 'of interest' (Moore 
1956:133). The blackbox machine is assumed to have a finite number n of states, a finite 
number m of possible input symbols, and a finite number p of output symbols. This 
machine can only be in one state at a time, with transitions to each new state by discrete 
time intervals and with each state other than the initial state being rigidly determined by 
the previous state and previous input symbol. The goal of the experimenter is to 
distinguish among states of the machine by inputting a sequence of symbols and 
observing the outputs. A state qi of machine S is indistinguishable from state qj iff every 
experiment performed on S starting in state qi produces the same outcome as it would 
staring in state qj; and a pair of states is distinguishable iff they are not indistinguishable 
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(i.e. if there exists some experiment the outcome of which depends on which of these 
states S was in at the beginning of the experiment) (1956:136).  
 
Moore's first two theorems concede that a class of machines exists for which (a) 
any pair of states is distinguishable but there exists no simple experiment to determine the 
initial state, and (b) it will never be possible to perform experiments to distinguish it 
uniquely from the class of all discrete state machines. However, if the class of machines 
under consideration is restricted to just those of a certain size {n,m,p} of states, input 
symbols, and output symbols and restricted in certain other ways, then some interesting 
results are obtainable. Moore's Theorem 8, for instance, proves that an {n,m,p} machine 
any two of whose states are distinguishable will be such that there exists an experiment of 
length (n(n-1))/2 which determines the state of S at the end of the experiment. Another 
researcher, Karatsuba, proved, for a similar machine S, the length of the shortest and 
longest experiments to determine the end-state of S.21  
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to present a formal account of abduction; 
however, the vast literature on Moore machines (and its improved incarnations (such as 
the Mealy machine)) points the way, I believe, to developing a rigorous account. Among 
other things, an account along these lines would need to (a) treat models with greater 
granularity, with respect to objects and relations; and, (b) provide greater flexibility with 
respect to input and output sets (in terms of the number of inputs/outputs per state of the 
                                                 
21 Dr.Creath correctly points out that appeal to Moore’s work depends crucially on first establishing that 
state-machines are good analogies for targets in the world. I propose the idea only as a future research 
program, and arguing for the relevance of the program will be requisite.  
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model). The general idea is a good one. Treating the target (world) as a blackbox in the 
way Moore suggests, with simplifying assumptions in line with those necessary to permit 
science and ward-off the global skeptic. It tallies well with the scientific account of our 
perceptual/epistemic situation – viz. one of isolation with respect to the world. I highlight 
here that whether the blackbox is the state of the furniture in the room or the state of 
molecules in a chemical sample makes no material difference to one in a state of 
epistemic isolation.  
 
Generally speaking, resemblance is established for some (unspecified) members 
in a pool of models by seeking out points of non-resemblance and eliminating from the 
pool classes of models sharing the non-resemblance. An invaluable tool in this process of 
elimination is the detector, the device appointed to provide us evidence.22 At bottom, a 
detector is a measuring tool, though it is a matter of theory which objects we should 
decide to treat as detectors. The senses we are born with are, practically speaking, the set 
of detectors forced upon us, though, in time, we will come to treat these with impiety. As 
most antirealists stress, language is essential for the conduct of science, but before we can 
come to learn or use a language, we must first come to regard other people as having 
minds and as reliably signaling information to us, i.e. we regard other people as detectors. 
Much (or most) of our world-theory is a result of the output of people-qua-detectors. But, 
regarding people as detectors itself must rest on a theory that understands how people are 
with respect to us and to the world. It's debatable just where to draw the line on what is 
and is not a detector. Is the rippling surface of a pond a sort of detector (indicating 
                                                 
22  Represented by elements in the intersection of the two domains in the earlier diagram. 
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something just thrown into it)? Does a series of glass lenses form a new kind of detector 
or are those lenses just a modification of an existing detector (viz., the eye)? As to the last 
question, it is a famously recalcitrant position of van Fraassen's to regard the output of 
microscopes not as a magnification of that which is not naked-eye observable (i.e. not as 
detector output), but merely as new empirical content (i.e. as just another artifact that is 
naked-eye observable) which must be made consistent with the theory. My position on 
microscopes is to agree with van Fraassen that they don’t extend observability, but then to 
disagree that there is such a thing as observability in the first place, in the sense that a 
direct-realist holds we can have first-hand knowledge of certain things in the world.23 I 
hold the representational realist view and maintain that our sense-organs and certain other 
things we appoint in the world together serve as detectors. However, I would accept the 
convention to call 'observable' some collection of our most settled detections. 
 
It is certainly a complex and advanced topic to argue, just how and on what basis 
we are justified to regard something a detector (or diminish or promote in rank one 
detector over another). But, it is easier to see that, once so regarded, the introduction of a 
new detector-type enriches the space on which we form our notions of model-parts and 
model-relations, such that (i) models gain in capacity (representational and otherwise) 
and (ii) there is an increase in the magnitude and nuance of evidence. It is for the 
historian of science to establish that the introduction of new measuring devices and 
detecting apparati precede important conceptual changes in science that supersede the 
                                                 
23 Dr.Creath points out that we do have uninferred judgments of, e.g., what we’ve just seen. I deny that 
these judgments may be taken as true reports of states-of-affairs in the world. Moreover, merely being 
an inferred judgment is insufficient to establish it as an observation, for I have any number of 
uninferred judgments (e.g., ‘Caesar wore a toga’) which I’d hesitate to call observations.  
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theoretical capacities of the theory that gave rise to the devices (and which may 
eventually change the story how exactly the devices work, but not that they are still 
detecting devices), but a superficial review seems to corroborate generally such an 
opinion. The point I wish to emphasize is that an increase in the number and type of 
detectors brings with it an increase in the ways by which models may be eliminated.  
 
One advocating a deductive view of the structure of scientific theories might, for 
instance, hold that a proper theory should provide a set of axioms each making a 
statement true of every member of the domain, such that, given some set of actual initial 
conditions and any actual event E true of the domain, E is deducible from the axioms 
given the initial conditions. On a reductionist view, axioms should concern the most 
elemental properties/relations/entities of the universe, such that all possible events in 
every field of science will be deducible given initial conditions on just the elemental 
items. Such views naturally place the greatest importance on the axioms and fashions a 
hierarchical arrangement of dependence whereby any error in the axioms spells doom for 
the entire system. It is no wonder that philosophers of science subscribing to such 
deductive views of theories have been apt to place special, if not singular, emphasis on 
physics, as opposed to the rest of science, for such views grant special status to the field 
of science whose job amounts to describing the ultimate axiom set. Yet, the curious 
tension with this perspective and the actual situation in science is that physics tends to be 
among the more speculative and less settled areas of science, whereas other fields, like 
biology, have enjoyed greater stability and a considerable degree of insensitivity to the 
upheavals in physics. Even more settled and less concerned with physics would be those 
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items of belief which we fully take for granted, along the lines of 'here is a hand,' 
discussed by Wittgenstein in On Certainty. From an individual, developmental point of 
view, these pedestrian pieces of our world-theory must be firmly in place long before we 
can begin to think about science proper. – The model-based view I espouse does not share 
the singular, hierarchical structure of the deductive view and better captures, I submit, the 
inter-relations among levels, or domains treated-of by science (and common-sense).  
 
I hold that the ordering that starts with facts of the sort 'here is a hand,' having 
greatest familiarity and reliability, and the ordering that starts with the most elementary 
and fundamental sorts of facts24, are both necessary to a complete account of the structure 
of theories. More precisely, I suggest there are three axes along which science develops. 
The first axis runs from generality to specificity - i.e. from higher-order models (whose 
targets are lower-order models) to lower-order models (where the target of the lowest-
order model is the world). The second axis runs from elementary or constituent bits to 
larger unions or composites of those bits. The third axis runs from more entrenched parts 
of the model to less entrenched.  As I discuss in Appendix I, regarding orders of models, 
every level of order is important in its own way, with higher-order models providing 
regulative and heuristic assistance to lower-order models and with lower-order models 
providing stability in entrenchment. As well, the generalities afforded by higher-order 
models are also important in strategically coping with underdetermination, in the way 
such generalities point to features whose rejection would eliminate the greater number of 
models from the pool of possible contenders.  
                                                 
24 i.e., those facts that are constituent to other facts, but which have no facts constituent to themselves.  
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Along the elementary/composite axis, it is important, as the deductive view of 
theories encourages, to understand how changes in elementary bits propagate through the 
structure. However, a model is not an axiomatic system, so there may be (if we so allow 
it) a modularity to the various chunks or regions of the model such that some chunk may 
turn out wrong and it need not devastate the remainder of the model. If the goal is 
resemblance, then a model can still satisfy that goal at some levels of composition while 
yet failing at some elementary level (as a painting portrait will capture the likeness of the 
subject in the parallel between relations of the splotches supposed to be eyes/ears/mouth 
and the relations among the subject's actual eyes/ears/mouth, but not in the parallel 
between the individual splotches of paint and those corresponding bits of flesh on the 
subject). This same point is also relevant to the third axis of entrenchment by which we 
are advised which chunks of the model should serve to 'anchor' or test those less settled 
chunks. In evaluating models along this axis, we consider the degree of confidence we 
have in some model-part. So, e.g., in some cases, we might evaluate the elementary part 
against the anchor of the more entrenched composite. In fact, I suspect that 'Eureka!' 
breakthroughs in science  often arise when very successful and well-entrenched model-
parts are applied in clever, new ways (e.g., as Democritus and Leucippus applied the 
divisibility relation). Finally, there is obviously a connection between entrenchment and 
the intuitions behind parsimony.  I will discuss in the Kuhn section how my proposal here 
would yield consequences different than those advanced by Kuhn for the case of theory 
failure, for theoretical content carrying-over across theories, and for theory-ladenness of 
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observation. In short, Kuhn's account follows from a deductive view of theories but 
would not necessarily follow from my model-based view of theories.  
 
Inferring to Resemblance: Taming Underdetermination 
 
Now that we have some sense about theory-generation, how do we cope with the 
threat of contrastive underdetermination? Parliamentary agreement (among other reasons 
to be discussed) reduces underdetermination possibilities. But, for any given 
theory/model, there would still remain an unsettlingly large number of empirically 
equivalent alternatives. Realists, in the past, have made appeals to various forms of the 
'no miracles' (NM) argument in the face of underdetermination. The NM argument, 
generally, reasons that the spectacular empirical success of mature theories is too great to 
be a lucky coincidence, and since we deny both miracles and the presumption of 
sequential lucky coincidences, then our mature theories must be at least approximately 
true.25 The entreaty to approximate truth is made in order to reconcile the fact of the 
predecessor theories all having turned out false with the fact of their being empirically 
successful, though antirealists have rightly challenged realists to produce the details 
behind 'approximate truth' which could account for this reconciliation. And, for some 
time, the debate had been revolving over just which account of approximate truth could 
effect this reconciliation, with nothing convincing so far forthcoming. However, 
especially where theories take mathematical form, it is easier for antirealists to argue that 
empirical success is just a matter of 'curve fitting' the mathematics to the empirical data, 
                                                 
25  Dr.Creath points out that the argument as presented is a non sequitur. The argument given in terms of 
IBE is less of a non sequitur, but then depends on the guarantee of IBE. 
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that no metaphysical conclusions may be drawn from a theory's merely 'saving the 
phenomena.'26  Realists (such as Worrall (1989:114)) have responded that mature theories 
don't just fit existing empirical data, but typically (Worrall argues must by definition of 
'maturity') predict novel phenomena, and such predictions typically provide 
confirmational vindication, and so have theoretical fruitfulness.27 No inductive or 
Darwinian sort of account can derive the reason for this, for as Dawid (2009:3) points 
out, to claim (as van Fraassen and Kuhn both do) that fruitfulness is explained by fruitful 
theories being selected-for on that basis is just to beg the question.  
 
Among some realists (not Worrall) who prefer an explanationist version of the 
NM argument, the explanatory quality of a theory is an essential factor accounting for its 
success in making novel and correct predictions. The claim is attacked by van Fraassen, 
as will be discussed later. Notwithstanding, it would seem that fruitfulness gives realists 
(explanationist or not) good grounds for optimism against underdetermination. – 
However, Hoyningen-Huene (2011) has devised an exceedingly clear rendering of the 
transient underdetermination argument, which makes use of the most charitable 
representation of approximate truth and, at the same, sets-up a counterargument to the 
novel-prediction form of the NM argument. It is most helpful to trace carefully 
Hoyningen-Huene's argument, in order to appreciate fully the force of the 
underdetermination argument, both to realism and antirealism alike.  
                                                 
26   I note here that calling mathematical descriptions of phenomena 'mathematical models' adds to the 
confusion of special terminologies; I've already acknowledged my use of 'model' (M-model) is a 
reconstruction and won't jibe with common usage (where scientists consider 'mathematical models' to 
be models), but I'm rejecting here that 'mathematical models' are first-order M-models 
27 I note that the realists’ demand to explain the persistent re-occurrence of fruitful theories is not an 
argument for realism, but (in my view) an argument against the antirealist alternatives to realism and a 
challenge for which any account of science must properly account.  
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Hoyningen-Huene begins with the assumption that appropriate notions of truth and of 
approximate truth of theories have been defined and that true and approximately true 
theories exist. 
 
Let D1 be a finite set of data. 
Let T1 be the set of theories such that T1 := {T, T is relevant for and consistent 
with D1};  
We assume that T1 ≠ Ø. 
 
Hoyningen-Huene next partitions T1 into two subsets: those theories which are true or 
approximately true, and those which are radically false (not even approximately true).  
 
T1
AT := {T ∈  T1, T is true or approximately true} 
T1
RF := {T ∈  T1, T is radically false} 
with T1 = T1
AT ∪  T1RF 
 
The final preliminary detail to Hoyningen-Huene's transient underdetermination 
argument is the introduction of a measure μ which represents the size of a subset, the 
measure yielding a magnitude more general than (but similar to) that of Euclidean 
volume, in order to provide the basis for a judgment of probability supplied by differing 
relative sizes of the sets of T1
AT and T1
RF
  theories. It is assumed that there are far more 
false theories than there are approximately true theories, and realists generally do not 




Argument 1 (Transient underdetermination) 
T1 = T1
AT ∪  T1RF and T1AT ∩ T1RF = Ø 
μ(T1AT) <<  μ(T1RF). 
Therefore for any T ∈  T1, it is very probable that T ∈  T1RF.  
 
That is, for any arbitrary theory T, chances are overwhelming that it is radically false and 
not even approximately true.  
 
The NM argument can be formulated in the same terms that were used to present the 
transient underdetermination argument: 
 
 
Argument 2 (NM Argument) 
T1 = T1
AT ∪  T1RF and T1AT ∩ T1RF = Ø 
∃  T∗  ∈  T1 such that T∗   makes the novel prediction N 
For any T ∈  T1RF, it is very improbable (or even impossible) to make prediction 
N. 
 
Therefore, it is very probable (or even certain) that T∗  ∈  T1AT. I.e., contrary to 
the transient underdetermination argument just made, μ(T1AT) <<  μ(T1RF). That is, 
according to the NM argument, keeping fixed the same assumptions regarding the 
volumes of approximate true and radically false theories in T1, the fact that some 
arbitrarily chosen theory T* bears the property of making novel predictions is grounds for 
regarding that theory as likely approximately true.  
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Transient underdetermination, however, can easily deal with this version of the 
NM Argument. For any theory T* which produces novel data N, we now define a new 
data-set D2 and theory-set T2, as follows: 
 
Let  D2 = D1 ∪  N is a finite set of data. 
Let  T2 be the set of theories such that T2:= {T, T is relevant for and consistent 
with D2}. 
 
And, transient underdetermination is born anew, utilizing D2 and partitioning T2 just as 
we did D1 and T1 before: 
 
T2
AT := {T ∈  T2, T is true or approximately true} 
T2
RF := {T ∈  T2, T is radically false} 
with T2 = T2
AT ∪  T2RF. 
 
The radically false theories contained in T2
RF are (just as with T1
RF
 with respect to D1) 
relevant for and consistent with the data D2. As well, per the undisputed assumption, the 
relative sizes of the sets T2
AT and T2
RF yields:  
 
 μ(T2AT) <<  μ(T2RF) 
 
Thus, most of the theories that manage to be relevant for and consistent with the old data 
D1 and the novel data N are not even approximately true. 
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While Hoyningen-Huene's argument seems explicitly directed against realists 
(who are the ones defending the NM argument), in fact, it is indiscriminate between 
realists and antirealists. While antirealists, like van Fraassen, embrace 
underdetermination as lethal to realism, the truly fatal assumption is that antirealists are 
not equally susceptible to it. Only where language (and all the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for language) and direct perception of the world and its regularities can be 
taken for granted as 'givens' and shielded from underdetermination worries can the 
antirealist even begin to sport sanguinity at the prospect that underdetermination is his 
friend.28 However, underdetermination just as easily threatens these 'givens,' as Quine and 
others have pointed out, and I certainly am not going to give the antirealists a free pass. 
Moreover, even if Hoyningen-Huene's argument removes confidence in the approximate 
truth of T* theories making novel predictions, it remains a challenge to antirealists to 
account for the regular occurrence of such exceedingly empirically successful T* 
theories. For, it will still be the case (where T2 denotes the set of all theories that are not 
relevant for and consistent with D2):  
 
μ(T2) <<  μ(T1) << μ(T 2) 
 
That is, the probability of choosing an arbitrary T* from among the set of all possible 
theories is exceedingly tiny. So, the onus still remains on the antirealist to account for the 
sequential occurrence of fruitful theories making novel predictions (which, I repeat, 
                                                 
28 As I will elaborate in this paper, on my analysis, the general antirealist tact is to reduce the methodology 
of science to a function of language and direct-observation, but Hoyningen-Huene’s argument doesn’t 
stop short of language and direct-perception. Especially if the view is adopted of epistemic isolation 
from the world, then the antirealist will then have to make very realist sorts of arguments to establish 
confidence in judgments of language and perception.  
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cannot accounted-for by 'curve fitting'). This challenge of accounting for the improbable 
selection of fruitful theories is made even stiffer when the situation is finding ourselves at 
epistemic ground-zero.29  
 
Does Hoyningen-Huene's argument show all hope lost for the realist view of the 
aim and structure of science? Of course not. The move to an infinite collection of 
possible theories is itself made possible by a simple mathematical induction argument 
wherein theories are already presumed inexhaustible so that the only task remaining is 
just to find the right way to correspond them to the natural numbers. And, insofar as 
theories (commonly conceived) are linguistic or mathematical artifacts with limitless 
vocabularies and boundless combinations of terms and expressions, it certainly would 
follow there are an infinite collection of theories. The argument being pursued in this 
section, however, is that models, not linguistic/mathematical artifacts, are the 
fundamental and essential (but not solitary) means for inferring to the shape and character 
of the world. Are there an infinite number of possible model-parts, model-relations, 
combinations of these, and therefore, an infinite number of models? In the following 
arguments that I give in answer to this question, I assume, per the ‘parliamentary 
agreement’ mentioned above, that knowledge of the world is achievable and, to some 
degree, has been achieved. 
 
The answer is not so obvious to this question of whether we should worry about 
an infinite number of possible models, especially if we insist that possibility be 
                                                 
29 As I noted in footnote 27, this is not an argument for realism, but an argument against the antirealist 
alternative and a challenge for any account to have to meet.  
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predicated on practical constructibility. I assert that an unfeasibly constructible model is 
not an M-model. The skeptic will harp the possibility that the would-be correct model of 
some given target may be in-principle unconstructible, but that would imply the 
possibility that the world is in-principle not knowable (assuming models are the sole 
means to worldly-knowledge and the possibility exists that every correct model is 
unconstructible). I suggest that an in-principle unconstructible model is like an in-
principle unfeasibly demonstrable proof; if you cannot in-principle demonstrate it, then 
you cannot call it a ‘proof,’ and if you cannot in-principle construct it, then it is not a 
model.30 In order to permit science (or any knowledge of the world) to go forward, we 
rule-out by parliamentary agreement the threat of this possibility suggested by the global 
skeptic and accept that correct models are in-principle feasible to construct. I note, 
though, that this skeptical challenge is separate and unrelated to the underdetermination 
challenge which does not dispute that the correct model is practically available to us, but 
just that other, incorrect models, indistinguishable from the correct one, are also 
available.  
 
So, we now ask: Are there an infinite number of practically constructible models? 
If infinitely large models are not practically constructible, then to arrive at infinitely 
many models, there would have to be an infinite number of different kinds of model-
pieces out of which the infinite collection could be constructed. Are there infinitely many 
different kinds of model-pieces? The kinds would have to be qualitatively differentiable 
                                                 
30 By ‘in-principle’ I don’t mean ‘in-principle by humans,’ but ‘in-principle’ under any condition. Later, I 
address realist modesty and human limitations. On the other hand, contra skepticism, it would warrant 
holding that it can’t be the case for everything we humans believe about the world, we are wrong. 
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from one another in an infinite number of ways, but I see this could only happen either 
(a) by qualitative degrees (as the color spectrum along a real number line), or (b) by an 
infinite number of different kinds of detectors31. As for (a), it is controversial that 
qualitative degrees can, in fact, be infinite, since it implies an actual infinity. But, 
assuming such a thing to be the case, then it would have to make a difference with respect 
to a model's relation to the world. In particular, it would have to spell the difference 
between resemblance and non-resemblance by that infinitesimal degree. If resemblance is 
established as the sort of property which will not fail on account of one real-numbered 
degree, but rather, which can be equally satisfied by a comfortably generous interval, 
then (a) is not a problem. Infinitesimal degrees could determine a difference in 
mathematical models, but I set these aside for now, except to note (i) mathematical 
models aren't going to be foundational, and (ii) they are not going to be first-order models 
(bearing direct resemblance to the world).  
 
As for (b), we again can wonder whether an actual infinity of kinds of detectors is 
meaningful here. Assuming such a thing, one might think underdetermination could get a 
toe-hold. But, it would first have to be established that the availability of a boundless 
number of kinds of detectors makes for a boundless number of incompatible models.32  
 
When are two (or more) distinct models to be regarded as belonging of the same 
class of models? It is generally uncontroversial to treat all the possible states of a model 
as just being a set of static models (with a common, stable set of objects and relations) all 
                                                 
31 As I discuss in Appendix I, Note 1, the ‘raw material’ for models is derived from detectors. 
32 For additional discussion please see Appendix I, Note 2. 
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belonging to the same class, such that we would say of any of them, 'That's the same 
model but in a different state.' Relatedly, we may sometimes say of two distinct things, 
‘These are just two different aspects of the same thing’ or of two distinct models, ‘These 
each show different aspects of the same target.’  A child may need some convincing that 
ice, liquid water, and steam are all the same thing, that a caterpillar and butterfly are the 
same animal, and so forth, but once convinced, this child will grant these disparate forms 
as having identity. Similarly, a town may be regarded from economic, historical, 
aesthetic, and political points of view (each with a distinct model), yet never be confused 
as more than one and the same town. For terminological convenience, let's call all models 
in the same identity class aspects (though we should distinguish state-aspects, 
developmental-aspects, trait-aspects, etc.). These models, though distinctly different from 
one another, are not necessarily incompatible or competitive.  
 
How, then, do we decide which models are aspects and which are competitors, 
which are friends and which are foes? The answer, in rough form, has to be that only by 
virtue of an all-encompassing world-model can we determine which models are 
competitors versus aspects. Aspectual models are always about a thing x with respect to a 
(possibly empty) set of other things a, b, c (with the remainder of the universe ceteris 
paribus). For instance, modeling the economic aspect of a town involves representing 
that town with respect to the representations of production, distribution, and consumption 
of goods and services among people, whereas modeling the historic aspect of a town 
involves representing that town with respect to representations of past persons and events 
(and prior states of the town). Two competing economic models for town x would be such 
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that each model contains the same town x and the same respective items that define that 
aspect. None of these distinctions are possible, however, unless we have first in-hand a 
world-model complete enough to make sense of which things are which. Thus, 
underdetermination for anything other than the world-model must be with respect to the 
world-model.33   
 
As insolent and out-of-line as may be for me to say so, I believe van Fraassen and 
Carnap have a sense of the very same point being made here, but they err in assigning 
this role to language or conventions, which as I shall argue subsequently, must make 
appeal to the very same world-model to begin to get off the ground. van Fraassen, in 
particular, in his recent work, makes the argument that aspectual seeing is primary to 
resemblance. Since only a select subset of elements constituent of a thing (a photograph, 
say) is being employed in the resemblance relation, while the remainder is being ignored, 
and since the subset changes from context to context, it can only be context which 
enables and actualizes the resemblance.  But, this is only robbing from Peter to pay Paul, 
since the context is itself just a subset of elements in the world, which on pain of regress, 
cannot appeal to yet another context. Moreover, van Fraassen never explains how we can 
know the subset elements in the first place in order to utilize them by way of context.34 
 
For all its importance, a world-model is still just a model. But, except for that 
unified view, we couldn't make proper sense of individual models and concepts. This 
                                                 
33  Dr.Creath notes that not all competing theories get at the same aspects. Perhaps so, but I am keeping this 
discussion mostly simple, reserving a more detailed discussion for a larger work. 
34 These points will be discussed in the discussions on van Fraassen and pragmatics. 
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notion comports with the conceptual holism found in Hanson and others and is certainly 
not my original idea, except, perhaps, in the way it ties to model-abduction. Concerning 
underdetermination, the issue would now center on world-model versus world-model, 
since it follows that non-identical world-models will all be competitors with one another. 
The uppermost question we have been considering is whether there are an infinite 
number of such possible competitors. I already argued that models must be in-principle 
practically constructible (for, if not, then global skepticism wins). I also assume, for 
similar reasons, that the possibility space for models, provided by the particular detector-
set, is only practically divisible in a finite number of ways. 
 
Any realist would be foolish to suggest that we are nearing the final and true set 
of theories of everything. My view of realism only requires of the realist that he be able 
to diminish the pool of possibilities by n+1 steps at a time. If the possibility persists of 
infinitely many possible models, of a kind that bypasses the neutralizations I've so far 
suggested, then even a modest progress of n+1 would be meaningless. Or would it? 
 
One kind of progress that may be immune even to the possibility of infinitely 
many incompatible models is that of diminishing the pool not by volume but by 
squeezing the bandwidth along certain parameters. Then, it could still spell victory for the 
realist. By analogy, suppose a police sketch-artist has spoken to witnesses and has limned 
a certain general idea of the suspect's face: the nose looks more or less like x, the mouth 
is more or less like y, and so on. As more details are filled-in, we should never (in Zenoic 
fashion) arrive at the final finished sketch, but at least, we should succeed in defining an 
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interval such that there would still remain an infinite number of possibilities, though all 
those possibilities fall within a range we tolerate. This would perhaps involve ruling-out 
extremely odd possibilities by fiat on grounds that, otherwise, global skepticism wins. As 
mentioned above, the parameters along which squeezing is done are chosen by our 
highest-order models along the axes of generality and entrenchment (so, e.g., whichever 
world-model is the correct one, it will bear representations of hands, chairs, divisible 
things, the sun, frogs, and so on). This possible strategy for cornering the truth needs 
further attention, but at least, we can conclude that, to constitute a problem, 
underdetermination must disallow being squeezed by parameters and possess an infinite 
number of non-resembling yet equally workable models.  
 
A final candidate means to subduing underdetermination has already been 
broached. If the goal for realism is shrinking the pool of possible models, and if each 
subset in the class only has finitely35 many possible models, then shrinking each one of 
the finite subsets would bring the overall pool, though still infinite, one step closer to the 
determinate model. Of course, that's only a fanciful conceit for a worst-case-scenario. 
The grim reality under any scenario is that we sentient beings can only ever acquire a 
finite number of detectors, and diminishing the pool of possible models available to us, 
still leaves untouched all the models for all the detectors we shall never have. The silver 
lining, it could be argued, is that (as I've presented the case) resemblance comes in 
degrees and can be achieved along different dimensions (e.g., by granularity, by parts 
                                                 
35 I assume here that subsets are determined by a collection of detectors unique to that subset. So, assuming 
an infinite number of detectors for the whole class, each detector with only a finite number of possible 
outputs, this yields (I argue) a finite number of models for that subset. 
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matching, and so on) and can be achieved at least for some region or dimension of the 
world. The parliamentary agreement provides security in the conclusion that some 
measure of success is possible, given our means, in acquiring worldly knowledge. If, by 
such means, we can shrink the pool by some small measure, for some region or 
dimension, and progress in some way towards an improved resemblance, then a modest 
realism has triumphed.   
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CHAPTER TWO: HANSON AND KUHN 
 
 Norwood Hanson's landmark 1958 book, Patterns of Discovery, made an 
enormous impact on the realism/antirealism debate, though ultimately not in the way he 
likely intended. Hanson's account is singular in having been presented as a blistering 
realist attack on logical empiricism, yet having had the misfortune of its core arguments 
being hijacked by antirealists, most notably Thomas Kuhn who published just a few years 
later in 1962 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. I am persuaded that Hanson's style 
of philosophy, clearly influenced by Wittgenstein, obscured his realist arguments to the 
degree that even a fellow, sympathetic realist can only guess at the details. Nevertheless, 
it is instructive to study Hanson's and Kuhn's accounts side-by-side in order that the 
contrast should sharpen what perhaps Hanson intended. I stress, though, that I am not 
attempting scholarship in Kuhnian or Hansonian studies, but rather, I am making an 
attempt to locate a strong Hansonian-style argument in defense of realism and comparing 
it with a strong Kuhnian-style argument. To that end, because Kuhn's accounts are the 
more well-known and because Hanson's are more nuanced, I propose to present these in 
reverse historical order, in order to show better just how Kuhn fails to measure up to 
Hanson by illuminating the differences within the exegesis on Hanson. In the end, I hope 
to show where both accounts fall short while yet recovering their strongest points for 







Kuhn’s strategic approach to Philosophy of Science was to reposition the big 
questions from the framework of philosophy to the framework of history. Moreover, 
Kuhn makes a persuasive presentation of working science, and fashions his philosophical 
position from that context. Even his severest critics will concede at least that much 
philosophy of science pre-Kuhn had too often been ignorant or at least naïve about every 
day, in-the-trenches science as it is actually carried-out, as well as the effects of historical 
forces and conceptual shifts on the development of science.36 All his merits 
notwithstanding, Kuhn, in my view, nevertheless depends too much on several weak 
assumptions, and in so doing, gives a flawed philosophy. 
 
Kuhn’s arguments in Structure are aimed to counter a variety of philosophical 
views, but most notably those of Carnap and Popper. With respect to Carnap, Kuhn more 
recently wrote: “...if I understand Carnap's position correctly, the cognitive importance of 
language change was for him merely pragmatic. One language might permit statements 
that could not be translated into another, but anything properly classified as scientific 
knowledge could be both stated and scrutinized in either language, using the same 
method and gaining the same result . . . Language change is cognitively significant for me 
as it was not for Carnap” (Kuhn 1993:313)(via Grunberg et al 1995). However, Kuhn's 
understanding of Carnap is clearly in error, and the two, in fact, have much in common. 
Carnap's Principle of Tolerance permits a choice of framework, with a categorical 
                                                 
36 Dr.Creath correctly notes that the logical empiricists were not among the group of naïve philosophers.  
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difference between judgments made internally and those made externally to the 
framework. The latter are often nonsensical where they exceed pragmatic concerns, and 
the former are strictly governed by the rules of the framework's system. As a result, 
theoretical postulates within the framework cannot be challenged, but rather, if one does 
not like the performance of the framework, then it must be wholly rejected in favor of an 
entirely new one. Because theoretical terms get their meaning (partial-interpretation) 
from TC – theoretical postulates and C-postulates (correspondence rules) – it follows that 
a change in TC would produce a change in the meaning of the theoretical terms. C-
postulates also impart influence on observation terms, and the framework determines 
which sorts of things are to count as observations in the first place (recall the protocol 
sentence debate). So, a kind of theory-ladenness of observation is at work in Carnap's 
framework scheme. These points add up to an incommensurability among sufficiently 
different frameworks, with no (guaranteed) means of translating from one framework to 
the next. It should then come as no surprise that Carnap himself would use the language 
of 'revolution':  
 
First of all, I should make a distinction between two kinds of readjustment 
in the case of a conflict with experience, namely, between a change in the 
language, and a mere change in or addition of, a truth-value ascribed to an 
indeterminate statement (i.e, a statement whose truth-value is not fixed by 
the rules of language, say by the postulates of logic, mathematics, and 
physics). A change of the first kind constitutes a radical alteration, 
sometimes a revolution, and it occurs only at certain historically decisive 
points in the development of science. On the other hand, changes of the 
second kind occur every minute. A change in the first kind constitutes, 
strictly speaking, a transition from a language Ln to a new language Ln + 
1 (Carnap 1963b:921)(via Grunberg et al 1995) 
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Boyd (1983) points out that Kuhn relies on Carnap's law-cluster account for the meaning 
of scientific terms, and Kuhn's social conventionalism plays a role in theory-selection 
comparable to the role Carnap's linguistic conventionalism plays in framework-selection.  
 
Of course, the view that Kuhn and Carnap were birds of a feather is not without 
exception, and notable dissent from philosophers like Earman (1993) appears in the 
literature. Earman notes that degree of confirmation in theory-choice plays no role for 
Kuhn. Earman also argues that, unlike Kuhn's picture of complete commitment among 
adherents in theoretical acceptance during the normal science period, Carnap views 
theory-choice being more circumspect, with theory-abandonment an easy and available 
choice. – Another obvious difference is that, whereas logical empiricism treated the 
history, sociology, and psychology of science as essentially irrelevant to questions of 
scientific justification, Kuhn argued they are inextricably wound together. 
 
Remarks on Kuhn's Account 
 
The most controversial aspects of Kuhn’s picture of science hinge on just one 
central thesis, to which I take objection, viz. the thesis of a monolithic, globally-holistic, 
meaning-determinative linguistic/theoretical construct that acts as a manifold through 
which one’s world-view is configured and filtered. I understand this to be a mostly 
Wittgensteinian inspired thesis that views social/conventional forces as behind the 
creation and securing of the construct. Thus, if a person is brought up and inculcated (by 
social forces) in a particular system of language, the consequence is a world-view and 
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ordering of concepts and experiences which are strictly non-translatable between a 
(sufficiently) different world-view and concept-ordering. Or, to put it in a more 
simplified, Wittgensteinian way, a person using a language according to one set of 
grammars could not participate in any language-game with another person using a 
language according to a different set of grammars disjoint from the first person’s set, 
though superficially both persons’ words may look the same.  The failure to recognize 
this difference in grammars causes philosophical confusion. Kuhn asserts that scientific 
training brings about a socio-linguistic construction of a world-view that marshals a 
specification and ordering of concepts, ways of observing, and standards and means of 
justification. The theses of incommensurability and non-cumulativity ensue from this. 
However, the basic assumption, that the constructs are categorical and independent, each 
resting separately on its own piece of bedrock, is undefended by Kuhn. I see no support 
for Kuhn’s view in the works of Wittgenstein (as I read him). I suggest there are also 
independent reasons to deny Kuhn’s thesis.   
 
 Let’s first consider Hanson’s and Wittgenstein’s views on language and the basis 
for language. 
 
In contrast to Kuhn’s view, Hanson (as I read him) presents a stratified and 
modular view of conceptual-systems, with those systems peculiar to science residing at 
the top of many layers of more fundamental systems. This allows for an easy 
multilingualism among agents who then may explore and evaluate scientific conceptual-
systems ‘from the inside’ (so to speak) as well as evaluatively ‘from the outside’ (so to 
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speak) from the vantage point of other, usually more fundamental sub-systems. This 
stratified and modular conceptual-system view challenges the basic constructivist tenet 
that one scientific paradigm determines one world-view completely and exclusively, such 
that one is forbidden the option to ‘try on the goggles’ (so to speak) of various sub-
systems without departing from the global system, as well as opt to adopt no scientific 
view at all. Presumably, the bottom ‘strata’ among the layers of sub-systems form the 
basis for the language. Hanson does not discuss this much, but to the extent I have 
described it correctly, I contend Hanson’s view more correctly captures the later 
Wittgenstein’s view.37  
 
What is Wittgenstein’s view of language? I certainly concede that Wittgenstein is 
notoriously difficult to interpret. Some passages from his writings will be construed 
differently by different people, for instance: 
 
Think of chemical investigations. Lavoisier makes experiments with substances in 
his laboratory and now he concludes that this and that takes place when there is 
burning. He does not say that it might happen otherwise another time. He has got 
hold of a definite world-picture - not of course one that he invented: he learned it 
as a child. I say world-picture and not hypothesis, because it is the matter-of-
course foundation for his research and as such also goes unmentioned. 
(1969:#167) 
 
Except for the second to last sentence, about the world-picture being learned as a child, 
this passage could have been read in a very Kuhnian manner. However, the parenthetical 
remark makes all the difference. Wittgenstein is here saying that Lavoisier had his world-
picture (world-view) put together long before he ever took his first science class. By 
                                                 
37 This is not to say I agree with Hanson in all respects.  
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Wittgenstein’s lights, Lavoisier’s groundbreaking scientific achievement is a mere 
‘hypothesis,’ compared to his world-picture. Consider another passage: 
 
I learned an enormous amount and accepted it on human authority, and then I 
found some things confirmed or disconfirmed by my own experience. […] In 
general I take as true what is found in text-books, of geography for example. 
Why? I say: All these facts have been confirmed a hundred times over. But how 
do I know that? What is my evidence for it? I have a world-picture. Is it true or 
false? Above all it is the substratum of all my enquiring and asserting. The 
propositions describing it are not all equally subject to testing. (1969:#161-2) 
 
Again, with selective inattention, one could find a Kuhnian sort of remark here. Yet, the 
passage is not saying that textbooks form our world-picture, but rather that the world-
picture I already have in place, before I read a single textbook, is such that I will take as 
true what I find there. The suggestion is that a world-view is primary to and separable 
from scientific training.  
 
In overview, I understand Wittgenstein as proposing (a) an individual language-
game is governed by an internal grammar (which is not a set of explicit rules, but which 
is established on the fixedness of the usage of certain linguistic elements relative to other 
elements). (b) Language-games comprise modules in the language and form clusters with 
respect to one another, making for ‘family relationships.’ Certain regions of each cluster 
will share common, overlapping grammatical elements. (c) Some set of grammatical 
elements, also overlapping, nevertheless constitutes a logical axis for the entire language. 
The axis is rooted in a ‘form of life,’ which I take to be at least biological, but perhaps, 
also including some deep social/historical factors. As he writes in On Certainty, for 
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instance: “I would like to regard this certainty, not as something akin to hastiness or 
superficiality, but as a form of life. That means I want to conceive it as something that 
lies beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were, as something animal” (1969:#358-
359). This ‘root’ is determinative of certain basic cognitive and behavioral commonalities 
among humans which we cannot and do not deviate from, so these become fixed in 
language-use as well. Hence, as Wittgenstein famously said (1953:223), even if a lion 
could be made to talk, we would not understand him. I agree to an extent with those who 
read ‘form of life’ to include the deepest social/historical factors, such that, e.g., a feral 
child might fail to master a language for this reason, even though she is human. I would 
disagree that world-view is substantially affected by more recent or local differences 
among social groups. Because of the ‘atomism’ of Wittgenstein’s view. because of the 
rootedness in biological and deep socio-historical commonalities, and because holism is 
only local and not global, we may conclude that Wittgenstein’s view of language tolerates 
a fair degree of divergence between any two systems without this resulting in an 
incongruity, let alone an incommensurability. Differences in theories are only 
neighborhood differences, not system-wide.  
 
In my reading of Wittgenstein, the seeing/seeing-as distinction, relevant to 
observation, is not directly pertinent to a world-view, but rather comes under the local 
governance of language-games. Suppose two people, A and B, each have a set of 
language-games with which they are familiar and the intersection of the two sets is rather 
large, but smaller than either original set. A is an architect with no knowledge of real 
estate, whereas B is a real estate agent with no knowledge of architecture. They each pass 
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the same house and see it as something different38, something we can say of them 
because we can talk about the two ways of seeing (assuming you, the reader, and I are 
each familiar with both real estate and architecture). This doesn’t mean that the architect 
and real estate agent ‘inhabit different worlds,' but only that they differ in the particular 
language-game being played. Each is taking different aspects of the house to be salient 
according to grammatical directives of the particular language-game that make relevant 
one feature but not another. That this is the case does not preclude one from being both a 
real estate agent and an architect and adopting both language-games simultaneously. A 
difference in world-views is vastly deeper than just a difference in sets of language-
games. Undoubtedly, two individuals with different world-views see the world 
differently, but a difference in seeing does not necessitate a difference in world-views.  
 
I cannot defend, in the space of this paper, my interpretation of Hanson’s view of 
language or of Wittgenstein’s account of language, world-view, or ‘form of life,’ nor will 
anything be settled regarding Kuhn’s account merely by presenting Wittgenstein’s view, 
even if there is no quarrel over my interpretation. Assuming I am right in my 
interpretations, then Kuhn’s view is clearly at odds. Notwithstanding, I would like to 
place this view, regardless of authorship, as the alternative to Kuhn’s view. I will add my 
own elaboration on this alternative view before returning to Kuhn. 
 
Among the reasons to translate from one language into another, two are of special 
interest. One reason is to render an equivalent meaning of some concept in the one 
                                                 
38 Which means, according to Wittgenstein’s account, they also each have other ways of seeing it, too. 
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language into the concept(s) of other language. Another reason is to be able to say, from 
either language, that the other is speaking generally about such and such. Let’s call this 
second way the ‘rough translation.’ For instance, 'tuna' in English and 'maguro' in 
Japanese have dissimilar respective webs of associations and relations to other terms in 
each one's own language. Some concepts associated with 'maguro' in Japanese have no 
proper English counterpart. In this way, there is no strict translation into English of 
'maguro' which carries the identical associations and relations. Even if one knows English 
and Japanese, one cannot know how to give a strict translation, for such is not possible. 
Could the bilingual person, however, give the rough translation, saying in English: "The 
Japanese word 'maguro' generally means 'tuna,' but Japanese people associate other ideas 
with 'maguro' that we do not in English"? I suggest an affirmative answer to this question. 
At the end of this section, I will discuss the Use-Meaning thesis and the Thought Theorist 
counterpoint which would deliver a deeper justification for my stance, but for now, let’s 
just consider that languages must be learned. On the Davidsonian model, for instance, 
verbal behaviors are executed under particular circumstances, and the language learner 
must ascertain how those behaviors and circumstances relate to the speaker’s intentions, 
where this understanding amounts to something like a charitable ascription of a T-
sentence. Kuhn adopts a conventionalist view of language, so he should not find the 
Davidsonian idea terribly objectionable. This learner’s understanding certainly cannot 
require a language if he is acquiring his first language. My point, then, is that language 
learning requires an extra-linguistic understanding of verbal behaviors, speaker 
intentions, and circumstances, otherwise no language would ever be learned. I suggest 
that this understanding at least would enable something of a neutral view, though it is 
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another question whether or how this understanding could be expressed. I will return to 
this line of thought momentarily. Now, let’s return to Kuhn’s view. 
 
Kuhn’s view of language, in contrast to the alternative view, subscribes to a 
global-holism, a non-modular architecture, and a very different conception of world-view 
that renders it more readily affected by proximate social-historical differences.  Insofar as 
language constitutes a construction that determines (or even just profoundly influences) 
observation and standards of justification, then incommensurability indeed follows where 
two languages are sufficiently different. World-view for Kuhn, then, is not in terms of an 
anchoring foundation but in terms of theory-determined observation. Galileo sees a 
different pendulum than Aristotle. Because the seeing is entirely determined by a 
globally-holistic conceptual-system and that system manages everything we experience, 
it makes for a world-view. On Kuhn’s account, the world-view is symptomatic of the 
language, not underwriting it. If anything anchors a language, it is convention.  
 
On the issue of translation, Kuhn regarded any manner of translation impossible. 
Whereas Quine argued, in the indeterminacy of translation thesis, that translation is not 
only possible, but supernumerary, such that we can’t decide which translation is the 
correct one, Kuhn argued we can’t even succeed in the first attempt.39 Kuhn (1982) 
criticized Quine’s indeterminacy of translation thesis as being too tepid in arguing for 
mere uncertainty. Kuhn distinguished sharply reference from translation as well as 
distinguished acquiring a language from translating a language, arguing that, if the 
                                                 
39 Thanks to Dr.Creath for clarifying this. 
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globally-holistic conceptual-systems are distinctly different between group A and group 
B, then even where a member of B also acquired the language of A and so knew the 
references of terms in A’s language, translation between A and B is still impossible. This 
conclusion describes Kuhn’s position of semantic incommensurability. The meaning-
holism thesis holds that, e.g., because the term ‘mass’ in Newton’s theory versus 
Einstein’s theory is used in different ways and because each conceptual system is 
holistically interconnected, it follows that the different systems are sui generis, even if 
every other term besides ‘mass’ were to be used identically. If this is the case, there can 
be no theory-neutral system between any two theoretical systems, for that third system 
will just constitute another, new sui generis system.  
 
Let’s list some problems with Kuhn’s view. (a) First, it is at odds with the 
alternative view, which I elaborated above from my reading of Hanson and Wittgenstein. 
Kuhn has not defended, but only assumes, the global-holism view. Unless he gives reason 
to think so, we are not compelled to accept his further conclusions based on the 
assumption. Is there a reason to prefer the alternative view over the global-holism one? I 
suggest some in the subsequent items. (b) It was noted above that learning a first 
language, on the Use-Meaning view that Kuhn apparently holds, requires understanding, 
in advance of knowing the language, which behaviors are verbal behaviors, types of 
circumstances and contexts relevant to those behaviors, and even speaker intentions. If 
we must understand these in order to learn a first language, and if all languages are 
similar insofar as they use terms with respect to circumstance and intention, then this 
same understanding would provide the language-neutral basis to compare languages. If 
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this understanding is in terms of M-models, then it would preclude the Kuhnian objection 
that the understanding can’t be expressed in some other language. However, without such 
a meta-linguistic basis, no language can be learned. (c) This also suggests that observing 
the world cannot be fully determined by the language, otherwise neither a first nor a 
second language could be learned. For the second language, how could we comprehend 
some other way of using a term in a context, if the first language already determines that 
we see the use as that first language dictates? In other words, insofar as the two languages 
coincide, the second language will be understood as matching the first. Insofar as the first 
and second language diverge, the first language will dictate a malapropism. So, this 
would appear to preclude learning a second language, implying there could be no theory-
shifting. (d) On the other hand, if observation is fully determined by the language, then, 
as Boyd (1983) and others have pointed out, it follows that anomalies should never occur. 
(e) It is also implied from (c) that there could be no such thing as theoretical innovation. 
Any violation of the grammar or logic of one’s language is intolerable and 
incomprehensible. Modification is undifferentiable from a violation. (f) What are the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for semantic incommensurability? If even the smallest 
divergence between any two systems makes (like a ‘butterfly effect’) for holistic 
difference and if holistic difference makes for incommensurability, then, unless any two 
language users is executing language use identically, everyone will be speaking a 
different language incommensurable to the next. If no one is speaking the same language, 
then there can be no conventions to constitute a language in the first place (on the Use-
Meaning thesis). How could one tell if one is speaking the same language as the next 
person if no meta-linguistic view is possible?  (g) Finally, semantic incommensurability, 
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if taken seriously, does not account for exclusivity or competition between two theories. 
If two distinct theories are so estranged from one another that one could not regard both 
simultaneously or compare them (as a rough translation would allow us to say: “T1 is 
giving a different account of mass than T2”), then how can they be in competition? 
Sewing and cooking applesauce are wholly different and, so, not in competition. As I 
suggested in Chapter One, for two theories (models) to be in competition, they must be 
understood (meta-theoretically) to be talking about the same thing but proposing different 
accounts for that thing. Yet, such a meta-theoretic understanding is precisely what is ruled 
out under Kuhn’s view. The idea of the ‘rough translation’ discussed above is what I have 
in mind for determining the points of contention between two languages. If the ‘rough 
translation’ or some other basis for establishing competition cannot be fixed, then why 
should one theory exclude the other? Why have a scientific revolution? 
 
Under the alternative view, second-language acquisition is explicable, since any 
two languages can still have a common basis (in ‘form of life’). Because the alternative 
view has identity conditions that tolerate divergence (of some modules, not the whole 
system), it therefore makes innovation is possible, and the innovation does not entail a 
failure of communication. As well, anomalies and theoretical competition are easily 
explicable, for one can evaluate a module’s performance, or difference from another 
module, from the vantage point of other, more fundamental modules. In just this way, a 
‘rough translation’ is possible, either from the M-models or from the common subsets of 
modules between any two languages. At the same time, strict translations will still be 
impossible, as well they should be.   
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 In this short section, I have given nothing approaching a rebuttal to Kuhn’s view. I 
hope I have at least shed some doubt that Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis rests on solid 
grounds. The vulnerability in his view, I have suggested, is in misapprehending the 
correct source of language and the nature of language. While the alternative view does 
not necessarily commit one to realism, at least there’s a path from the alternative view to 
realism, whereas from the Kuhnian view, there is none. To begin to establish realism from 
the alternative view, the emphasis should also shift to explaining first-language 
acquisition (in terms of M-models), as well as to an account of progress towards truth, 
not by way of cumulativity, but by way of shrinking the pool of possible contender 
theories. As a final note, I observe that realism is not incompatible with the constructivist 
view that agents are encapsulated from the world by a construction which denies direct 
access. In fact, the orthodox view in cognitive science is both that our experience and 
conception of the world is entirely a construction (in terms of mental representations) and 
that this construction is (mostly) correct. The only difference between an antirealist 
constructivist and a realist constructivist is that the latter holds that we have good reasons 







 Hanson's arguments in Patterns of Discovery (1958) are like the fibers in a braid 
and, stylistically if not in deeper ways, obviously influenced by Wittgenstein's style of 
philosophy. Unfortunately, this style lends itself to a wide range of interpretations, and it 
is most unfortunate that antirealists, such as Kuhn and van Fraassen, managed such an 
egregious (in my opinion) misinterpretation of Hanson's realist philosophy of science. I 
do not claim to have the uniquely correct interpretation that Hanson intended for his own 
work, but I offer my interpretation and analysis of Hanson's account in Patterns of 
Discovery that aims to make a strong case for his sort of realist position. 
 
 I propose first to explore three major points in Hanson's book, then to try putting 
them together into a coherent whole, and finally to evaluate the result.  
 
The Theory-Ladenness Thesis 
 
 It is in his first chapter, on observation, where Hanson first uses the phrase 
'theory-ladenness.' It occurs in the context a motivating question by which he commences 
the book: 'Do Kepler and Tycho see the same thing in the east at dawn?' (5). The question 
is asked to impress upon us the distinction between a purely-optical, sense-data inspired 
notion of 'seeing' versus a conceptually-rich, systemic, patterned notion of 'seeing.'  
Hanson points out that little can be gleaned from the strictly optical kind of seeing, and 
that, but for a language and a conceptual system with which to pattern that seeing, our 
optical experience would be little more than a 'buzzing confusion' a 'kaleidoscopy' and of 
little relevance. Sense-data proponents would respond that we interpret the purely optical 
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elements of our seeing and that this is how we arrive at the more conceptually rich 
experience. However, Hanson points out two flaws in this picture: (i) we are aware of no 
procedure or activity of interpreting when we, for example, see that this thing is a table; 
there's no 'squeezing into a box' process that occurs. (ii) Secondly, this picture implies 
that we can directly refer to the sense-data, but this also is not something we can really 
do.  
 
 Hanson concludes that 'observation is theory-laden.' Hanson does not here 
explicitly define what is to count as a ‘theory,’ but from his examples (which include both 
scientific and non-scientific kinds of observation), it is safe to interpret him as meaning 
something like the conceptual-subsystem modules of language that I described above for 
the alternative view to Kuhn. Says Hanson, our observation of X is shaped by our 
knowledge of X. The conceptually-rich notion of seeing, Hanson calls 'seeing that,' and 
attempts to show by examples that 'seeing that' bridges the gap between pictures (purely 
optical) and knowledge (fundamentally linguistic). Pictures cannot assert truth or falsity, 
cannot characterize, and cannot include non-optical (e.g., auditory) aspects in its 
representation. A picture's capacity to represent owes to its possessing features in 
common with the subject represented. All representing elements of a picture work in the 
same way.40 But, language is different. Hanson disagrees with those who, like (the early) 
Wittgenstein, held that language represents in the way pictures do. Concepts in language 
do not all work the same way, do not represent by similarity of form, and because of this 
(and not despite this), language has the power to talk about the world, to merge or purge 
                                                 
40 Hanson’s use of ‘representation’ should be understood in the narrow sense of an aspectual reproduction, 
not in a broader sense to include things like maps which related to the target in more complex ways.  
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different sensory concepts, to make category-mistake errors, to assert truth and falsity, 
and so on. In short, the utility and versatility of language is in part due to its being free of 
representational capacities. Language and the picture-like optical experience are two very 
different kinds of thing, but 'seeing that' (observation) closes the gap and ‘threads’ 
knowledge into seeing. Our observing or 'seeing that' something is an X entails all of X's 
attendant possibilities and relations. I understand Hanson to be asserting that ‘seeing that’ 
involves the participation of sensory elements into the language, just the way a word 
(thought of as a set of phonemes) gains meaning when it joins a pattern of linguistic 
usage (on the Use-Meaning notion of meaning).  
 
 It is tempting to read Hanson as promoting the more forceful view that 
observation is being dictated by a monolithic non-modular conceptual system, but this 
interpretation does not jibe with the rest of the book. This erroneous interpretation is 
fueled by Kantian instincts that import into Hanson's theory-ladenness thesis the claim 
that the ‘objects of the senses’ must conform to our cognition. However, as Hanson 
argues in his second chapter (and elsewhere), there are many conceptual systems, and we 
may willfully move from one to the next, though force of habit or convenience may 
discourage migration. Hanson asks us to consider some alternate ways of expressing 
mundane facts, ways that will not be familiar to us. Instead of the adjectival idioms "The 
sun is round" or "The sun is yellow," Hanson has us try on for size the verbal idiom 
forms: "The sun yellows" (as in radiates color) and "The sun rounds" (as in incessantly 
pulls itself together into a sphere). The shift in expression, says Hanson, carries with it a 
shift in the ‘logic,’ which shapes our sense of the fact, changing it from one about a 
61 
passive property to one about an active property. The exercise of putting down one 
conceptual-subsystem and picking up another to 'try on' indicates that Hanson is 
promoting conceptual multilingualism that does not entail a full departure from the global 
system and that does not assert a single monopolistic conceptual system that precludes 
‘external’ (to the subsystem) comparisons and contrasts, while yet remaining inside the 
total system. Notice that, in Hanson's example, (i) the mediation of observation by 
conceptual systems begins at a very basic level, at the point of ordinary language and 
folk-theories, and (ii) Hanson does not claim the impossibility of there being a purely 
optical, sensory registration on our minds, apart from the conceptual system's patterning. 
About point (ii), I mean to emphasize that Hanson is not claiming the conceptual-system 
is prior to and the gate-keeper of any sort of purely sensory experience, but rather, he 
leaves open the possibility that the conceptual-system must work in concert with the 
purely sensory experience. By this, I mean that the purely optical has a status independent 
of the conceptual system and so can act as a kind of check on that system, insofar as the 
system may predict something of the purely optical and the purely optical may genuinely 
falsify the prediction. I understand Kuhn’s view to preclude the possibility that the purely 
optical could falsify a theory.  
 
 Kuhn would certainly not agree with the availability of a multiplicity of 
conceptual-subsystems (being that he is a global-holist), that we can and do practice a 
conceptual multilingualism (among the sub-systems), or that the control a scientific 
theory exerts over us is marginal and usurpable by the mundane-level conceptual systems 
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we must developmentally master first. If these are the claims Hanson is making in the 
text, then Hanson is, so far, no ally of Kuhn.  
 
Patterns, Facts, and Theory-Breaking 
 
 Hanson poses an important question: "What is an in-principle inexpressible fact?" 
This question leads to one of several case-studies (two historical and one imagined) of 
scientists who each push a scientific theory to its breaking point for the reason, one would 
say in retrospect, that the theory was incapable of expressing a fact of interest. The 
antirealist might see in these examples a different lesson: All theories possess inbuilt 
limitations and incapacities which (i) indicate that no theory could tell the whole truth, 
and (ii) determine an inherent eventual obsolescence of any theory. However, Hanson's 
case-studies tell a far more optimistic story, one that underscores progress, rather than the 
opposite.  
 
 The case study of Galileo is intended to elucidate (i) the difficulty of superseding 
a conceptual system that both enables and hinders explanation, and (ii) the degree to 
which a conceptual system spells-out and coheres with the facts. Galileo, says Hanson, 
sought not merely a descriptive and predictive formula for the data, but much more, viz. 
an explanation of the data, intelligently systematized, reasoning back to more 
fundamental principles. He did not seek a cause; that was Descartes' program. Galileo 
first tried to build a rigorous physics on the Aristotelian notion of impetus, but failed. 
Then, he tentatively substituted for 'internal motive power' the idea of 'repeated external 
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shocks,' which was his “march out of the wildernesses of contradiction” that had beset his 
predecessors who were always seeking after “a constant cause… to produce a variable 
effect” (41). “By allowing for an increase in acceleration while a body was under the 
effect of a constant cause, the impetus theorists were admitting creation ex nihilo” (41). 
In Padua, Galileo developed the notion of 'moment' (the product of weight and velocity) 
which was a turning point in his thought. Motion could be regarded as brute, and no 
longer a “perplexing explicandum” (42). 
 
 By this and adopting a geometrical representation of motion, Galileo was able to 
ignore impetus and its causal/time orientation in favor of a spatial orientation. It is ironic 
that the new logic would free him of one thing but trap him from another.  
 
 In a geometric representation, time had no prominence. In Galileo's earlier 
geometric proofs, velocity is the sum of instantaneous velocities acquired at each point 
along a trajectory, representable by triangles as a linear function (43). But, velocity is also 
the sum of instantaneous velocities acquired at each moment in time, which cannot be 
plotted this way and which only allows for a uniform increase in time (43). There was no 
'logical space' for a time parameter (43). Eventually, after enormous intellectual struggle, 
in 1604, Galileo made the necessary modifications, but representing time geometrically 
was unwieldy. As Hanson puts it, “thinking thoughts in a conceptual system not designed 
to express them [required of Galileo] unprecedented physical insights” (46). Says 
Hanson: “The task of the few has been to find means of saying what is for others 
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unsayable” (46). Despite not having calculus, Galileo still succeeded in capturing the 
unifying idea of constant acceleration.  
 
 The case-study exhibits facts unwelcome to a Kuhnian account of theory-change. 
Galileo's story is not one of a communally intolerable anomaly that impels the 
community to dispose of the old theory in favor of a new one. Galileo's story is that of a 
lone genius, struggling with and against the conceptual system and logic available to him, 
locating its limitations, and taking rational steps to repair. It's a story of conceptual and 
logical progress, finding a means to rationally attune the available logic with other 
theory-independent elements: the data, ‘physical ideas,’ and so on. To put this another 
way, Kuhn's scientists work to find a pragmatic limitation in the theory and then move to 
trash it. Hanson's scientist works to understand why there exists a limitation in the system 
and then moves to repair it.  
 
 Theories are explanatory systems, meaning that theories provide very general 
systems of patterning from which facts and observations follow 'as a matter of course.' 
Facts and observations have a good degree of independence from the scientific theory, 
which is precisely the reason Galileo found frustration in the failed versions of his 
theories. As noted above, observation is largely influenced by mundane-level conceptual 
systems, though, owing to the co-existence of many conceptual systems, influence may 
be exerted from many directions at once (including the scientific theory). The monolithic 
conceptual system described in Kuhn's account has been long criticized as preempting 
and not guaranteeing the discovery of anomalies. Hanson's account, as I understand it, 
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provides a more plausible picture for the appearance of anomalies where theory-
ladenness is in effect.  
 
 Nevertheless, the antirealist can challenge Hanson's picture of progress. Just 
because a pattern is found by which the facts follow 'as a matter of course,' it does not 
follow that we have convergence to the truth. Indeed, Hanson’s forceful rejection of the 
preservationist ‘correspondence principle’ (as advocated by Weyl) can be read as an 
embrace of the history of science viewed as a series of solid rejections of old theories and 
acceptances of entirely new theories logically incompatible with the old ones. If truth 
were being approximated, then one would think Hanson would have adopted the 
preservationist stance on theory change, but he spends the final section of his book 
making a full-throated repudiation of such a view. Yet, as I shall discuss next, Hanson is 
equally insistent that theories that best explain the facts provide good grounds for 
regarding those theories true. This is quite a puzzle in light of the rejection as false of 
explanatorily successful theories in history.  
 
Hansonian Theories and Hansonian Abduction 
 
 To unravel the puzzle requires first paying close attention to Hanson's idea of the 
structure of scientific theories. At bottom, he rejects the deductive view in favor of a 
collaborative view of theories embedded in a wider system of modules. The deductive 
view stems from a misapprehension (by philosophers) of the nature of causal relations. 
Philosophers, Hanson says, focused on causal chains as representative of causality in 
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general, but that misrepresents the more integrated and decentralized understanding 
scientists actually have of causal relations. Scientists rarely use the word 'cause' and even 
less 'causal chain' in the lab or in journals. Instead, they treat causality “less like the links 
of a chain and more like the legs of a table” (52). Causal chain examples are loaded with 
implicit assumptions and theoretical presuppositions, without which they would be 
unintelligible. For instance, in the example of one billiard ball bumping to the next which 
bumps into the third, contiguity, propinquity and asymmetry are insufficient to a 
complete causal account. Much more is needed. The geometrical properties of balls, the 
material properties of the balls and their surfaces, the dynamics of elastic bodies, and so 
on, must all be included into an organic understanding and must be in place before we 
form the expectations we have of billiard ball behavior. Hanson says: "We have... an 
explanation of X only when we can set it into an interlocking pattern of concepts about 
other things Y and Z” (54). So, causality for X only becomes intelligible after we see X’s 
place in relation to other things, i.e. its conceptual role in the greater system. This implies 
that “a completely novel explanation is a logical impossibility” (54), which is not to rule-
out conceptual innovation but only to recognize limits on innovation. For Kuhn, any 
novelty in explanation (that exceed the strict bounds of the theory) is a logical 
impossibility. 
 
 Hanson charges that the hypothetico-deductive (HD) and enumerative-induction 
(EI) accounts of theorizing are entirely unfit to account for what scientists do. The EI 
view is simply false; scientists do not derive theories from instances. And, continues 
Hanson, HD does not tell us how theories are arrived at, but is only relevant to 
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completely finished theories. Hanson insists that explanation is the actual goal for all 
theories and that this can't be done by building-up from isolated facts. Explicans cannot 
be derived from explicanda by summarizing over particulars, as he puts it, the way an 
actuary squeezes functional relationships from columns of data. For instance, that spectra 
are produced when sunlight strikes a beveled mirror is not explained by pointing out that 
all such mirrors in such circumstances do this. Explanations are not produced by 
searching for deductive systems out of which the data appear as consequences.  
 
Hanson's positive account of explanation (abduction) is forthright, but delivered with 
only implicit supporting argument. According to Hanson, the heart of explanation can be 
found in the Peircean account of retroduction (abduction), which has us begin with data, 
search for hypotheses, study the facts, and devise theories to pattern the data. The only 
justification for retroductive inference, says Hanson, is an appeal to indispensability: If 
we are ever to understand anything at all, it must be in this way. Peirce described 
retroduction as “perception of the world of ideas” (86). Hanson reads this to mean that 
abductive inference and perceptual judgment are “opposite sides of the same 
epistemological coin” (86). In other words, just as perceptual elements are utilized in 
conceptual-systems on the simpler level of observation, they also play a role in forming 
abductive judgments. However, as I understand Hanson, unlike the case of observation 
where perceptual elements play a more passive role with respect to the conceptual system 
which adopts them, I understand ‘perceptual judgments’ at the level of abduction to be 
somewhat authoritative. I think this is at least part of what Hanson indicates in recounting 
the role of ‘physical insights’ in the Galileo case study. The general form of abductive 
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inference is as follows: (1) Surprising, puzzling phenomena P is presented. (2) If 
hypothesis H is true, then P follows as a matter of course. (3) Thus, we have grounds for 
holding H true. Hanson emphasizes that we cannot retroductively infer H unless its 
content is already present in the premise (2). Perceiving the pattern in the phenomena is 
essential for its being explicable it ‘as a matter of course.’ The hypothesis’ providing 
intelligibility to the data constitutes a 'conceptual gestalt' that now patterns the 
phenomena. Hypotheses are not pieced together from the phenomena, but rather what 
make it possible for us to observe the phenomena as being of a certain sort and as related 
to other phenomena.41 
 
 Hanson asks: "What is it to supply a theory? It is to offer an intelligible, 
systematic, conceptual pattern for the observed data. The value of this pattern lies in its 
capacity to unite phenomena which, without the theory, are either surprising, anomalous, 
or wholly unnoticed" (121) Why should we accept a theory? "You should accept it 
because if you do a comprehensive and systematic explanation of these diverse and 
apparently incompatible microphysical phenomena will follow as a matter of course. 
What could be a better reason?" (109). That question crystalizes his basic indispensability 
argument for realism. At the point where our explanations no longer lead to unsound 
inferences, intelligibility demands that we regard the entities/relations invoked by our 
theories as no doubt real. Hanson says these entities, like elementary particles, are not 
just logical fictions or mathematically divined hypotheses spirited from nowhere to serve 
                                                 
41 Dr.Creath points out this is a ‘fully Kantian point.’ I think, though, Hanson would deviate from Kant in 
Hanson’s conceiving us as having much more individual control over the conceptual system that 
fashions perceptual judgments.  
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as summary descriptions for large-scale observations or as deductive scaffolding. He says 
(somewhat cryptically) that we must learn that such knowledge derives from means more 
complex than philosophical accounts would suggest. I take him to be intimating that the 
relationships between a person, the conceptual systems available to him, other people and 
forces in the world involved in shaping that system, and the actual targets of investigation 
altogether make for an extremely complex collection which ordinary epistemological 
accounts don’t even begin to address. Nevertheless, he is vigorously affirming that 
knowledge is achievable. 
 
 Assuming for the moment that retroduction is a legitimate category of inference, 
then there is nothing wrong with holding to its ampliative conclusions, even if such 
conclusions turn out wrong. Just as, in the case of induction, it is right to hold to an 
expectation of approximately 50% of flips of a fair coin showing heads over the long run, 
even if it should turn out 99% of flips for that fair coin happen to show tails. In this one 
regard, I would say Kuhn and Hanson might be on the same page, since Kuhn regards it 
the proper attitude for a scientist in the 'normal science' mode to treat the claims of 
science as beyond reproach, even though the history of science should prompt pessimism.  
 
 I think it is important to emphasize, in judging Hanson's account, that the 
composition and configuration of a conceptual-system (whether a language-game, or a 
folk-theory, or a scientific hypothesis, or a scientific theory) is largely outside of our 
individual control. One lesson from the case-studies may be that only the rarest of 
humans in the rarest of times and with the greatest efforts could exert some small 
70 
individual influence over a conceptual system. Hanson does not say so directly, but one 
might be led by the text to think that the relative independence of conceptual-subsystems 
and their roles in retroductive inference suggest some possibilities in the direction of 
truth-regulation: (a) the world exerting an impelling external force on conceptual-system 
formation (as Boyd (1983) suggests in appeal to the Putnam/Kripke causal theory of 
reference); (b) an economy of minds (and sensory organs and interactions) collectively 
cobbling together conceptual-systems and giving them more/less currency; (c) some 
combination of the economy of minds and the world itself imparting degrees of 
entrenchment to a conceptual-system. In general, these possibilities suggest that 
conceptual systems are not our personal creations, are not within our control, are not 
obedient to our wills, but instead, conceptual systems are fashioned by complex 
interactions between social forces and worldly forces in such a way that, as Boyd puts it, 
for some type term t and some real entity e, “what is said of t, generally speaking and 
over time, is reliably regulated by the real features of e” (1983:209). Thus, despite our 
basic epistemic isolation from the world, conceptual systems are available intermediaries 
causally regulated to bring us closer to truth. As attractive of an idea this is, it amounts to 
little more than a hypothesis and the skeptic can demand non-circular justification for it. 
So, none of these possibilities would necessitate that a successful conceptual-system is 
more likely true, but in these sorts of ideas of truth-regulation is the beginning of a weak 
argument. At the very least, the emphasis on conceptual-system independence bolsters the 
indispensability argument, which is really the only one Hanson directly gives. 
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 In the last two chapters (1958), Hanson makes the clearest statements of the 
rational demand that we accede to the reality of the entities described by our most 
successful theories. He dwells at length on the breathtaking precision of our current 
conceptual-systems in science and the fantastic intricacy of complex usages of their 
elements which all must hold together in the most intimate way. He asserts that this 
symphony of exceedingly precisely calibrated coordination must be just so. Otherwise, 
even the smallest alterations would result in dramatic shifts or chaos. If some group of 
scientists made even a miniscule change to the rankings of usages, it would ultimately 
lead to a dramatic divergence in problem selection, research programs, and ‘frontier’ 
science (119).  
 
 It is safe, I think, to conclude that Hanson's central argument for realism boils 
down to indispensability and inevitability. He attempts to make the case that there just is 
no alternative to accepting as true our most successful theories. We cannot, as antirealists 
counsel, hold our theories at arm's length and pretend to adopt agnostic or skeptical 
attitudes towards these, for scientific theories are not severable from the rest of our 
conceptual systems; they are not in our control to change or ignore. By what other 
conceptual-system could the antirealist think his thoughts? There are no alternatives; 
therefore, the antirealist is either confused or pernicious. – This points to an inconsistency 
in Kuhn's account, which argues along similar lines for indispensability of the 
conceptual-system to the working scientist, but yet somehow makes an exception for the 
historian of science who can occupy an point of view outside the bubble in order to draw 
antirealist conclusions. If anything, Hanson is consistent whereas Kuhn is not. 
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Concluding Thoughts on Hanson 
 
 I would nevertheless agree with antirealists who find Hanson's stated arguments 
for realism ultimately weak, while granting that sub-theses along the way (e.g., the 
theory-ladenness of observation) are powerful and persuasive. If we are at the point of 
self-consciousness of indispensability and can make sense of the thought that we are 
compelled to pronounce a theory 'true' and/or treat as 'real' the entities mentioned in those 
theories, then it hollows to emptiness the substance of the pronouncement of 'truth' or 
treatment as 'real.' It would make such gestures as meaningless as a gunpoint 'confession.'  
Hanson has not, in the end, provided us with adequate justification for his assertion that 
we must regard successful theories as true. He has not provided enough detail in his 
account to, e.g., determine the degree of theoretical success sufficient to compel belief.42 
I disagree with some of Hanson's points, such as that linguistic-systems are the necessary 
and only means by which adequately to pattern experience, that certain areas of science 
are in-principle unpicturable (if this is taken to mean: in-principle not able to be 
modeled), that predecessor theories in science are never embeddable and always logically 
discontinuous with successor theories. More importantly, I do not accept his retroduction 
form of abduction, principally because I do not see what requires or motivates us to 
accept its conclusions.  
 
                                                 
42 Thanks to Dr.Creath for making this point. 
73 
 However, I have taken great inspiration from Hanson's work, and his other central 
theses I embrace. Pure sensory data would be useless to us without an entire system by 
which to make sense of that data, as I also tried to argue in Chapter One. I agree with 
Hanson that we cannot separate our most rarefied scientific theories from our most 
mundane ideas about the world, for (as I argued in Chapter One) the mundane ideas 
anchor the theoretical ones, as well as provide the practical pathways for testing and 
confirmation. I agree that scientific theories must be explanatory (at least in the model-
based sense I have argued), and we at least should consider seriously theories based on 
their ability to pattern the data (which is how I understand M-models to perform with 
respect to the data). – I also would agree that the realist's best hope of achieving 
dominance over antirealist lies with some kind of indispensability argument, but the one 
Hanson chose is not foundational enough to refute the antirealist.  
 
The Use-Meaning Thesis, the Thought Theorist View, and Realism 
 
 I find it interesting that both Hanson and Kuhn, whom I view as intellectual rivals, 
each make appeal to the Use-Meaning thesis,  no doubt each being under the sway of 
Wittgenstein and the Oxonian school of ordinary language philosophy. While Hanson 
found a way to bend this view into the service of realism, the Use-Meaning thesis 
generally is only favored by antirealists. I agree that the Use-Meaning thesis is pernicious 
to realists, where it is construed as positing that language fundamentally constitutes 
meaning and explanatorily precedes thought. On my view, the realist must establish that 
thought has priority to language, in order to preclude the antirealist maneuvers that 
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deflate realist claims about the world (re-casting them instead as some manner of flatus 
vocis). So, with an aim to addressing Kuhn’s antirealism and to anticipating van 
Fraassen’s antirealism, I think it important to undertake a review and critique of the Use-
Meaning thesis at this point in the paper.  
 
The Use-Meaning thesis is a view that held great sway by the middle of the 
twentieth century. Beginning with Grice’s carefully distinguishing semantic meaning 
from pragmatic, the Use-Meaning thesis and Ordinary Language philosophy in general 
began its descent. The last great defender of the Use-Meaning view was Michael 
Dummett who argued (the Priority Thesis) that language is explanatorily primary to 
thought, that language use 'encompasses the contents expressed by the utterances' (Heck 
2007), that T-sentence semantic theories are best understood as descriptions of a language 
user’s practical ability, not as a basis for language use. Dummett writes:  
 
[T]he philosophical task of explaining in what a mastery of a language 
consists is not completed when we have set out the theory of meaning for 
the language. . . . [W]e have to go on to give an account of what it is to 
have such knowledge. This account can only be given in terms of the 
practical ability which the speaker displays in using sentences of the 
language.  (Dummett 1993:101). 
 
Dummett points out that, contrary to the Though Theorist’s view that non-linguistic 
thought supplies semantic content into language-use, if this were so, then why can’t we 
refer to these thoughts directly sans language? Why do we structure our thoughts in 
language? How do we establish that our non-linguistic thoughts are correct? 
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Contra Dummett’s arguments, John McDowell (1998) dockets two horns of a 
dilemma facing the Use-Meaning theorist as he attempts to clarify the thesis: (i) If the use 
of a sentence is taken to be what that sentence is used to say, then its meaning is just the 
thought it is used to express (i.e., the use is 'meaning-laden' by virtue of the thought). 
This clearly contradicts the Priority Thesis. (ii) If use is understood in Quinean terms 
(noises people make in certain circumstances), then the Use-Meaning thesis commits one 
to a 'behavioristic reduction of meaning' (ibid.), which few will wish to commit to. 
Richard Heck, Jr. (2007) gives a careful partial-defense of the Use-Meaning thesis, 
propounds a hybrid notion, with content dividing into two sets, the Gricean one being 
(presumably more elementary) thoughts bearing content, while the other Dummettian set 
gains content from use, in particular being use-determined constructions out of the 
simpler Gricean components (along the lines Davidson suggests). Heck also distinguishes 
'content' from 'meaning' in a significant way: content belongs to a theory of truth (is 
associated with components of the T-sentence), whereas meaning is a meta-semantic 
concept (belonging to a theory of meaning) and treats of content in the determination, by 
rational judgment, of correctness of a T-sentence. In making this distinction, the Use-
Meaning theorist can have his cake and eat it, too, by permitting content of thought to 
instill content into basic expressions, but denying that this amounts to meaning which 
belongs to the realm of reason in requiring the capacity to judge the thought-contents and 
expression as suitably related with respect to use/convention, such that use indwells in 
meaning. Since thought-content has been integrated, the one, Quinean horn of 
McDowell's dilemma is avoided, and since meaning is made out to be a kind of second-
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order relation, separate on that plane from content, Heck believes he has avoided the 
meaning-ladenness horn as well. 
 
I disagree that Heck has saved the day for the Use-Meaning thesis. Let’s sum-up 
how Heck has differentiated the Use-Meaning view from the Thought Theorist view. I 
understand his proposal as follows:  Let Y be either thought-content and/or usage-content. 
Let "x" be an expression in language; then, <"x", Y> is a pairing (of the sort, say, 
representable by a T-sentence). Let Z1 stand for some pattern of conventional language 
usage in a context for expression "x". Then, meaning will be the triple <<"x",Y>,Z1> 
where "x" is used in accord with Z1.43 Perhaps surprisingly, the Thought Theorist of a 
Gricean bent would propose almost exactly the same formula for the meaning of the 
expression "x", since the priority-of-thought-friendly Gricean program full-well 
recognizes that utterance-expressions are conventionally selected encodings for thoughts. 
So, the full-description of an expression's semantic import must include, first, the 
thought-content and, then, the proper coordination with convention/usage. The singular 
difference is that, for Heck, Y will sometimes have pure usage-content, with no 
admixture of thought-content. So, I challenge this singular difference.  
 
What is the epistemological dissimilarity between knowledge of states-of-affairs 
in the world and knowledge of conventions? How aren't conventions also just states-of-
affairs in the world? Why would knowing one set of states-of-affairs in the world, in 
order to ascertain correctness of a pairing of “x” and Y, be different in kind from 
                                                 
43  Of course, I'm running roughshod here, but my purpose is a fast-and-dirty bottom line on Heck's 
proposal 
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knowing another set of states-of-affairs in the world in ascertaining the correctness of a 
pairing of “snow is white” with that very state-of-affairs? I suggest that linguistic 
conventions are not different from other artifacts in the world. The epistemological 
challenges in coming to know a language or a convention are the same challenges that 
must be overcome in coming to know other things and relations in the world.  
 
Keeping in mind the point just made, let's return to the questions of the role of 
thought-content and the nature of thought-content. To this end, I introduce another 
example. Suppose a particularly brilliant parrot, Polly, having been trained to converse 
linguistically in just the way a (less than brilliant) person would and to do so correctly, by 
the conventions of usage.  There is, we presume, an elementary thought-content in Polly's 
head, involving perhaps thoughts of certain squawks and facial contortions from his 
human and thoughts of sugar treats. But, we can be confident, the thought-content does 
not include a parrot's notions of snow being white when Polly is using the words 'snow is 
white.' So, the parrot conforms to Heck's account that has the language agent utilizing 
elementary thought-content sufficient to acquire the conventions of language, but then 
depend only on the conventions of language for meaning thereafter. The Use-Meaning 
advocate might say that Polly's words, because they are correct with respect to 
convention, do have meaning. Let us now suppose Polly's sister Molly is equally trained 
to converse by correct conventions of usage. Polly and Molly carry a conversation for 
quite some time, even when no humans are around. In fact, a researcher could describe a 
by a T-sentence theory the know-how capability, in Dummettian terms, of these parrots to 
use language that would match that of the parrots' human counterparts. Would the Use-
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Meaning proponent, however, still insist that the words have 'meaning'? If so, then the 
question becomes: To whom do the words have meaning? Certainly, there is no meaning 
in these words to Polly or Molly. Perhaps, the Use-Meaning proponent would argue that 
the conventions are not really parrot conventions but human conventions and that this is 
the reason why Polly's words are meaningless to Polly. I respond that this objection 
misses the point of the example, which is intended to show that mere conventions and 
mere elementary thought-contents only associated with the proximal features of those 
conventions cannot amount to semantic content of the sort that would account for the 
truth of 'snow is white' standing or falling on whether snow is white (vs. grass being 
green), no matter how much more we complicated the conventions. 
 
The parrot example is supposed to illuminate the need for a fuller sort of thought-
content in the determination of meaning.  Recently, I suggested that the Use-Meaning 
advocate wishes to replace the issue of the relation of actual states-of-affairs to 
correctness of pairing with an account of convention instead. To the contrary, the parrot 
example shows that correctness of pairing can be achieved between an expression and a 
convention, but if the thought-content has no relation whatsoever to the actual states-of-
affairs (that a realist would say are described by the expression), then we really can 
question whether meaning was achieved after all – that is, whether Heck's peculiar 
definition of 'meaning' is correct. This is the heart of the realist view, with respect to 
language, that our judgment of an expression's truth depends intimately on what we think 
is the actual state-of-affairs described by that expression. 
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Dummett (1973:255) has raised doubts about the role of the actual state-of-affairs 
to a determination of truth and has given examples such as colors changing in fact but 
this fact being unrecognized by us or our measuring apparati. In such a case, our use of 
language would be unchanged, including our assignment of truth-values. The conclusion 
Dummett draws is that the actual state-of-affairs must not be relevant to the meaning of 
our expressions if the meanings fail to change when the states-of-affairs do. I have two 
responses to this. First, as stated above, conventions of use are also states-of-affairs, so  it 
can't generally be the case that states-of-affairs are irrelevant to meaning without that also 
undermining the convention basis, also. Secondly, even waiving this first response, 
Dummett's challenge portrays a simplistic view of the relationship between our beliefs 
(or thought-content) about states-of-affairs and the actual states-of-affairs. It describes the 
naïve realist. The mature realist has no problem with aiming for a target and missing the 
mark, so long as there are grounds to hold that something was aimed at, that we can come 
to a meaningful judgment about more or less distance from our guess and the target, that 
progress in accuracy is a realizable goal.  
 
The case in which it makes sense to speak of aiming and missing should be 
contrasted with the case in which it does not make sense, i.e. the case in which there is no 
connection whatsoever between our thoughts of states-of-affairs and actual states-of-
affairs. The question, however, for both cases is this: What is it that we have in mind 
when we think about the states-of-affairs such that can still meaningfully talk about those 
states-of-affairs (and their truth conditions), even where we are in fact wrong? The realist 
could say that we have in mind a world-model, under which truth-conditions relative to 
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that model, for some state-of-affairs, can be specified. What makes those truth-conditions 
genuine is that we have grounds for thinking the world-model correct, such that even if 
we turn out to be wrong on occasion, we can still claim justification for having made that 
judgment in the first place. The mature realist does not have to be correct in every 
instance or to every degree to maintain his position. It is only necessary that progress be 
substantiated. And, the argument for progress can't be defeated by the antirealist without 
also defeating grounds for holding all states-of-affairs suspect, including those that 
comprise conventions.  
 
The antirealist, on the other hand, will answer the above question, saying we only 
need have in mind that which is necessary for following the conventions of usage, even 
where this includes some elementary thought-content. Expressions will have meaning 
where conventions for the use of those expressions (and paired content) are correctly 
followed. I challenged already exactly this claim with my parrot example. Dummett's 
rebuttal to the realist assumption contained in the parrot example, that there must be in 
meaningful language a connection between thought-content and states-of-affairs, has now 
just brought us back to the antirealist making the same claim all over again!  
 
I think this argument loop can be broken if we consider more carefully what we 
must have in mind when we have knowledge-how, whether Dummett's kind of 
knowledge-how (practical ability) or Heck's more though-content inclusive kind of 
knowledge-how. First, contemplate the extreme case of a thoughtless practical ability, 
such as a worm's ability to wriggle. One should hesitate to say of a worm that it knows-
81 
how to wriggle. It twitches muscles in a patterned way, starting and stopping in response 
to certain cues. Compare that to a fish's ability to swim (the example used 
contraventionally earlier). A tuna, e.g., appears to do more than merely twitch muscles. It 
swims sometimes quite strategically and in response to novel circumstances that cannot 
be regarded as mere environmental cues. One could safely presume that a tuna is not self-
aware of its own swimming, that it has that ability without needing to think about it. 
However, it is more difficult to claim that the tuna is not conscious of anything at all. In 
fact, one is given to say that, but for a somewhat comprehensive modeling of its 
environment, of predator and prey, of complex behaviors of other tuna, and so on, it 
should not swim as it does. The more intelligent is the particular animal, the more we are 
willing to say that its know-how ability is impossible except for a prerequisite,  non-
linguistic, and largely correct (if perhaps crude) modeling of the world.  This is not to say 
that the animal's model isn't possibly wrong in the details. The point is that what the 
animal has in mind when it executes a knowledge-how is a model which it takes to be the 
world, and that model should bear a relation to the world such that the animal can 
successfully perform its feats by taking the model so. Success is tantamount to 
correctness here, if we regard the way tunas perform their feats as a convention in the 
sense of a social pattern of behavior. The realist can make further arguments linking 
empirical success to progress towards accurate representation of the model to the world. 
 
What I am putting forward so far is that knowledge-how for thoughtful animals 
does require a prior knowledge-that, though not a linguistic knowledge-that. For humans, 
we have both linguistic knowledge-that and non-linguistic knowledge-that. Clearly, a 
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linguistic knowledge-that can't be a prior requirement for a linguistic knowledge-how. 
But, I do assert that a non-linguistic knowledge-that is required for linguistic knowledge-
how, and not just a knowledge-that of the conventions of usage. I am asserting a non-
linguistic knowledge-that of a world-model as a prerequisite for knowledge-how of the 
use of expressions which we take to be meaningfully about the world. To assert that the 
knowledge-that required for language ability is limited to the worldly elements making 
up conventions of usage is just like asserting that strategic animal behavior is merely 
muscle twitching in response to proximal cues. There are too many novel arrangements 
of things and their relations to formulate a single set of rules that would warrant success 
in all (or even most) cases. The knowledge-that must be more than knowledge-that of 
proximal environmental cues and patterns of linguistic behavior. Even if some pattern 
were rich enough to capture correct linguistic behavior, it would be too intractable for 
human brains to learn or retain.  
 
When I hear, "There's a banana on that table," what comes before my mind is not 
a convention, but rather, my non-linguistic notions of bananas and tables and their 
relationships to each other and to other things in my world-model. The challenge 
Dummett makes to this intuitive idea is that, if non-linguistic thoughts were to be 
available which matched the structure of language, then why don't we just think them? 
Why do we in fact always structure our thoughts in language? This is a good challenge 
from Dummett.  
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The standard example that is supposed to show the superiority of language to bear 
certain content the incapacity of non-linguistic thought to bear that same content is the 
case of the past-tense. Wittgenstein's example is of one's dog being able to be happy to 
see one today, but not (today) being able to be happy about having seen one yesterday. 
This would be correct if all that we had, in the way of resources for non-linguistic 
thought-content, were static pictures or images. If you show me a photo of a fellow and 
his dog, I couldn't tell you which day it was, without some other clues. If such a picture 
were all that comprised a single thought-content, then indeed Wittgenstein and Dummett 
are right. But, this is wrong. We don't have a photo-album conception of the world. We 
have a robust world-model and the passage of time is part of that model. I quibble with 
the suggestion that, say, a calendar or other tool for measuring time, while certainly 
conventional in the particulars of form and unit, therefore belongs to language. Tools are 
tools; they extend our abilities and help us better avoid errors. Someone with a prodigious 
memory could, with effort, construct a sequence of experienced events and mark the 
passage of time this way.  
 
If our concept of the past is fundamentally a linguistic one, and if language 
embodies the idea, then how do we learn the convention for this in the first place? Every 
teaching and learning of something takes place in the present. Which way do we point to 
point a language-learner to the past? Pointing to a day last month on the calendar is only 
to point to a spot on the calendar today. In order to learn the convention of past-tense (or 
to use a calendar for that matter), we must already have in-place a notion of the past in 
our world-model. For example, the calendar teacher would point to a place on the 
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calendar and say, 'Remember that day, when you lost your tooth?' or refer to some other 
past event, where what comes to mind in the mind of the student is not another piece of 
language or a convention of usage but a memory of a string being placed around the 
tooth, and other related people and things surrounding that event (including a special 
marking of the calendar), and the relation of this event to other events, forming sequences 
of events. The resultant historical model is what shapes our understanding of the past. I 
suggest that the non-linguistic notions must be primary before we can properly learn the 
linguistic conventions of past-tense, not vice versa. So, to revisit Wittgenstein's dog 
example, the dog could, in fact, be happy today to have seen us yesterday, but we can't 
know this is what he's happy about. The dog, lacking a language, cannot communicate in 
a Gricean fashion what's on his mind. 
 
The confusion, perhaps, is in conflating the tools of thought, which certainly 
include language, with language itself (conceived in isolation). Language, as a tool, helps 
us do things we couldn't do very well ourselves, not unlike the way shovels and 
jackhammers help us. But, the capacity gained in the use of a tool is in our knowing how 
to use it, not in the tool itself. Language, as a tool, requires us to coordinate with 
convention. But, our knowing how to use language, I suggest, is knowing how to extend 
thought by means of it. Polly the parrot knows-how to coordinate with the conventions of 
language but does not know-how to extend thought by means of language. Only the latter 
makes for meaningful language.  
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So, to return to the evaluation of Heck's account, he builds his case on the 
compartmentalization of content and meaning, but I have argued here that such a 
segregation is tantamount to a category mistake. This becomes particularly acute when 
we point out that the convention itself is just another set of state-of-affairs in the world. 
Correctness with respect to knowledge-that of subtle facts of context, utterance, behavior, 
and so on, is no different than correctness with respect to knowledge-that of other states-
of-affairs in the world. The Use-Meaning proponent cannot undermine the one without 
undermining the other.  
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CHAPTER THREE: VAN FRAASSEN 
 
Bas van Fraassen has crafted a strategic position within the realist/antirealist 
debate that involves rejecting realist arguments and that aims at garnering all the benefits 
that realists had believed they had all to themselves to enjoy, while avoiding the pitfalls 
that beset his antirealist predecessors. I do not believe he succeeds. In my opinion, van 
Fraassen's most serious strategic error, in countering realists, is leaving himself 
vulnerable to the same sort of skepticism he applies to realists. van Fraassen assumes that 
whatever arguments would harm the constructive empiricist will just harm the realist far 
worse, and whatever arguments would help the realist will make the case far better for the 
constructive empiricist. But, this is a mistake.  
 
van Fraassen's polemical tactics best make sense in light of his semantical view of 
theories. If we pair his semantic view of theories with the pragmatic view underlying his 
constructive empiricist account of explanation, we have the central planks of his position. 
In this chapter, I propose to present both his semantical view and the pragmatic view, 
then to appraise these, weighing the degree each has accomplish his antirealist goals.  
 
van Fraassen's Account of Theories 
 
The syntactic view of theories (1980:54) is one that van Fraassen rejects. It 
identifies a scientific theory with a deductive theory T, in a specified language L, with 
statements being axioms or theorems. Suppose the terms of L are partitioned into 
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observational and theoretic terms. We designate the former as E, the observational sub-
vocabulary. The empirical import of a theory is just its deductive observational 
consequences, represented as T/E, the theorems of T expressed in E. Two theories T and 
T' are empirically equivalent iff T/E is identical with T'/E. On van Fraassen's reading, this 
account led into a quagmire of logical difficulties, such that the important philosophical 
questions were lost in the fray, and much time was wasted (in van Fraassen's opinion) 
following up technical issues of no philosophical import. The chief questions of 
philosophical import surround the distinction between observational terms and theoretical 
terms. As it turns out, T/E can express everything that T does, albeit in a 'hobbled and 
hamstrung' fashion (55).44 For instance, 'there exists a thing which both has position and 
does not' expresses a highly theoretical assertion, but uses just observational terms (54). 
Thus, says van Fraassen, the distinction “reduces to triviality or absurdity, it is hard to say 
which” (55). Several attempts were made to solve the difficulty, e.g. by narrowing the 
definition of empirical equivalence by constraints on axiomatic extensions. However, 
these attempts failed. van Fraassen says, even if a solution could be found, it would not 
matter anyway, since (a) we still would not be able to extract from T the observational 
information we seek and (b) the statements of the theory would not be expressible in a 
natural language. – Because realists made great hay over these problems of the syntactic 
view, and for other philosophically strategically motivated reasons, van Fraassen urges 
instead a semantic view of theories.45  
 
                                                 
44 Dr.Creath notes van Fraassen’s claim exceeds what he has actually demonstrated. 
45 Dr.Creath observes that van Fraassen has here adopted the realist critique of logical empiricism in an 
attempt to inoculate himself against the charge that the ‘failures’ of logical empiricism are his failures. 
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Under the semantic view of theories, rather than a theory being identified with a 
set of statements in a language, a scientific theory is to be identified with a set of models. 
This set of models can be described in any of an endless number of different languages, 
each with its own potential limitations, and while such limitations stunt the capacities of a 
language, no such problem exists for the models. The collection of models that define the 
theory are (in principle) self-sufficient with or without a language to associate with. We 
designate a part of each model to serve “as candidate for the direct representation of 
observable phenomena” (65), calling this part its empirical substructure. Observable 
phenomena van Fraassen calls 'appearances,' being structures describable in measurement 
and experimental reports. The remainder of the model, not included in the empirical 
substructure, van Fraassen calls internal structure (what realists would take as candidate 
for corresponding to some trans-observational part of the world). A theory is empirically 
adequate (EA) just in case it has at least one model such that the empirical substructure of 
that model is isomorphic to all appearances. If for every model M of T there is a model 
M' of T', such that the empirical substructure of M is isomorphic to the empirical 
substructure of M', then we say that T' is empirically at least as strong as T. If T' is 
empirically at least as strong as T and T is empirically at least as strong as T', then T and 
T' are empirically equivalent (EE).  
 
van Fraassen is less than clear on the precise nature of his conception of model, 
describing models at times as along the lines of a possible world, at other times in the 
sense of a logical model, and at other times along the lines of a mathematical model.46  In 
                                                 
46   For an extended discussion of this, please see Appendix II, note 1. 
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his clearest enunciation, it still remains open to interpretation: “I will continue to use the 
word 'model' to refer to specific structures, in which all relevant parameters have specific 
values” (1980:44).47 Given the shift in his views from 1980 to 2006 (to be discussed), I 
suggest that, in Scientific Image, van Fraassen regards models as essentially 
representational and qualitatively definite. Later in this chapter, we will follow his 
transition from the semantic view of theories to a form of structuralism, in which a theory 
is taken to be an abstract mathematical structure. 
 
Given van Fraassen's semantical view of theories, it is not difficult to see how he 
might exploit underdetermination to subdue realism while yet availing antirealists of the 
philosophical and practical benefits of a literal construal of theories. First, class together 
all EE and EA theories whatever their differing internal structures. In virtue of being EE, 
each will be empirically functionally the same. That is, for all members of this class of 
theories, for any empirical 'input,' the empirical 'output' will be identical.48  van Fraassen 
intends this manner of underdetermination to be disabling to the realist, who is unable to 
ground belief in any one of this class of theories. For the constructive empiricist, 
however, this situation is most welcome, for he may accept whichever theory he pleases, 
immersing himself in the 'world-picture' of that theory. From an antirealist point of view, 
so long as the practitioner appropriately 'ontologically brackets' his statements, then he is 
free to indulge the theory nearly as if he were a realist. It won't matter that the theory 
might be, in fact, false, just as it wouldn't matter if it were true (since how would we 
                                                 
47   Contrast this to van Fraassen's characterization of the use of models in science where certain parameters are left 
unspecified, and so are more properly model-types, as he puts it. 
48   However, there will be important pragmatic differences among these theories, and this will form an 
important part of van Fraassen's pragmatic view. 
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know anyway?). All that matters is that the theory is EA and useful. That is the chief aim 
of science under constructive empiricism, viz. to find and apply EA theories. In fact, van 
Fraassen stresses that empirical minimality (i.e., having no 'metaphysical baggage') is not 
a virtue for a theory. 'Metaphysical baggage,' says van Fraassen, provides detours, via 
theoretical variables, to useful, manageable descriptions of observable phenomena (31). 
So, van Fraassen says to antirealists (as it were): “Don't worry! Have fun! Act like 
realists! Answer questions ex cathedra, let your language be guided by the theory, 
immerse in the world-picture, chase down robust causal explanations, but at the end of 
the day, make sure you acquit yourselves of all realist commitments by pronouncing a 
vow of agnosticism.”  
 
Under the syntactic view, the individual statements of a theory may be true, taken 
separately from the rest of the theory, and the truth of all constituent statements makes for 
the truth of the whole theory. But, that is not the case under the semantic view, where 
empirical adequacy is a strictly a global property of theories and is not applicable to 
constituent statements (representing classes of models). Each statement that can be called 
a proposition of a theory will be true for every model of the theory, and a statement that 
cannot be called a proposition of the theory will be false in at least one model. But, the 
empirical import of a theory cannot be isolated syntactically. Thus, it is nonsense to ask 
about (i) the EA of a single statement, or (ii) a logic of syntactic functions from premise 
to conclusion that preserves EA. Some statement S may be regarded as EA insofar as it is 




On van Fraassen’s semantic view, a singular statement S cannot by itself be EA, 
even if we understand that there may exist a set of models that satisfies S. Of course, if S 
is not well-defined or self-contradictory, then no models will satisfy it, and EA will fail. 
More interestingly, S cannot, by itself, determine what is or is not to count as empirical 
substructure. When merged to a theory T, S may achieve or fail EA depending on the 
content of S, the structure of the models in question, and whether T determines a larger or 
smaller portion of the structure of each model to count as empirical substructure. Also of 
potential import to the EA of S are the internal structures of the models of S that may 
conflict with, or be limited by, the internal structures of the models of T.  
 
As an example for case in which EA for S is affected by the degree of empirical 
substructure allowed by T, suppose that S is 'Bill has a bacterial infection' and that T only 
allows naked-eye observations as permissible among the possible appearances. Further, 
suppose T regards red, inflamed tissue as evidence for bacterial infections. Under such 
conditions, S may be regarded EA with respect to T. But, if conjoined to a different theory 
T’ which dictates that microscopic data are to be included among possible appearances, S 
may now fail EA with respect to T’, where the microscope shows viruses and not bacteria 
on Bill’s tissue.49 For van Fraassen, as I understand him, the case of EA for S ‘by itself' is 
unfathomable. There must be some larger theory present at least for fixing the limits of 
empirical substructure. So, perhaps, we are supposed to read any empirically evaluable, 
well-defined individual statement as always tacitly merged to some background/collateral 
                                                 
49  Note that van Fraassen regards the phenomena of microscopes as consistent with empiricism (as a class of 
phenomena for which the theory must be consistent) but not as belonging to the class of 'observables.' 
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theory.50  It should be noted that no inherent limits constrain the degree to which a theory 
chooses the range of empirical substructure. van Fraassen gives separate arguments why 
these limits should be fixed where empiricists want them, but in principle, a theory could 
be such that empirical substructure includes microscopic things. On the other hand, van 
Fraassen is happy to include the observable outputs of scientific apparatus as among the 
empirical. So, while he will regard the term virus to name the internal structure of a 
certain biological model (and we are to remain agnostic about the things in the world 
which may or may not correspond to that model), the microscope’s image is to be taken 
as empirical data (about which we are not to be agnostic) and the theory can now stand or 
fall on what it predicts of the image.  
 
What happens when a theory is extended, or merged with another theory?51 Given 
what has just been presented, one would naturally conclude theoretical extensions or 
mergers might have an important effect on the EA of the involved theories. If an 
extension causes EA to fail for some previously EE contenders of a theory T, but 
preserves EA for T, then this would be a powerful tool in coping at least with local 
underdetermination. The constructive empiricist does not see things the same way. On 
van Fraassen's view, if theory T is EA, then extending (or conjoining) T with T' only 
means that T' must now 'find a home' (51) among the models of T, meaning that T' must 
now try to form a non-empty intersection with T. van Fraassen asserts that, since the 
models and resources of T are unchanged, T must still be EA. The extension of T to T' is 
                                                 
50  See Appendix II, note 2. 
51  Realists see extensions/mergers as significant in that it renders previously EE and EA theories now 
discriminable, a potentially useful tool in coping with underdetermination. 
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'victorious' if the intersection is EA. The extension is a 'total defeat' if (T & T') is 
phenomena are such that no model in the intersection has empirical substructure 
matching the phenomena. van Fraassen’s account of theories has hidden assumptions 
which I will straightaway begin to question.  
 
Comments on van Fraassen's Semantic View of Theories 
 
The theory-as-a-basket-of-models idea, while philosophically captivating, is hard 
to comprehend in practice, unless it's just a cunning philosophical device to evade the 
pitfalls that beset the syntactic view while still, in effect, using the syntactic treatment of 
theories. Suppose we are entirely in control of the choice of models, and suppose by 
'models' van Fraassen means something along the lines of a definite representation 
whereby we establish EA by comparing the empirical substructures of the models directly 
to the set of all in-principle observations, searching for a perfect match. Then, the 
specification of the details of this match must be made explicit in the same way our 
derivations must be made explicit. Such a task would be daunting for even the simplest of 
theories. Where our specification of models and observations is less than perfect, we 
should worry always about the hidden saboteurs in the bunch. This can't be what van 
Fraassen intends.  
 
On the other hand, still assuming models as definite representations, if model-
selection is not fully determinate, then most of the particular details of each model will be 
beyond our control. In other words, if models are appointed in a way analogous to the 
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way possible worlds are selected, as when we assert ‘Let J be the set of possible models 
at which S is true,’ then all we know about the appointed set of model is that, e.g., it does 
not falsify S. But, then, there is the epistemological problem of coming to know these 
models in other ways and the particulars of their empirical substructures in the first place, 
which is certainly important for establishing EA. Such knowledge and the means of 
model-selection in this case, seem to depend on language in a way that re-installs the 
syntactic view of theories as primary. Hence, I don’t see this interpretation compatible 
with van Fraassen’s semantic view of theories.  
 
Finally, to the extent van Fraassen takes 'model' to mean a mathematical structure 
of a certain sort, then the sense of 'empirical substructure' becomes hard to capture, 
especially in light of van Fraassen's own rejection of a realist, descriptive notion of 
structuralism. It is not obvious how a collection of functions mapping numbers to 
numbers should establish facts about the non-numerical world.52 Indeed, van Fraassen's 
recent work rejects mathematics as descriptive and instead proposes that mathematics be 
embedded within a pragmatic system in order to relate mathematical results to the world. 
At any rate, it is clear that coming to a judgment about EA involves far more than simply 
noticing a straightforward correspondence between a part of the model and a part of the 
observable world. 
 
So far, we have been unable to locate a clear answer to the question: How could 
scientists utilize the semantic view of theories as a practical method for doing science? I 
                                                 
52   van Fraassen will address this problem in his answer to Reichenbach's coordination problem, discussed 
below. 
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will now raise some further challenges to answering this question. (i) Epistemological: As 
just stated, van Fraassen does not detail the epistemological project involved in 
undertaking discovery of a match between empirical substructures and the observable 
world so as to judge a theory's EA. Direct-realism is assumed, as is the clear dividing-line 
between what can and cannot be directly perceived. On the assumption of direct-realism 
and a theory that determines empirical substructure, van Fraassen can uncontroversially 
prescribe agnosticism about whether a match might obtain between a model’s internal 
structure and the imperceptible but full belief about a match between the empirical 
substructure of some model and the perceptible. However, this epistemological view is 
undefended, not just by van Fraassen, but by any advocate of direct-realism, as BonJour 
(2004) points out. If the epistemological project of establishing a match between 
empirical substructure and the world turns out to be a more complicated process, 
involving gaps that must be bridged by means other than direct-perception, then it 
undermines the rationale for the boundary line in the model and our corresponding 
attitudes.  (ii) Metaphysical: There are also some undefended assumptions that the world 
is a certain way, yet this way is not ascertainable by empirical study. The scientist only 
ever observes slices of the world, and it would commit the fallacy of composition to 
conclude that the slices ever add up to a whole. Similarly, there are metaphysical 
assumptions involving, e.g., kind membership. The realist would hold that the internal 
structure of the models play a role in explaining how distinct things can belong to the 
same kind or how the world as a whole hangs together, and we cannot simply be agnostic 
about it. This point is especially important for the notion of 'regularities,' of which van 
Fraassen makes great use. Without somehow grounding these serious metaphysical 
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assumptions, one cannot declare some set of things to constitute a regularity. (iii) 
Skeptical: Are other minds to be counted among the observable things in the world? Or, 
are we to be agnostic towards these and the observation reports they produce?  Why isn’t 
underdetermination (holistic or contrastive) a problem for deciding things about the 
observable world? 
 
The challenges above are all too easy make, and if van Fraassen were worried 
about such challenges, he would have bothered defending against them. One important 
reason he does not, I think, is his assumption that whatever damages the constructive 
empiricist’s position will damage the realist’s position that much more. His position was 
designed to be the more conservative option, such that any realist confidence in the truth 
of a theory would be still greater confidence in the EA of that theory, but the constructive 
empiricist option, of mere acceptance but not belief, involves fewer metaphysical 
commitments and therefore less risk.  
 
But, is this right? We should first appreciate the extreme difficulty of establishing 
the EA of a theory. EA is a very high bar to cross, as van Fraassen himself acknowledges. 
Even making simplifying assumptions, there are no grounds (short of assuming a 
tremendous degree of homogeneity in regularities for the universe and across time) for 
declaring a theory EA unless we can also establish that the ratio of actual observations 
that match empirical substructure to all possible observations that match empirical 
substructure approaches unity. Can this be taken seriously?  – I will argue that, in our 
actual use of theories, grounding belief in the EA of an individual theory only proceeds 
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by appeal to background theory, which implies a practical interdependence among 
theories. van Fraassen's semantic account mostly conceals this interdependence among 
theories, an interdependence which, when recognized, pushes us towards realism. 
 
van Fraassen's example of theory extension is the case where a settled theory T, 
with EE alternatives, is attempted to be conjoined to a less settled theory T', and the 
conjunction appears to eliminate all the EE alternatives to T.53 However, van Fraassen 
denies the appearance that the EE alternatives to T were actually eliminated by the 
conjunction, arguing that the new, conjoined theory (T&T') has itself an infinite number 
of EE alternatives (T&T')', (T&T')'', and so on. However, I counterargue, the example is 
not representative of the general case, and the fact that the conjoined theory is 
underdetermined does not refute the point that the original conjunction did indeed end EE 
for the alternatives to T.54 While it is acknowledged that, indeed, sometimes, a less 
settled, interloper theory T' may be rejected on the grounds that it has obvious EE 
competitors, regardless the effects it would have in conjunction with T, in other cases, 
rejection of T' is not an easy option. In that case, the conjoining theory T' may be one that 
we place in high regard and to which we may lack reasonable EE alternatives. If T' is just 
as settled as T, is consistent with T, but is inconsistent with every EE alternative to T, then 
the rational choice is accept T&T' and reject the EE alternatives to T. In such cases, 
contrary to van Fraassen's assertion, theoretical extensions can positively be deployed as 
                                                 
53  For a careful and extended discussion of theory conjunction ending EE among a set of theories and a treatment of 
van Fraassen's counterargument to this point, please see Appendix II, note 3.  
54 I show this Appendix II, note 3. 
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a weapon in the arsenal against underdetermination.55 While this does not force van 
Fraassen to adopt realism, it forces consequences on theory acceptance that restrict 
subsequent choice, and it forces the constructive empiricist to take seriously the 'internal 
structure' of accepted theories.56 Moreover, if T' is the background theory, then this 
feature of theory extension to discriminate among otherwise EE theories gives special 
status to the background theory. 
 
Let's explore further how commitment to a background theory comes to force the 
antirealist into a more realist-like position. In general, van Fraassen's initial presentation 
of the semantic view suggests an epistemic independence among different models and 
theories, which belies the practical interrelations among them. He will come to 
acknowledge this point in a different way as he introduces his pragmatic views, but I 
think it is important to explore the way van Fraassen’s official presentation of the 
semantic view courts inconsistency. On the one hand, van Fraassen says making changes 
to the collection of models constituting a theory can effect changes in global EA, while 
on the other hand, in the case of extensions, conjoining the models of T with the models 
of  T' is expected always to preserve EA (except under the ad hoc constraint that T' is not 
to have any effect on T).  
 
Let's consider a simple example. Suppose Holmes is trying to discover who 
murdered Smith who met his demise at the base of a cliff by the sea. Messieurs X, Y and 
                                                 
55   at least local underdetermination. 
56   The constructive empiricist must take seriously the internal structure in such cases because that is the 
very thing generating inconsistency with the EE alternative theories.  
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Z each have alibis except Mr.X for 2-3pm, Mr.Y for 4-5pm, and Mr.Z for 7-9pm. Given 
just the relevant evidence that Holmes has collected (and some body of 
background/collateral theory KH), it appears that each suspect looks equally likely to be 
guilty of the crime. Then, the local constable suggests the circumstances of the tide may 
shed light on the case. After some investigation, it is determined that Smith would not 
have died in the manner he did had he fallen into the water (at high tide) but only if he 
had fallen onto the rocks (at low tide) which, on the date of his death, would only have 
occurred at 2-3pm, making Mr.X the guilty party. – True enough, the theory of the tides 
did not disturb the initial models, per se, but certainly did render new observational 
consequences, at least in making formerly irrelevant or unnoticed phenomena now 
decisive (a Hansonian point). Isn't this the normal sort of case?  
 
van Fraassen might respond: 'The initial theories were not EE after all, but only 
incompletely investigated.' But, that is not correct (or else it assumes more about the 
models and background knowledge than is legitimate). The initial theories are EE given 
KH and the scope of observability peculiar to those theories. Conjoining each of them 
with tide-theory spells defeat for two of the murder-theories; tide-theory models of water 
covering the rocks is inconsistent with whichever of the murder-theory models has Smith 
dying on the rocks. But, there's more to the picture than just that. Tide-theory changed the 
lighting, so to speak, by making certain phenomena salient, whereas, prior to the 
conjunction with tide-theory, that same phenomena was not worth noticing.57 Suppose the 
set of models for T only addresses a range of appearances A. Those models will be 
                                                 
57 This is the 'Hansonian point' just mentioned above. 
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insensitive to some other appearances A', such that EA for T is unaffected by A'. If the 
conjoining theory T', however, finds these other appearances A' decisive, then (T&T') 
now finds the wider class of appearances (A or A') decisive. 
 
Another possible response from van Fraassen: ‘I object to partitioning the 
background knowledge as you do it; there certainly is tide-theory (or the physics behind 
tide-theory) implicitly in Holmes' KH.’ I reply: (i) we can always perforce arrange 
Holmes' KH to fit the example, but it is unreasonable to expect complete sets of 
background knowledge. (ii) Going the other direction and enlarging KH just makes my 
point. In order to navigate the world as we do, we don't or can't fashion models to have 
such autonomy with respect to one another or to the rest of the world. Without an ample 
background theory to tie things together, most scientific theories are truly disjoint (each 
internal structure treating of different categories of thing and each set of 'appearances' 
treating of different categories of measurement). Consider Paleontology and the 
important methodological use it makes of radiocarbon dating and geology. Then, consider 
the methodological use it makes of common sense assumptions (ontological stability of 
things, other minds, and so on). There is nothing original in the observation that, strictly 
speaking, most scientific fields have little genuinely in common, yet in practice, scientists 
draw from a unified theory-of-everything. In this way, van Fraassen's ‘clean’ portrayal of 
models is plainly misleading. On the ‘clean’ semantic view of theories, we would almost 
never have the rationale for extensions in the first place since internal structures and 
specific observational measures rarely overlap among theories of different fields. Yet, 
scientists do, with easy conscience, draw from a pool of theories, conjoined in some 
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sense differently than van Fraassen has depicted it, with the result that, more often than 
not, EE hypotheses can after all be differentiated. Because a robust background theory 
can severely limit choices, the easy agnosticism van Fraassen describes for the 
constructive realist is actually not so available. In other words, believing in a wide array 
of theories that refer only to the observable world still places great constraints on 
acceptance of theories that refer to trans-observational entities. So, e.g., even mere 
acceptance of our contemporary scientific theories rules out also accepting goblin theory. 
If I do not accept goblin theory, then am I still agnostic about it?  
 
I make one final remark before moving-on to van Fraassen's account of 
explanation. For the realist, generally, the expectations formed on the predictions of a 
theory are grounded on the belief that there is good reason to hold the theory true. If we 
know already that a theory is EA, then we would have a different, non-realist reason for 
forming expectations on theoretical predictions. However, van Fraassen never shows that 
we have good reason for holding a theory as EA. van Fraassen assumes correctly that any 
realist who holds a theory true ipso facto holds the theory EA, but he does not account for 
what constitutes good reasons for holding a theory EA simpliciter.  And, for the realist, 
removing the belief that a theory is true equally removes the grounds for thinking it EA. 
Since, as noted earlier, no amount of actually collected evidence could ever practically 
begin to establish EA, the constructive empiricist is left with no reason to expect success 
from a theory. EA, it turns out, is not the default to realism, and if not, then constructive 
empiricism is not either.  
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When van Fraassen pivots to his pragmatic account, he will give different reasons 
for theory acceptance. But, pragmatic reasons for accepting a theory are not sufficient 
grounds for holding the theory to be EA. It is proper to demand of van Fraassen, on the 
basis of his semantic view, grounds independent of pragmatics for holding a theory EA. 
From the antirealist's point of view, why would (illegitimately) thinking a theory true 
provide grounds for thinking it EA? Unless solid grounds for thinking a theory EA are 
provided for, the antirealist has no right to take theoretical prediction seriously. If 
scientific antirealism is to be more than just skepticism, it must provide an independent, 
workable alternative to realism. As I said, antirealism doesn't win by default.  
 
Let's take stock of where we are at the end of this subsection. Constructive 
empiricism hinges on a particular version of the semantic view of theories that defines 
theories in terms of models, but when the view is examined more closely, we discover 
that it is not clear what models actually are and that models are not practically useable. 
For those reasons, practically pursuing EA by means of models is elusive. But, even if EA 
were obtainable by comparing models to the world, in the absence of any reason other 
than the ratio of observed appearances to all possible appearances reaching unity, there is 
no reason to hold a theory EA. In effect, this means no theory will ever be judged EA. 
Since belief that a theory is EA is the rationale for antirealists to behave with respect to 
that theory like realists and perform science the way most scientists do, then that rationale 
is unavailable. Also, recalling a point from chapter one, constructive empiricism cannot 
account for the sequential fruitfulness of mature scientific theories, which just adds to its 
embarrassment. As we looked more closely at van Fraassen's account of theoretical 
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extensions, which he had intended to show of no avail to the realist, we uncovered the 
very opposite to be the typical case, viz. conjoining two settled theories eliminates EE 
contender theories. Where one of the conjuncts is the background theory, tremendous 
constraints are placed on subsequent theory-choice, forcing even the antirealist to respect 
the internal structure of theories. Background theory plays an ineliminable role in actual 
science, tying together otherwise disparate theories and creating a global interdependence 
among theories. How do these points add up? As discussed in chapter one, I advocate a 
realist position under which the realist does not fully subscribe to any theory but does 
take theories seriously with the goal of diminishing the pool of possible contenders and 
bringing us just that much closer to the correct model of the world. The role that 
background theory and other settled theories play in eliminating contenders and 
constraining subsequent theory-choice exemplifies the realist approach of diminishing the 
pool of contender theories and thereby cornering the truth. I noted earlier that the realist 
approach is more of a methodological course than a credo that one endorses. Hence, if 
van Fraassen's account has led to the result that the constructive empiricist has no basis 
for holding his antirealist view but, unwittingly, follows the methodological course of the 





As many realists hold, that a scientific theory referring to the trans-observational 
world explains the evidence well provides the best grounds for thinking that theory true. 
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van Fraassen, however,  rejects realist accounts of explanation, and he gives some oft-
repeated counter-arguments that are easy to summarize. Against the realist's demand that 
every universal regularity requires an explanation (which leads inevitably to trans-
observational explanations), van Fraassen replies (i) What is the warrant for such a 
demand? It can't be discovery of the truth, because trans-observational claims will forever 
be empirically frustrated in demonstrating this claim to truth. (ii) The demand cannot be 
applied universally, for it will lead to contradictions, such as the demand for hidden 
variables in quantum physics. (iii) The demand leads to an unhelpful regress, since if 
satisfying the demand (momentarily) just means supplying an explicans (about, e.g., 
microstructure) that is itself another brute universal regularity, then why not just accept 
the first (observable) one as brute? And, even if we were to accept the explanation, the 
explanationist would demand yet another, new explicans for the previous explanation, ad 
infinitum. A second general line of counter-argument wants to know whether there is any 
difference in empirical import between 'the theory which best explains is true' and 'the 
theory that best explains is EA.' If not, then the latter is the more philosophically prudent 
choice.58 Dr.Creath points out that one could go further and argue that ‘the theory that 
best explains is EA’ is more likely the case, since it will hold even where the explanation 
is, in fact, false.  
 
If explanation cannot guide us any closer to the truth, why, asks van Fraassen, is it 
being demanded? What impels us to want an explanation in the first place? To answer 
this question, van Fraassen has us look carefully at the relationships between theory, facts 
                                                 
58    Note: 'total possible empirical import' and 'empirical adequacy' are synonymous; realists require EA of 
theories just as the constructive empiricist 
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in the world, descriptions, and explanations. He notes: “Traditionally, theories are said to 
bear two sorts of relation to the observable phenomena: description and explanation” 
(153). Some realist philosophers saw explanation as something 'over and above' 
description. Realists, says van Fraassen, were then emboldened and concluded that, 
therefore, explanation is an irreducible, special pathway to truth, these ideas giving rise to 
'explanation-mysticism' (154) such as Aristotelian necessity or mysterious causal 
processes extending beyond the observable. Yet, if this is so, we should be able to say 
clearly how explanation differs from description. Yet, in the typical, real-life case, when 
we ask for an explanation from a scientist, all we actually receive, says van Fraassen, is a 
description of the facts, determined by the theory to be relevant to the context of our 
request.59  
 
Digging deeper, van Fraassen asks: What is the relationship between a theory and 
an explanation? The paramount theory/world relations are truth, EA, and empirical 
strength. In fact, argues van Fraassen, explanation is not a theory/world relation and 
concerns the world little. Rather, explanatory power should be classed with the pragmatic 
virtues (along with simplicity, scope, mathematical elegance, etc.). The only belief 
involved in theory-acceptance is belief that the theory is EA. But, there are other non-
belief factors ('human concerns') that are sometimes importantly involved in theory-
acceptance: the commitment to account for all future phenomena, the commitment to a 
research program, the wager that the theory can confront future phenomena without our 
having to give up that theory, ...., and explanatory power. van Fraassen maintains that, far 
                                                 
59  van Fraassen’s aim, in this line of argument, is to show the scientific realist confused, not to show 
scientific realism false.  
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from being a preeminent virtue, explanatory power is among the least important on the 
list, only becoming decisive in theory-selection when all other factors are evenly matched 
between contender theories. Since explanatory power is a pragmatic virtue, there is 
nothing peculiar to explanation per se that makes it rational to pursue. The epistemic 
merits a theory has in contributing to good explanation are just the ones it had in being 
EA, empirically strong, and so on. The 'name of the game,' van Fraassen famously says, 
is 'saving the phenomena,' and whatever pragmatic role explanation can serve to that end 
will be its raison d'etre.  
 
"Theory T explains fact E" asserts only a relation between the particular theory 
and some particular facts, and the explanation asserts nothing about T's relation with the 
rest of the world. Explanation has no further theory/world features other than providing 
evidence that the theory is consistent with the selected facts, and so, it is impossible, on 
the basis of explanation alone, to establish anything further about the theory, such that it 
is true or even EA or acceptable. – At bottom, says van Fraassen, explanation has no sui 
generis mysterious powers, but it is rather, as van Fraassen will argue, that explanatory 
power is just a manifestation of the theory from which it issues. If an explanation has the 
qualities of empirical strength, and internal consistency, that is because the theory that 
issues it is empirically strong and internally consistent. A good explanation does not lead 
to consistency with the facts, but consistency with the facts is a precondition (on the 
issuing theory), in order to make possible a good explanation. 
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I reserve comment for now, except to point out that 'explanation' is an ambiguous 
term, and van Fraassen is seizing on a particular sense of that term that, I contend, is 
philosophically uninteresting to the realism debate and that has only to do with finished, 
secure theories. van Fraassen portrays 'explanation' as essentially 'theory-application to 
the facts,' and he is exactly right that a theory cannot be applied successfully unless the 
theory itself is in good working order. On the other hand, I see realists such as Hanson 
framing a different sense of 'explanation' wherein it is conceived as part of a meta-
theoretical evaluation: How 'organically' do the theoretical concepts fit together to 
produce correct empirical results? How 'naturally' do the concepts derive from the wider 
extra-theoretical language?  The term explanation (and related concepts), as Hanson used 
it, applies especially to incomplete theories, and so stands in stark contrast to van 
Fraassen's use of the same term. 
 
The moral of the story from van Fraassen's analysis and critique of realist 
accounts of explanation is that an explanation cannot be untethered from a theory, for 
when it is, on van Fraassen's view, it becomes meaningless and leads to absurdities. 
However, he has yet to provide a constructive empiricist account of explanation, one that 
slakes the methodological, realist-like ‘desire’ (156)60 to give and receive explanations, 
while still staying true to the constructive empiricist articles of faith.  
 
                                                 
60 van Fraassen writes: “So, scientific explanation…is a use of science to satisfy certain of our desires; and 
these desires are quite specific in a specific context, but they are always desires for descriptive 
information.” He suggests that explanations are eliminable and replaceable by descriptions, but our 
(irrational though pragmatic) desires demand descriptions be served-up in the form of explanations.  
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van Fraassen's Positive Account of Explanation 
 
van Fraassen begins his positive account of explanation with a motivating 
example of the extinction of the Irish Elk. Its disappearance was the effect of an entire net 
of causal factors, yet the one we find salient is its evolutionary development of unwieldy 
antlers, good for mating but bad for survival (a story I will tell my son when he becomes 
a teenager). van Fraassen also gives the example from Hanson of the poor fellow who 
met a singular demise, yet who received a great number of different explanations for his 
death (from the medical examiner, carriage mechanic, road engineer, etc.). Hanson says: 
There are as many causes of death as there are explanations (1958:54). van Fraassen 
takes Hanson to be asserting that, in order to locate the salient factors, look not to 
phenomena, but to the pragmatics of language, since explanations are linguistic artifacts 
whose meanings are determined by pragmatic factors.61 Which factors become salient in 
answering the question 'why did this man perish?' will depend on who is asking the 
question and under what circumstances. 
 
In van Fraassen's view, an explanation is, generally speaking, a certain sort of 
answer to a certain kind of why-question, guided by language, theory, context, and 
facts.62 van Fraassen's account builds on the interrogative logic of Belnap and Hintikka. 
Consider the why-question: "Why did Adam eat the apple?" In order to answer this 
question correctly, we must first understand the precise sense of the question. The first 
                                                 
61  I disagree this is Hanson's point. 
62  van Fraassen's formal account of explanation is more general than just for causal explanations and 
should, he promises account for explanatory asymmetry, relevance, rejection, and salience.  
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component of this understanding is the topic which van Fraassen defines as: that which 
expresses the fact of the question. It would seem, in this case, that the topic is just the fact 
of Adam's eating the apple. However, depending on the context, there are numerous 
possible ways of reading the question, each one producing a different fact: Why Adam vs. 
Steve? Why eat vs. throw? Why apple vs. pear, and so on. – So, the topic will be just the 
one particular fact corresponding to the one particular reading of the question under the 
particular context, and the remaining facts for the other readings will now form the 
contrast class.  
 
Having made these clarifications, what's needed now is a constraint on possible 
answers. This is the relevance relation (R), what van Fraassen describes as 'the respect in 
which the question is asked.'   63 
 
Explanations require that: (i) the question topic is true, (ii) all the contrast-class 
topics are false, and (iii) there exists at least one proposition which bears relation R to the 
topic/contrast-class pair. Thus, one feature of explanatory relevance important to van 
Fraassen, the rejection of why-questions, has clear conditions: If any of (i)-(iii) fail to 
obtain, then there does not exist a direct answer, and so, the proper response to such a 
request for explanation is rejection in the form of a corrective answer (correcting the 
falsified presupposition).  
 
                                                 
63  For the formal version of van Fraassen's explanationist system, please see Appendix II, Note 5. 
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The mystery of explanatory asymmetries64 is handled by contrast-class and 
contextual relevance, and van Fraassen shows this by the following test: A change of 
contextual relevance (given a contrast-class) should produce a reversal in asymmetry. In 
an update on Aristotle's lantern example, van Fraassen has us imagine a father asking his 
son, “Why is the porch light on?” If the son answers: “Because the switch is permitting 
electricity to flow through the wiring to the bulb,” we might consider it impudent (where 
we have in mind an answer like “Because we are expecting company,”), but if the context 
is that father and son are doing electrical work on the house, the son's explanation would 
be correct (131). That is, whether X explains the light's being on or the light's being on 
explains X, depends on the specific sense of the question (in contrast to other readings) 
and the contextual relevance of X to the light or vice versa.   
 
So far, van Fraassen's why-question logic does not have an evaluative component. 
van Fraassen introduces his account of what constitutes a 'telling answer' (i.e., a good 
explanation): the answer (a) must be probable in light of our background knowledge; (b) 
must probabilistically favor the topic over the other alternatives of the contrast-class 
(relative to background knowledge); and (c) must be comparatively better in these 
regards than other potential answers. Though he admits that the evaluative portion of his 
theory is least developed, van Fraassen nevertheless feels confident that, on the whole, 
the central issues of asymmetries and explanatory relevance have been dealt with, and an 
account of explanation has been given which meets the demands of constructive 
empiricism while yet being faithful to the aims of science. In the respects important to 
                                                 
64  E.g., the flagpole explains the shadow, but the shadow does not explain the flagpole. Previous accounts 
of explanation had trouble showing why the shadow does not explain the flagpole. 
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him, van Fraassen has laid the groundwork for the antirealist to be able to immerse in the 
theory like a realist while yet knowing all along that immersion is being used strictly for 
pragmatic ends. Unlike other antirealists, the constructive empiricist can, with a guiltless 
heart and with good grounds, choose to prefer a causal explanation over a non-causal one, 
so long as the causal explanation meets these criteria of a 'telling answer' better than the 




Some Comments on van Fraassen's Explanationist Account 
 
Has van Fraassen really accomplished anything here? He has made it possible to 
accommodate the antirealist wishing to indulge causal explanations, but I note that 
nothing compels the use of causal explanation. A close reading of van Fraassen's account 
makes clear that bearing the marks of causal character is by itself irrelevant to an 
explanation's being 'telling.' Quite misleadingly, van Fraassen gives an example (112), 
much earlier in the chapter, of the Plains Indians, which appears to suggest that the causal 
explanation (whites killed-off the buffalo) of their ending up on reservations is 
intrinsically a better explanation than the citing of mere statistical facts (technologically 
superior invading peoples tend to displace indigenous peoples). But, by the end of the 
chapter, it is clear that the statistical explanation could equally trump the causal one, so 
long as van Fraassen's criteria are satisfied. So, with respect the why-question, 'Why did 
the Plains Indians end up on reservations?' suppose we have a statistical theory T 
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(together with background knowledge K), a contrast class which lists the various 
alternatives we might be asking after (Plains Indians vs. Cherokee, reservations vs. cities, 
etc.) and a relevance relation R which obtains for the specific topic as opposed to the 
alternatives. If the answer "...because advanced civilizations nearly always displace less 
advanced ones" is true (given T&K), if it favors the topic vs. the alternatives, and if it is 
the best answer that T&K offers, then it is a telling explanation.  
 
Thus, van Fraassen's earlier rejection of the statistical answer, over and against the 
causal one, is not because the causal one, and the satisfying story it gives is necessarily 
the better explanation, but rather because, where the speaker/audience assume a causal 
theory, then the causal explanation will be preferred. Even where T&K are rich enough 
that either a causal or a statistical explanation could be given, van Fraassen's why-
question explanationist logic still perfectly allows for preference of the non-causal to the 
causal explanation, given that the appropriate conditions are met.  
 
The important thing to note here is that the why-question logic only works to 
discriminate among contender explanations relative TO THE SAME THEORY. And, this 
is exactly as van Fraassen wants it to be. For, he does not view the request for explanation 
as any different in sum and substance than a request for description from a theory (as 
applied to some set of facts in a particular context). It is merely an exercise in theory 
application, executed within a question-and-answer format. If we don't like the results of 
the application, we have the theory to thank (or blame) for that, not the explanation 
(which is only a practical manifestation of the theory).  
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It is the inclusion of pragmatics that renders his account superior to the other 
reductive accounts of explanation, van Fraassen believes. However, I see his appeal to 
pragmatics as a back-door route to plunder the benefits of realism without having to 
commit to it. In short, the reason why asymmetries, relevance, and rejection are all 
available to van Fraassen but not to the reductive accounts is just that van Fraassen 
allows for the full, causal story to be made available, not because of the magic powers of 
pragmatics. There will be no mistake that the position of the sun caused the flagpole's 
shadow and not vice versa, e.g., because we have available to us the full causal story of 
all the elements and their roles with respect to one another. Pragmatics only seemed 
important because van Fraassen cast explanation in terms of question and answer, in 
terms of theory-application to specific instances (in certain contexts). But, I suggest, the 
power behind the explanation lies not with the clarification of the question or the re-
processing of the theory to permit pragmatically-determined selection of answers. Rather, 
the power resides in the precise characterization of the relationships among entities and 
the full accounting of the natures of the entities involved, as tied to the bedrock of 
everything else we know or are committed to, such that, e.g., the causal asymmetry 
among a set of entities ‘follows as a matter of course,’ as Hanson would put it. This 
clearly involves more than theory-determined description. A theory may provide a 
context-specific description of phenomena, but if we lack the fuller story of the entities 
and their inter-relations and how this story connects to everything else in our corpus, we 
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will find the description-cum-explanation unsatisfying.65 If this is right, we will find the 
richer, more ‘organically-connected’ story, though with an insubstantial empirical track-
record, preferable to, e.g., the statistical theory with a long track-record of empirical 
strength. This preference is not irrational or pragmatic, but, I contend, derives from the 
rational preference for a strong M-model over a weak one.66 Indeed, pragmatics only 
seems like a feasible solution if we already have in hand the full causal story in the first 
place, where the only remaining task is to work backwards to the pragmatic proxy. But, in 
the absence of the rich causal story tied into the corpus, developing a pragmatic account 
which achieves the same results is thorny if not intractable.  
 
So, we now ask: Is van Fraassen's victory over asymmetry due to deep insights 
into the pragmatics of explanation or simply due to the fact that the antirealist is now 
allowed to think like a realist? Hempel, Salmon, and others struggled to locate a reductive 
account in order to find more general principles and to avoid having to resort to blatant 
realist thinking. The realist, utilizing his fully fleshed-out theories, never has problems 
with asymmetry, even independently of the contexts of a particular application. The 
substance behind van Fraassen's account is not in the context, but in the relevance 
relation which plunders a realist theory for the specific causal relationships it discloses. 
Thus, if we switched away from the rich, realist theory to a purely statistical one, as we 
                                                 
65 For a presentation of an additional critique of van Fraassen's explanationist account from Salmon and Kitcher, see 
Appendix II, Note 6. 
66 And, this implies inter-theoretic comparison of explanatory powers, where explanation is understood in 
terms of M-models. Also, this implies that we can gauge a story’s explanatory power apart from truth, 
as we do in gauging good fiction from bad fiction. 
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note van Fraassen's account of explanation perfectly well allows us to do, the asymmetry 
problems can creep right back in again. 
 
In the case of choosing from among theories, under van Fraassen's account, there 
exists no explanation-specific framework for the relative comparisons of inter-theoretic 
explanations, so pursuing explanations for the purpose of theory-selection is a 
pronounced waste of time for all but the rarest of circumstances67. Stranger still to van 
Fraassen’s account would be the pursuit of explanation in the appraisal of a single theory 
under review, as Galileo did in Hanson's case-study. By van Fraassen's lights, this is just 
topsy-turvy. Thus, van Fraassen demands the pre-existence of unproblematic, finished, 
well-worked theories as a prior condition on explanations when they are requested, for 
otherwise, a problematic theory will fail presupposition requirements, whereupon the 
appropriate response is to reject the request for explanation. Thank goodness Galileo and 
others did not subscribe to this line of thought. 
 
If EA is the measure by which a theory is unproblematic and finished, then the 
kink in the plan is that no such theories are available, for by van Fraassen's own 
admission, EA is a never-ending quest. As I argued earlier, no positive account was given 
for judging the likelihood of EA. So, for constructive empiricist's explanation, the only 
remaining support is the pragmatic one.  
 
                                                 
67 Circumstances that involve explanation only incidentally and qua pragmatic feature. 
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There is a point at which, one might say, pragmatic methodology and realist 
methodology are coincident, and whatever benefits may genuinely accrue to the one 
would incidentally accrue to the other. But, that is not to say both are necessarily capable 
of the same feats. If one is genuine and one is just imitating the other, then we must 
distinguish which is the impostor. So, I ask whether the pragmatics-version is just copy-
catting and whether we could, after all, distinguish a difference from realism which 
shows it genuine in producing such golden eggs as empirically successful theories.68 
First, as pointed out above, van Fraassen's account is only such that it accommodates a 
realist-type 'immersion' in the theory, but it does not necessitate such immersion. The 
constructive empiricist, besides imitating the realist, also has the option to be a strict 
black-box functionalist. Yet, van Fraassen (in Scientific Image anyway) is oddly silent on 
this alternative. How would it go? Suppose a real black-box that tells us what phenomena 
to expect when we plug-in certain information. I say: 'Tell me what the per-share price of 
Apple stocks will be next week,' and my marvelous black-box tells me: 'On Friday of 
next week, at the close of market, the price will be $521.73.' Oh, how glorious that would 
be! Suppose this works for awhile, but after several months of successful stock picks, my 
black-box begins giving erroneous predictions. How do I fix it? What steps would I take? 
There’s not much that I could do; it is a black-box.  
 
Even more elusive are the details about how a purely functional black-box theory 
is produced in the first place. As van Fraassen himself agrees (with Sellars), when he 
                                                 
68  This pursuit is not intended, by itself, to show realism is correct in claiming the truth of theories or 
existence of unobservable entities, but rather is meant to show that pragmatics can’t replace a realist 
methodology. 
117 
discusses Sellars' demolition of the 'levels' picture of science, there really are no true 
empirical laws; everything has special exceptions: “On the level of the observable, we are 
liable to find only putative laws heavily subject to unwritten ceteris paribus 
qualifications...We do not really expect theories to 'save' our common everyday 
generalizations...” (32). This is one of several powerful arguments Sellars gives against 
antirealist construction of empirical or nomological generalizations from 
autobiographical observation. The import of Sellars’ arguments is that mere ‘curve-
fitting’ of theory to phenomena, as a means to building black-box theories, is insufficient 
to account for all phenomena. Fruitful theories, as noted earlier, are that much more 
difficult to construct in this way, and as Dawid (2008) points out, van Fraassen cannot, 
without circularity, account for the availability of fruitful theories by claiming that they 
are selected-for on that basis. Hence, except for the exploitation of realist methods 
(whether correct or not) to develop empirically successful theories, the constructive 
empiricist appears to have no genuine alternative. If the constructive empiricist is to insist 
that his account provides all that realism does, but without the metaphysical 
commitments, then he must be able to show that it indeed supplies the promised goods, 
independently of adopting a realist methodology. I emphasize that I am not giving some 
sort of indispensability argument in favor of realism, nor am I specifically attacking the 
basis of constructive empiricism, but I am trying to make the case here for a 
differentiation of realist methodology and antirealist pragmatic methodology. My aim is 
to show that there is an important methodological difference that is important to a 
methodologically oriented account of realism.69  
                                                 
69 A methodological-orientation is opposed to a credence-oriented account of realism.  
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So, here is one important difference between realist and pragmatic methods: 
When the pragmatic method ceases mimicking the realist one, it ceases to be workable. 
This is why van Fraassen, and antirealists generally, must always pretend empirically 
successful theories are in abundant supply, or that we or they evolve in short time-frames. 
Except for such easy spontaneous generation of successful theories, antirealists would 
then have to explain how their sterile methods should produce them, which they cannot. 
 
van Fraassen's framing of realism and explanation is crucial to his case. For him, 
the only difference between the pragmaticist and the realist is the realist's declaration of 
belief that the theory aims at truth. Beyond that, on van Fraassen's view, the realist is 
letting his language be guided by the theory, appointing models, making observations, 
and so on, no differently than the pragmatic constructive empiricist. What more is there 
to a declaration of belief besides a little ceremony and pomp? And, if what remains after 
the declaration may equally be claimed and colonized by the constructive empiricist, then 
the latter has all the benefits and none of the risks. However, I have accepted none of 
these assumptions. Being a realist, I tried to argue in Chapter One, means following an 
abductive methodology and need not transpire in language or within a social context. 
Realists need not depend on (linguistic) explanation at all, and to the extent they would 
find explanations interesting would just be insofar as they reflect abductive modeling. So, 
I contend, contrary to van Fraassen's assumptions, the pragmaticist who behaves like a 
realist to the point that he is doing abduction (taking models seriously, performing 
experiments and discarding models on that basis, whittling the remaining pool of 
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contender models, and so on), on my view, is therefore a realist, regardless of whether he 
crosses his fingers behind his back or refuses to make an official declaration. So, where 
constructive empiricist pragmatics and realism appear functionally equivalent, I see two 
possibilities: (a) the constructive empiricist just is a realist, because of what he is doing, 
though he will try to convincing himself otherwise, or (b) the constructive empiricist is 
lying in wait for the realist to utter his conclusions, then parrots those conclusions, telling 
himself it is merely a linguistic exercise that is being performed, not realism. However, 
unless constructive empiricism explains how it develops empirically successful theories 
in a way that doesn't just rely on the pre-existence of those theories and/or on an opulent 
background knowledge K being already in place, then it is just realism in denial.  
 
Going the Limit: From Agnosticism to Constructive Empiricist Structuralism 
 
In his most recent book, Scientific Representation, van Fraassen considerably 
deepens his development of constructive empiricist structuralism and its reliance on 
pragmatics. At the heart of this work are van Fraassen's attempts to tackle the challenge 
of representation that badgers other forms of structuralism. His account of representation 
understands it as a four-place relation: Z uses X to depict Y as F (21). For the scientific 
case, van Fraassen conceives of X as a representation, Z as a self-locatable person in a 
particular pragmatic context, Y as the target, and F as the particular aspect of interest (i.e., 
a predicate instantiated in Y).  
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As I read Scientific Image initially, van Fraassen presents his semantic view of 
theories officially and with fanfare, then by the end of the book somewhat 
inconspicuously pivots away from that view, collapsing it into a full-fledged pragmatic 
view. In Scientific Representation, he now heralds the preeminence of pragmatics stating: 
"There is no representation except in the sense that some things are used, made, or taken, 
to represent some things as thus or so" (2006:23). Whereas, before, the semantic view of 
theories left some ambiguity about the relationship between models and targets, offering 
room at least for an interpretation suggesting a model's inherent representational powers, 
now, he baldly states that representation is a capacity exclusively belonging to 
pragmatics. To support this view, he argues that representation simpliciter cannot be 
reduced to or defined in terms of something else, for it is a “cluster concept with multiple 
critical hallmarks...[and] only family resemblances among instances” (59). As with his 
account of explanation in Scientific Image, he argues that representation cannot be 
understood in itself or reduced, but has features that require contextual and pragmatic 
factors: “A representation is made with a purpose or goal in mind, governed by criteria of 
adequacy pertaining to that goal, which guide its means, medium, and selectivity. Hence 
there is even in those cases no general valid inference from what the representation is like 
to what the represented is like overall” (7).   
 
van Fraassen argues that the concept of resemblance is important to understanding 
representation, but while he would allow some autonomy to the powers of one thing to 
resemble another, he observes that the resemblance is always selective and mixed 
together with other  non-resembling elements and distortions that actually make the 
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model more useful to us. Thus, it can only be in the intended use we make of the selected 
elements that representation occurs, for by itself, the sum-total of elements in the model 
do not even make a resemblance (come to "nothing" (25)). “Resemblance comes in, not 
when we are answering the question What is representation?, but rather when we address 
How does this or that representation represent, and how does it succeed?” (33). Thus, 
despite whatever degree of resemblance we may think belongs to a photograph or charts, 
they contain, in themselves, no representational powers, no meaning, unless and until we 
provide a context, a purpose, or other pragmatic parameters. Where we change the 
pragmatic parameters, the representations and meanings change along with them, while 
the physical objects themselves remain the same.  
 
This heavy commitment to pragmatics therefore (a) rules out "the notion of 
mental images or mental representations, whether taken to be brain-states or something 
more ephemeral — for no such things, if they exist at all, are used or put to use, or taken 
in one way or another" (24), and (b) rules out "‘representation in nature’, in the sense of 
‘naturally produced representations that have nothing to do with conscious or cognitive 
activity or communication" (ibid). Representations must be publicly traded commodities 
to be representations at all.70  
 
van Fraassen argues for the role of representationality to be greatly enlarged, to 
contain even observation. Earlier, in Scientific Image, van Fraassen had distinguished 
observable phenomena (that which is in-principle observable) from appearances (that 
                                                 
70 Obviously, this is another direct contradiction of my view 
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which actually is observed, taking the form in science of measurement and observation 
reports). In Scientific Representation, van Fraassen now elevates the role of measurement 
in science and adds representationality to its status, while fully subsuming observation 
into a function of pragmatics.  
 
van Fraassen maintains that all observations, but particularly measurements, are 
perspectival. Perspectivity, like representationality, is an elusive concept, and it similarly 
cannot subsist in itself, but requires a pragmatic underpinning, especially indexical 
information. van Fraassen's prime example of perspectivity is cartography. A map, like a 
photograph, is nothing unless put to use as such. But, particularly in the case of a map, 
even assuming as unproblematic the map-supplied representational information of terrain 
markings, etc. and even assuming a 'you are here' pointer, an additional, essential piece of 
information that cannot be found in the map itself, viz. the information supplied by a user 
in the form of a self-ascriptive indexical (such as: 'I am here now').  
 
What holds true of the map and user also holds true for theory and user. While 
theories and their models are 'officially' not perspectival descriptions (86), they amount to 
nothing until put to use, and application entails perspectivity. In science, perspectivity 
means measurement, and measurement is “...science’s main initial access to the 
phenomena” (87). Measurement yields the perspectival information that selectively 
represents the target, but at a carefully placed level of abstraction. Measurement does not 
show us what the target is like (actually), “but only what it 'looks like' in that 
measurement setup” (175). The data of the measurement are taken in an interaction 
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within the phenomenal world, but are represented in a logical space, a representation 
initially taking the form of a data model.  
 
The so-called logical space in which measurement representations occur is what 
might be called by others a conceptual-space or conceptual-framework. van Fraassen 
gives as example the warmth of the room, whereby a thermometer reading is a 
representation in one sort of logical space, while mean kinetic energy is a different 
measurement representation in a different logical space. Relative to a theory, these could 
be folded into a greater logical space and viewed as different perspectives on the same 
thing.  The data model is further massaged (“‘smooths’ - in fact, ‘idealizes’” (167)) into a 
surface model, which takes some liberties afforded by statistical methods. The surface 
model, in principle, can now be compared with the empirical substructure of the 
theoretical models, and if a match is found, embedded in the particular theoretical model 
(and if not found, the model is rejected).71 van Fraassen writes: “So there is a ‘matching’ 
of structures involved; but is a ‘matching’ of two mathematical structures, namely the 
theoretical model and the data model” (6). And, the data/surface models connect the 
theory to phenomena by way of pragmatically enabled representation. Thus, the theory is 
the ultimate logical space within which these different representations can find a home 
with respect to one another and with respect to other things.  
 
                                                 
71  I say 'in principle' because of the reductive pragmatic treatment given to such models (next paragraph) 
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van Fraassen is leading up to his constructive empiricist account of structuralism 
which must make sense of the connection between abstract mathematical statements and 
phenomena.  
 
To that end, van Fraassen considers the riddle of Reichenbach’s coordination 
problem, which is the problem of linking-up the objects of knowledge in mathematics 
with the objects of knowledge in physics. The theorems of mathematics are epistemically 
grounded on their internal coherence, while the truth of statements of physics is 
dependent on something external. Reichenbach argued we cannot just correlate an item of 
the one set with an item of the other, because, to do this properly, the items must 
themselves first be defined, yet we find that definitions presuppose the very theories 
whose elements we are trying to define in the first place. Reichenbach settled on the idea 
that the 'real' objects are in-themselves undefined, whereas the mathematical/theoretical 
items are uniquely defined by virtue of the system in which they participate, and so, 
physical objects (or perceptual objects) receive definition (at least initially) by being 
subsumed under the defining powers of the theoretical system in coordination with those 
theoretically defined elements. However, Reichenbach adds that, while the physical 
(perceptual) lack definition apart from the theory, it nevertheless constrains the theory in 
important ways so as to prevent willy-nilly correlations leading to absurd results.  
 
van Fraassen takes the riddle of the coordination problem to be “How can  an 
abstract entity, such as a mathematical space, represent something that is not abstract, 
something in nature?” (2006:2; also 1980:240). There is a shift from 'coordination' to 
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'representation,' but van Fraassen defends this, saying 'coordination' carries some baggage 
of mathematical ideas that might lull us (as he claims it did Reichenbach) not just into 
wrongly framing the actual problem in terms of mathematics itself, but in assuming a 
“presuppositionless starting point” (137). “But  that makes sense only if the question of 
just what coordination can be, between something abstract and something concrete, has 
already been settled” (2). As he goes on to explain, if one (e.g. a realist) thinks of 
coordination in terms of a functional-mapping-to-the-world, then this requires we identify 
the domain, the range, and the coordinating relation between them. But, “if the target is 
not a mathematical object, then we do not have a well-defined range for the function” (3).  
 
van Fraassen imagines a realist trying to defend the functional-mapping-to-the-
world idea, by conceiving of the range of the physical system (say, a thunderstorm) as a 
set of parts in relation to one another; but, this is still to use the mathematical to relate to 
mathematics. If the realist says that, because the physical thing is real, the set-designated 
parts are real, and so, it is these real parts that get embedded in (or are isomorphically or 
homomorphically mappable into) a mathematical structure, then van Fraassen responds 
that this is fine except for the erroneous assumption of uniqueness, for we could have 
divided and grouped any number of different ways.  
 
van Fraassen concludes Reichenbach made the fundamental mistake (and became 
'puzzled'  as a result) of neglecting context in his framing of the problem: “...how a 
specific mathematical object  can be used to represent specific phenomena makes sense 
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only in a context in which some description of the latter is at hand” (5).72 Reichenbach 
misguidedly sought out theory-neutral, 'empiricistically hygienic' (6) description (a 'naïve' 
view, says van Fraassen), as if we could know the world directly and outside of context 
(and language and theory), which is to ignore the key fact that “there is no independent 
epistemic access to the parameters to be measured—no access independent of 
measurement” (138).  
 
In fact, pragmatic conditions on representation (and so coordination) go further 
than mere necessity, but become sufficient (assuming the obvious qualifications): “...we 
can use any suitable entity, abstract or concrete, to represent something else, and 
represent it as thus or so, but only provided we [already] have a pertinent description of 
both items. The description must be in our own language, in our language-in-use” (5). So, 
by the prodigious powers of pragmatism, it would seem anything can be made to 
represent, that theory and world are successfully linked (in whatever ways pragmatic 
concerns deem permissible), and having re-assigned all problems that formerly puzzled 
great minds to pragmatism, there remains precious little else to do!  
 
Finally, and important to present concerns, van Fraassen (giving a 'mea culpa') 
concedes that his initial presentation of the semantic view of theories in Scientific Image 
appeared to suggest just such a (metaphysically-oriented) position as the functional 
mapping one: “For empirical adequacy uses unquestioningly the idea that concrete 
observable entities (the appearances or phenomena) can be isomorphic to abstract ones 
                                                 
72  Note that van Fraassen uses ‘used’ in the quote. 
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(substructures of models)” (3). Now, it should be clear what was meant (at the time or ex 
post facto), for “If we try to check a claim of empirical adequacy, then we will compare 
one representation or description with another, namely, the theoretical model and the data 
model” (8). There can be no such thing as a context-free checking for a match of the 
phenomena directly with the theory:  
 
...the phenomenon, what it is like, taken by itself, does not determine 
which structures are data models for it. That depends on our selective 
attention to the phenomenon, and our decisions in attending to certain 
aspects, to represent them in certain ways and to a certain extent. (7)  
 
Similarly, there is no context-free checking the representation of phenomena for a match 
with the theory: 
 
There is nothing in an abstract structure itself that can determine that it is 
the relevant data model, to be matched by the theory. A particular data 
model is relevant because it was constructed on the basis of results 
gathered in a certain way, selected by specific criteria of relevance, on 
certain occasions, in a practical experimental or observational setting, 
designed for that purpose. (253) [italics in the original] 
 
Thus, for the empiricist, 'the theory is adequate to the phenomena' and 'the theory is 
adequate to the phenomena as represented' turn out to be the same.73 
 
Now, the ground is properly set for van Fraassen's constructive empiricist version 
of structuralism (denote this CES). In Scientific Representation, he has taken 
                                                 
73   I have omitted van Fraassen's argument from history: "how can such coordinating definitions be 
meaningfully introduced except in a historical context where there are some prior coordinatings already in place? I 
submit that they cannot" (121). 
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structuralism into the core of his argument nexus to the point it supplants the widely 
received interpretation of his earlier views presented in SI. About this perceived shift in 
van Fraassen's fundamental view, Giere (2009) writes: “So, regarding unobservables, he 
was [in Scientific Image] a semantic realist but an epistemological agnostic,” whereas 
now, in Scientific Representation, van Fraassen has “abandoned standard semantics for a 
usage based view of scientific representation” whereby he is free to abandon agnosticism 
as well, with the result that “Empiricist structuralism is closer to skepticism than 
agnosticism” (2009:9). van Fraassen gives the essence of his structuralism in two points: 
“(1) Science represents the empirical phenomena as embeddable in certain abstract 
structures (theoretical models); (2) those abstract structures are describable only up to 
structural isomorphism” (238).  
 
Point (1) issues directly from the considerations just discussed. Point (2) places an 
in-principle upper-bound on the resolving power of structuralist theories: 
“...mathematical structures, as Weyl so emphatically pointed out, are not distinguished 
beyond isomorphism—to know the structure of a mathematical object is to know all there 
is to know” (238). In other words, if two representations of the world (which we may, on 
a qualitative consideration, regard as inequivalent) nevertheless both equally fit a 
particular mathematical theoretical model, then that model declares them two different 
instances of the same thing. Giere gives, as an example of this, vibrations in a diatomic 
gas molecule versus vibrations in electromagnetic radiation such as visible light. Whereas 
we might regard these as distinctly different, the mathematical structure treats both as 
instances of harmonic motion, and “that is as far as our theoretical knowledge can go” 
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(2009:9). So, whereas Worrall would hold that the same equations could embrace both 
Fresnel's model of light and Maxwell's model of light but yet the models remain 
importantly differentiable, van Fraassen seems to be arguing that all theories are 
essentially structural and, moreover, ought not distinguish among equally embeddable 
though intensionally different measure-representations (except insofar as pragmatic 
factors would overrule).  
 
I read Worrall as encouraging non-structural theories on the one hand while 
holding firm to the structure as a divining rod (so to speak) pointing us towards the truth. 
van Fraassen is boldly discouraging concrete theories and viewing the structural 
replacement as itself not even a possible world-representation but simply as a 'vehicle' for 
measurement-representations. To accommodate historically residual concrete theories 
within these assertions, van Fraassen views concrete theories as pis aller, their saving 
grace providing serviceable outputs for getting around in the world to those unlucky 
enough to be stuck with nothing better: “...the stories about nature, about what things are 
like, which spell out a way the world could possibly be like for such a theory to be true, 
take on a lesser role. They allow us to move around in the theory, to exercise the 
imagination, even to get to the point intellectually where we can draw qualitative 
consequences via the theory without actual calculation” (238). Notice the shift in van 
Fraassen's language here. Whereas, in Scientific Image, under the semantic view, theories 
are identified with those 'stories' (qua semantic models) in a way that aimed at preserving 
much of the semantic and epistemological content, by contrast, in Scientific 
Representation the 'stories' are fully eliminable, along with the semantic and 
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epistemological content, where the genuine (or ideal) theory is now an abstract 
mathematical structure.  
 
In the final chapters of his book, van Fraassen cements his commitment to 
structuralism and hardens his view that structural theories, without any 'internal' content 
(that is, without a story about unobservables etc.), manifests the enlightened goal of 
science. Because van Fraassen's structuralism depends so heavily on pragmatic factors, 
there is the obvious danger to his position that pragmatic factors, specifically propositions 
expressing indexicality, become themselves the subject of scientific representations and 
theories (i.e. become 'naturalized'), but van Fraassen strongly insists (261) such facts 
remain in-principle beyond the scope of science, since theories can only ever describe 
and there is an in-principle difference between describing a capacity and having the 
capacity.  
 
van Fraassen's many examples seem designed to drive home the point that a great gulf 
hangs between the initial interaction with (phenomenal) things, through many 
intermediary steps and modifications, to the decision about what the data should be taken 
to 'represent,' and then, a further gulf, across further steps, from that point to the theory. If 
the theory is not structural, it ought to be, and so embedding is exchanged for empirical 
success without wanting or needing a realist tale of unobservables. van Fraassen uses 
every opportunity to argue for the contextual dependence of various key operations 
(measuring, representing, etc.), thereby further removing the sense that science is 
grasping at reality, and replacing it instead with the sense science is just supplying 
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pragmatically determined outputs to certain highly contextualized inputs. It does not 
seem to occur to van Fraassen to defend this pragmatic basis as he charges realists must 
defend their basis. I see him sawing furiously, if elegantly, to cleave the bough from the 
tree, not realizing he is sitting on the doomed part. For, these very same gulfs that have 
been argued for also exist between the objects of pragmatics and the agent seeking to use 
them. Moreover, having blocked (for good reason) the trespass of science into pragmatic 
factors, it leaves him with substantially fewer resources to defend these factors.  
 
Concluding Comments on van Fraassen 
 
In Scientific Image, van Fraassen treated theories as models with essential 
representational powers. He there argues that the antirealist should defend antirealism by 
applying a clear epistemological line in the sand past which it is not acceptable to make 
commitments or to allow belief. In this scheme, the antirealist could still fully immerse in 
the theory and milk all the benefits of doing so but should understand it as a pragmatic 
exercise. I argued that van Fraassen's strategy of adopting the vehicle of realism but 
striving to avoid commitment by avoiding the mental acknowledgments just amounts to 
realism anyway. Once we clarify a true antirealist path, we see it is sterile. An antirealism 
that little more than parrots realism might just as well be called 'realism,' especially if 
realism is understood in terms of methodology not legal declarations.  
 
In Scientific Representation, however, van Fraassen has tilted towards a more 
radical antirealism which now seeks to remove all realist trappings and to shift the notion 
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of representation away from a capacity essential to the model and toward a purely 
pragmatic operation, where the representational is just an effect of context and 
convention. Whereas before, with an essentially representing model, one could adopt an 
agnostic stance and say 'maybe the model is telling us correctly about the trans-
observational part of the world, but we must refrain from believing so,' now van Fraassen 
is arguing that our epistemological stance is irrelevant because there are only the 
pragmatic exercises of taking measures, building data models, embedding these in 
abstract mathematical structures and only up to isomorphism (which cannot distinguish 
intensionally different models), and evaluating the pragmatic results. At bottom, the 
actual world (whether observable or not) is being removed from consideration. This is 
van Fraassen's solution to Reichenbach's coordination problem (which, for Reichenbach, 
was the problem of how to bridge the mathematical and the actual world). For van 
Fraassen, the target of representation is not the world, but just another mathematical 
object (the surface model). This way of picturing things appears to solve many problems 
at once and yields a view of science in which scientists are not really investigating the 
nature of the world, but merely devising mathematical objects and plugging these into 
mathematical structures.  
 
However, we can ask whether the world can so successfully be sidestepped in this 
way that the antirealist should never have to get his hands dirty.  The central problems 
with van Fraassen’s newer view are (i) rather than opting to mimic the realist, now he 
opts for the sterile method, which only works until it encounters the first bump in the 
road; and, (ii) all the eggs have been placed into one basket, viz. pragmatics, and, as I 
133 
argued in the section that rejects the priority of the use-meaning thesis, pragmatics must 
be underwritten by realism. Whereas, in Scientific Image, van Fraassen’s strategy was to 
divide the observable from that which is pragmatically determined (such that his account 
contained at least one set of things completely free of epistemologically worry), in 
Scientific Representation, his strategy is to render all of science into a pragmatic activity. 
He emphatically burns all bridges to an context-independent knowledge of the world, 
saying, “There is no independent epistemic access to the parameters to be measured—no 
access independent of measurement” (138).  
 
Yet, if there is, now, nothing immune from epistemic worry and if all activity, that 
a realist would want to describe as ‘coming to know what the world is really like,’ is just 
so much qualitatively empty, pragmatic, numerical procedures, then where is the 
guarantee that pragmatic conditions indeed obtain in order to warrant the particular 
procedure? Such a guarantee would have to make appeal to actual circumstances in the 
world (the circumstances that comprise contexts). Yet, wouldn’t this, by van Fraassen’s 
account, require appeal to further contexts, in order to take those measurements and 
produce those data-models, and so on, required to establish the first round of contexts? As 
well, distinguishing that set of features of the world which comprise the context from 
those features, mixed together with the first set, which do not, also requires a context. 
This leads to regress. The problem is only exacerbated by the involvement of 
conventions, and other determiners of pragmatic value, that require a voluminous and 
enormously nuanced account of the world. Since no part of the new account sets aside a 
special reserve of knowledge of the world that may be taken for granted, van Fraassen’s 
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new account falters. Yet, if there is a way, outside of context, to know the contexts, then 
that same way may be utilized for knowing other things outside the context. This 
undermines van Fraassen’s new account.  Finally, as already stated, the new view, unless 
it can show a methodological pathway to empirically fruitfully successful theories, will 
come to a sterile dead-end. It is not enough to declare a dividing line between the context 
of justification and the context of discovery, for I assert, a key component of the meta-
justification of the justification is precisely demonstrating its capacity to bear fruit. That 
is, if an inferential method does not yield mostly successful results, then it is legitimate to 







My plan for this paper, in defending realism, could not be simpler or less original. 
Determine the fundamental vulnerabilities of antirealism and the basic lines of attack 
deployed against realism, and then, formulate an account of realism which both 
counterattacks the antirealist vulnerabilities and shields against the antirealist lines of 
attack. Where successful, this is the way of philosophical progress.  
 
The fundamental vulnerabilities of antirealism, or almost any view for that matter, 
are found in its undefended assumptions. On my analysis, antirealists generally assume 
that language and direct-realism may be taken as givens. The strategy for many 
contemporary antirealists has been, in one form or another, to argue that realist claims 
about certain classes of purported things in the world are best understood as mere 
functions of language in concert with simple observation. Since the latter are taken by the 
antirealist as givens, then the judgments based on these are taken to be sound ones.  
 
The main lines of attack made against realism have targeted either the grounds for 
its claims or the very medium of its claims (i.e. the language of realism). The most gentle 
of attacks only pitch realism as insecure. The most severe of attacks portrays the realist's 
claims as incoherent. Antirealists then argue their alternative is the better one, being 
neither risky nor unintelligible. Underdetermination has been the weapon of choice for 
antirealists, whether used explicitly or implicitly, in undermining realist's grounds for 
thinking claims of unobservables even approximately or probably true.  
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Naturally, the shrewd realist should respond by constructing a view of realism that 
challenges the antirealist givens and that presents realist claims and the grounds for those 
claims in terms that cannot be opposed by the antirealist without undermining antirealism 
as well. These grounds should plainly confront underdetermination. 
 
The view of realism I have formulated requires that we begin at 'epistemic 
ground-zero,' an epistemic starting-place described by orthodox scientific theories which 
hold that humans are so biologically configured that our sensory output is, in fact, 
amorphous, that our minds lack direct access to the world, and that we are not born 
knowing a language or any other facts about the world. As a result, direct-observation 
and language are ruled-out as givens. I further argue that, in ascending from ground-zero 
to an epistemic position from which we may infer basic facts about the world, we must 
utilize a non-linguistic means of forming representations of the world and must appeal to 
abduction in justifying a representation as more or less correct.74 Achieving this for even 
the simplest facts, of the sort even antirealists would require, means finding a route to 
successfully coping with underdetermination. This is accomplished by a combination of 
(i) parliamentary agreement with antirealists of minimal grounds for making possible 
science in the face of global skepticism, (ii) crafting a position of modesty and 
methodological emphasis for realist progress, and (iii) viewing success in 'cornering the 
                                                 
74 I have phrased (‘infer,’ ‘utilize,’ ‘appeal,’ etc.) this description of ascent from ground-zero as though the 
agent were consciously in control of the process, but I wish to emphasize that the process could be 
automatic. Perhaps, it works better with a conscious and self-conscious agent. 
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truth' in terms of a diminishing pool of remaining contender theories, rather than in 
approximate truth in terms of the relationship of a current theory to the world.75  
 
Kuhn's antirealist account is heavily invested in the 'given' of language as well as 
in unwarranted assumptions about the nature of language, the priority of language, the 
epistemology of language, and the agent-world-language relationship. Kuhn's attacks on 
realists are in terms of these very assumptions. Underdetermination is an element of this 
attack, especially in the way his account implies realists cannot discern investigating the 
nature of the world from fitting phenomena into the conceptual boxes of the socio-
linguistic construction. Because of this overdependence on language, kicking out the 
pillar of support for his thesis also removes the force behind his offensive. I argued that 
the nature of language is such that it is not monolithic but stratified, that language cannot 
have priority since we must know the world sufficiently before acquiring a language in 
order to acquire it, that scientific language is just one influence (and a weak one) among 
many shaping our observation of the world, to list a few of the arguments aimed at 
Kuhn's central vulnerability. I agree with Kuhn that agents have no direct access to the 
world and that all we have is a construction; however, I disagree with Kuhn in that I hold 
this construction is fundamentally non-linguistic and that we have grounds for progress 
towards a correct view of the world.  
 
Hanson is also heavily invested in language and makes considerable assumptions, 
like Kuhn, about the nature, priority, epistemology, and agent-world-language relation of 
                                                 
75 Though, we can make a judgment (and find some degree of confidence) about the current theory with 
respect to the pool.  
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language. I defend many of Hanson's assumptions as more reasonable than Kuhn's. 
Hanson's account of stratified, modular conceptual systems, of theoretical progress, and 
of theory-ladenness are very much in league with my own view. However, the central 
dependence on language is ultimately Hanson's undoing. His main argument for realism 
is an indispensability argument: the very forces of language which pattern phenomena in 
concert with the other patterns and logics of the rest of the linguistic strata also compel us 
to accept-as-true whichever empirically successful theory is under current consideration. 
However, as antirealists have noted, we may simply view this sort of accepting-as-true as 
a function of language, rather than as a judgment about the world. Further, Hanson does 
not provide a prophylactic against underdetermination. I hope my own account has 
captured some of the best parts of Hanson's account but has avoided its pitfalls. 
 
I tried to divide van Fraassen's general account into two different sorts of account, 
one that avoids dependence on language, in appealing to the semantic view of theories, 
and one that is heavily dependent on language, in appealing to pragmatics. The first 
account, as read straightforwardly and considered somewhat independently from van 
Fraassen's wider view, depends heavily on direct-realism and is specially designed to 
exploit the weakness of realism to underdetermination. van Fraassen argues we are able 
to check the match of the empirical substructures of models to our observations of the 
world, but we are not able to check the match of the internal structures of models to the 
world, which underdetermination guarantees will be infinitely many. van Fraassen's 
supporting arguments for his semantic view of theories was intended to bear out this 
view, as well as to supply an antirealist license for science to continue operating just as it 
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does, even with scientists acting and speaking just like realists. However, I countered that 
this dependence on the 'given' of direct-realism, and a closer inspection of van Fraassen's 
semantic view of theories itself, reveal an antirealist vulnerability to underdetermination, 
a lacuna for practical application, a means for eliminating EE contender theories (that 
helps the realist cope with underdetermination), and a resultant methodological approach 
that coerces the antirealist into realism.  
 
van Fraassen's language-dependent view is seen in his accounts of explanation 
and constructive empiricist structuralism.  In his explanationist account, he advocates 
pursuit of causal, realist-like concrete theories, while his structuralist account leads him 
to advocate that those realist-like theories be avoided in favor of abstract mathematical 
ones. Nevertheless, his central argument is that the key operations involved in scientific 
judgments (explanation, representing, measuring, and so on) are fundamentally pragmatic 
operations, essentially dependent on context, indexicals, and other pragmatic parameters. 
These judgments are therefore pragmatic ones. Since those who utilize pragmatics are 
merely carrying out linguistic operations, realist aims are therefore precluded (or 
deflated). I noted two general liabilities of van Fraassen's appeal to pragmatics. First, if 
the constructive empiricist is doing something other than merely mimicking realism, 
then, not being required to use realist theories, the constructive empiricist should have an 
independent means to carry out science that works just as well. I argue he does not, and 
so, he offers no real alternative to realist methodology. If, as I try to argue, those who 
pursue realist methods just are (despite beliefs) realists, then the constructive empiricist is 
a realist. The second general liability is in accounting for the epistemological and even 
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metaphysical requirements for carrying out pragmatic operations themselves. If the 
pragmaticist must appeal to realism to make possible pragmatics, then that undermines 
the constructive empiricist goals. In other words, I challenged the central 'given' of 
language for this part of van Fraassen's view.  
 
For each of the philosophers studied in this paper, I have tried to show that the 
dependence on a 'given' of direct-realism or language always ends badly. I also attempted 
to uncover the fatal flaws in the antirealist attacks on realism. I have not fully 
demonstrated my own view, but I hope I have at least shown it does not suffer the 










Note 1  
A More Careful Illustration of Abduction Under Epistemic Restrictions 
 
I emphasize that this illustration is merely figurative and that abduction may 
proceed by other routes. On the one hand, in Chapter One, I said that abduction is 
guessing about the state-of-affairs in an entirely different domain (the target domain) by 
way of indirect information composed of elements of the known (M-model) domain; 
then, on the other hand, I gave examples (toy in a giftbox, Wright brothers) where 
nothing at all is hidden or mysterious about the target (except perhaps that it doesn't 
materialize until some future point), where resemblance may be vindicated (ultimately) 
by an easy look-see. So, to clarify things, I will here sketch a more proper case of 
abduction, though, full disclosure, I am hardly equipped nor have I even begun to figure 
out the full details of abductive logic; this is just an attempt to make an attempt. As well, I 
make boatloads of assumptions. But, as the account develops (in this paper and beyond), 
these assumptions can find justification or be eliminated. We have to start somewhere. 
 
So, let us assume a set of blip and bleep values (b1, b2,...,bn) delivered by a set of 
n vectors D1, D2,...,Dn.76 This makes an n-tuple of possible values. Let's say a particular 
assignment of values to each element of the n-tuple makes one pixel. We can imagine the 
n vectors generating an n-dimensional space (a possibility space for models under the 
                                                 
76 ‘Blips and bleeps’ are the output of detectors. A detector could be a nose, eye, thermometer, etc.. Each 
detector’s range of output makes for a vector in the space of empirical possibilities. I use ‘blips and 
bleeps’ to emphasize that there is no meaningful content assumed at epistemic ground-zero.  
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fixed constraints), and one coordinate in this space being a pixel. I am further assuming 
here that the realized values are involuntarily delivered to us, that we can faithfully recall 
past realized values, and other cognitive, etc., issues may be considered unproblematic 
for the time being. Motivationally, I'm also going to assume, for illustration, that the 
meta-situation is that we are building an M-model from a position concealed from the 
target (in the head of an animal), that the target is the physical world, that the vectors are 
sensory detectors, that the information is reliable, etc.. I will elect one sensor Dt to be a 
time sensor (perhaps, measured in terms of strength of memory, etc.). Finally, I designate 
a set of actions (A1,...,An) available to the agent. In terms of the meta-situation, this 
might correspond to things like 'turning head left,' 'reaching out,' etc.. But, for the 
homuncular model-builder, it will not be known what these actions or detectors actually 
are doing/detecting. We can imagine him having simply a row of buttons A1, A2, etc., 
and a set of outputting devices D1, D2, etc., and a grid that lights up. This model-builder, 
then, is a little like the guy in Searle's Chinese Room. 
 
Let us imagine, next, that data streams in from the detectors and lights up the grid. 
There will be rough clusters of pixel activity that appear time after time (owing to the 
generous assumptions of the example). The model-builder draws lines around the clusters 
(i.e. classing certain bunches of n-tuple values) and remembers these as nodes or 
concepts or objects (c1, c2,..., cn). Next, he draws relational lines combinatorially 
connecting all the objects, together with the action-states, as for example the triple R1 = 
<c1,c3,<A1,..,An>> or 4-tuple R2 = <c1,c3,c4,<A1,...,An>> etc.. The state S of the 
model would be the n-tuple of all relations <R1, R2,..,Rn> which ultimately just amounts 
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to a fancy classing of co-active pixels. I suggest that relations become characteristic over 
time, as the differences among the states take shape. The defining of such characteristics 
takes place in second-order models (models whose targets are first-order models). 
However, the first-order model is the metaphysically significant one, in that our aim is to 
make it resemble a worldly target.  
 
The critic objects: “But, who's to say which collection of pixels is properly a 
'cluster'? What grounds making this vs. that decision here?” And, it doubtless looks 
arbitrary and unmethodical. Yet, that's how it has to be done at the start. Abduction is 
unique, I assert, in its capacity to stipulate hypothetical categories, virtually ex nihilo. The 
methodology enters afterwards, in a way analogous to a Bayesian prior probability which 
will come to meet an updating procedure that hopes eventually to wash away those first 
priors (though, I stress, the Bayesian prior presupposes the categories).  
 
In the second-order space, the model-builder will, e.g., look at the behavior of all 
m-tuple relations (indexing/plotting the relative m-tuple values with respect to one 
another), and in a fashion similar to how objects were defined in the first-order model, 
draw a circle around a cluster. It may turn out that, say, R5 and R6 exhibit very similar 
behavior. Or, R6 may be unique. Or, R9 may be so uncharacteristic and un-clustered 
(uncorrelated) that we decide to eliminate it as a contender. – Similarly, the model-builder 
can construct a second-order space on objects and draw similar conclusions. – The central 
purpose of the second-order model is regulative. We use these to help us define the 
'vocabulary,' so to speak, for the first-order parts, to manage expectations on these parts. 
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In the absence of more precise expectations, we may import and use the second-order 
object as a boilerplate object on the first-order model. There is no problem that I can see 
with this because what makes something first or second-order is the target, not the pieces.  
I must urge here, with special emphasis: ONLY the first-order model is inferring to the 
world. The higher-order models are only targeting lower-order models. From my point of 
view, much philosophical confusion arises from puzzling how something as abstract as 
physical laws should connect to the world, whereas such laws are typically and for the 
most part not speaking (directly) about the world at all. It follows from my position, 
perhaps problematically, that we can only assert one model of the world, whether that 
model includes tables and chairs or quarks. Of course, in practice, we have multitudes of 
models of the world, but philosophically, I view these as all being pieces of the same 
global-model. Where a theory or model becomes general, it ceases to be about the world 
any longer. Thus, van Fraassen's examples of representation in the form of generalized 
numerical charts and graphs strikes me as silly. These things are not resemblances of 
chart-like and graph-like things in the world, so of course, it will be perplexing to ponder 
how such things could 'represent' items in the world. In my view, such things are just 
models of models and say nothing (directly) about the world. Finally, I add that some 
models may seem to possess a general character in virtue of modeling some specific thing 
(e.g., a sort of molecule) and such a model will be asserted correct for all equally 
resembling individuals. But, I would argue this is not a case of generality in a strict sense 
(as it is possible to make a true general statement of a set of things, a statement that 
would be false for any element (e.g., 'the average family has 3.4 members')). In the case 
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of models, resemblance can hold between the model and any number of equally 
resembling targets (e.g., a model of H2O and every H2O molecule in the universe).  
 
Consider a fanciful case of abductive model-building, meant to show how, from 
barebones epistemological resources and epistemic ground-zero, a simple creature might 
come to have a representation of the world: Unbeknownst to a homuncular model-
builder, he's in the clammy head of a Snedley the snail. Let's suppose two detectors D1 
and D2 which are registering taste and touch (the model-builder knows none of this). 
This makes a simple vector-space. Let's further assume (for the meta-situation) only two 
items of interest in Snedley's environment: uncomfy rocks and delightful morsels of food. 
We can imagine his experience over some interval of time adding up to this:  
 
Object c1 is, we know, a rock, and c2 is a morsel. Let Snedley's actions be: A1= move 
forward tilt right; A2=move forward tilt left; A3=stop. We initially assume the relation R1 
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to hold between the two objects. Again, I emphasize that the homumcular model-builder 
knows nothing qualitative here, nothing of the target.  
 
Next, we construct a second-order model which, we could imagine, is built-up as 
a stack of first-order models, with the z-axis being time, as a kind of representation of 
memory (I picture this as a stack of photo-transparency snapshots illuminated from the 
side opposite observation and observed from the top or side):  
 
 





We would see a kind of averaging of the objects and relations (left-side figure), but it 
would be an abductive decision where to draw the second-order lines representing the 
second-order conceptualization (right-side figure).  The side view of the second-order 
stack would also yield some interesting subject matter for us: 
 
  
Let's call this side-view the 'time view' for the sake of this example, though I stress that 
the second-order models could be constructed along various dimensions. I have neglected 
so far to include the coordinating elements of the actions A1, A2,..., which are an integral 
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part of the relation, because this would complicate the illustration too much. But, we can 
consider it (in a simplified form) now:  
 
 
Suppose Snedley lives in a simple environment as pictured above (2 rocks, 1 morsel). If 
he maintains a sustained action over a period of time, then the 'time view' of the 2nd-
order model would appear as shown above on the right (I represent the rocks in gray and 
the morsel in red). This table summarizes:  
 
 t1 t2 t3 
A1 (fwd-R) Rock Rock Food 
A2 (fwd-L) Food Rock Rock 
A3 (stop)    Nothing Nothing Nothing 
 
The model-building homunculus is oblivious of all but the 'blips and bleeps' of the grid 
and has only the model-making tools at his disposal. In the table above, he would have 
c1, c2, etc. rather than 'rock' or 'food,' and R1 is just an interesting link rather than, say, a 
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'spatial relation.' Nevertheless, after a while, following abductive procedures, these grid-
objects and relations will take characteristic shape.  E.g., because the homunculus is tying 
the actions to the objects with respect to their interplay over time, the 2nd-order relation 
2R1 will eventually germinate a little personality. Because rocks stay put and morsels 
tend to disappear and reappear in different places, our homunculus may come to label as 
R2 the relation between rock and morsel encounters, but retain R1 for the relation 
between rocks encounters. For the homunculus, R1, personality or not, is just R1, and 
even if the homunculus has his own separate knowledge of spatial, causal, temporal, etc. 
relations, those ideas have no applicability here.  
 
Our homunculus should build a model such that the behavior of the model 
coincides with the activity of the grid. Obviously, many models would work (have 
empirical success) just fine here.77 For now, let us imagine some possibilities, with c1 
(rock-like experience) relabeled r and with c2 (morsel-like experience) relabled m. For 
simplicity, I will continue to use the single relation R1. I represent below a portion of 
each model outside the active grid and a portion superimposed atop the active grid. In 
each case, the model is matching-up with the activity of the grid: 
 
                                                 
77 Underdetermination! 
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There's no reason to assume that any given model-object mapping onto experience is one-
of-a-kind, one of a small number of the same kind, or one of a long series. The first 
model above supposes the latter. The second model supposes the former. The third model 
is, we know, the correct one for Snedley's actual environment. All such models 
collectively form only a subset of the total pool of possibilities, and it is certainly beyond 
the ken of any animal (snail or human) to know all the members of this set.  
 
Of course, the example of Snedly the snail and his homuncular model-builder is a 
fairy-tale. Snails certainly operate by different means. I don't pretend to be doing 
molluscoid epistemology here. However, it is my hope that the morality-play of Snedly's 
working towards epistemological salvation is philosophically instructive. And, my 
approach is not entirely divorced from work being done in cognitive science and biology 
(not explored in this paper). I intend only that my reader should witness how, by way of 
philosophical reconstruction, I envision that abduction might operate under the epistemic 
strictures of ground-zero.  
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Note 2:  
 
One imagines different sets of vectors, the output of each set orthogonal to the 
next, ad infinitum, as an old science fiction movie portrayed an endless number of 
distinctly different universes all sharing the same location but each existing at a different 
unique frequency and oblivious to one another. Certainly, treating vectors formally (D1, 
D2,..., Dn,...) and assuming an infinite supply, one may infinitely partition on the set and 
produce an infinite number of models, even though each cell can only produce a finite 
number of models. As an analogy, we could imagine each cell of the partition 
corresponding to one person forming opinions about his world based on his unique group 
of detectors (with the supply of vectors/detectors such that no amount of acquisition of 
additional ones would ever threaten that uniqueness). This, however, still does not settle 
whether there are going to be an infinite number of sui generis models, only that there are 
an infinite number of models. Yet, if only a finite number (however large) of sui generis 
models are possible, then the infinite number of repetitions is of no interest or worry. One 
might think it easy enough to attempt some sort of diagonalization procedure whereby 
each model includes a point-on-a-real-number-line, corresponding to a real number such 
that we could diagonalize and produce a new point-on-a-real-number-line for each new 
member, ad infinitum. But this misconstrues the representational purpose of a model (just 
as if one were to try a similar diagonalization on observation-reports): (i) M-model 
constructions must be grounded on the data, so such point-on-a-number-line chunks are 
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Within the bounds of non-global-skepticism feasibility, any given finite vector-set 
will cap possibility to a finite number of possible models. Thus, the remaining avenue 
open to underdetermination would be the worst-case scenario of an infinite number of 
available vectors, whereby we could infinitely partition (as described above) and produce 
an infinite number of competitor world-models. There are independent reasons not to take 
seriously the worry of an actual infinity of possible vector/detectors, especially given the 
start-point assumptions that antirealists make about the world and our capacity to glean 
facts from it. Nevertheless, let's persist further in exploring the ramifications of this 
worry. First, it's worth mentioning that a cardinal component of the epistemic/social 
account of the practice and viability of science is, in terms of my view, the acquisition of 
new vectors/detectors over time (e.g. people-detectors). Some detectors, such as those for 
detecting electromagnetic energies, are regarded as treating-of a whole continuum of 
would-be vectors (such that a would-be infinite collection is collapsed into a single 
detector/vector). So, for the underdetermination worry under consideration to really bite 
at us, it would need to demand that the partitioned sets of vectors are neither (i) 
extendible into one another nor (ii) collapsible into one another, in either case in a way 
that would reduce the number of possibilities to a finite set. It is worth noting that 
antirealists, especially those who base their accounts on the assumption of sharing a 
common understanding (as in, a common language) among people, would regard the 
possibility of non-intersecting, dislocated conceptualizations of the world as an 
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impossibility (being that linguistic concepts are public artifacts to begin with (by the 
views popular among antirealists)).   
 
A second clarification has to do with the scope of aim in selecting our target. It is 
assumed that the universe is a fairly homogenous place within certain limits of time and 
space, otherwise fragility would preclude any process of empirical discovery, and then, 
global skepticism would win. Our goals in acquiring knowledge are modest, at least in 
where we place the lower threshold. Science should at least tell us what's going on in our 
own neighborhood. If the possible infinity of vectors/detectors is due to the possibility of 
there being an infinite space throughout which detectors may be distributed, or is due to 
there being an infinity of different levels or neighborhoods throughout which detectors 
would be distributed, then we defuse this particular underdetermination bomb by sticking 
to the modest aim of only asking our science to conquer one region at a time. It would 
still be a science that which only could determine the first ten levels of our local 
neighborhood of the universe. So, for underdetermination to proceed, it would have to 
insist that the possibility of infinite vectors/detectors should threaten for any scope of 
target(s), irrespective of the size or breadth of level or neighborhood.  
 
Thirdly, there's another sort of modesty that realists are content with. Realism (on 
my account) does not insist to locate the true or even approximately true theory/model of 
the world or part/level/aspect of the world. Realists recognize, in despite of 
underdetermination, there are limits to what may be discerned. Cognitively limited 
animals can only do so much with the resources they have, and the human epistemic 
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position is only somewhat better. The modest realist only aims to make substantive 
progress in shrinking the pool of possible contender theories, and if only so much 
progress can be made, then c’est la vie. But, progress is progress, and the realist succeeds 
thereby. 
 
I add another small point of clarification. Typically, the underdetermination 
situation is framed (as above) as some number of theories, the data for which are equally 
fitting/confirming. But, under my scheme, the data of the vector-space can only be made 
consistent with the models formed in that very same vector space, and only a finite 
number of such models are possible for each set of vectors. So, for some finite set or sets 
of vectors, the set of possible competitor models consistent with the vector-specific data 
would only ever yield underdetermination in a non-threatening mode. The data for a 
particular vector-space is irrelevant to models of a different vector space. 
Underdetermination, of the worrisome sort, would have to be in terms of separate vector-
spaces each producing their own separate data sets for which (and out of which) models 
are constructed. So, the meta-situation would be that some real event e is occurring; and 
the respective detector-sets are reporting whatever they report (which we presume 
reliable); and the models for each vector-space are constructed accordingly. This raises 
the question whether the different models are genuinely comparable, apples to apples. 
The argument could be made that they are not, in which case underdetermination ceases 
to be a threat. If such a route is pursued, then an account is begged for by which a model 
may be correct (or true) peculiar to its vector-space. This notion of vector-relative 
correctness does make a certain kind of sense. Painters will produce a resemblance of the 
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subject in the medium of pigmented oils and canvas, and this mode of representation will 
be correct in a way distinct from, say, a sculptor’s representation in the medium of 
marble. If the resemblance to the subject of each piece of art is successful, then it should 
also be the case that the painting will resemble the statue. By parity, for some model 
relative to vector set A and a different model relative to vector set B, should some way 
exist so that the model of A could register to B and vice versa, then it would be the case 
that, in principle, an agent by the lights of B infers B's model to resemble A's model, and 
vice versa. Of course, adding one more link in the transitive chain of resemblance, 
supposing A's and B's models are mental ones, a common touchstone could be provided 
by a public model accessible to an agent holding an A-model and a separate agent 
holding a B-model. At any rate, another possible avenue to quelling underdetermination 








Note 1:   
I observe that van Fraassen neglects a few details. What is the model made of? 
Where is it located? Who manufactures them? These questions would just provide a little 
comedy if van Fraassen were talking strictly about logical models, under which anything, 
real or imagined, known or unknown, occupying any universe of discourse, which does 
not falsify a set of statements is therefore a model. Such models are useless to science. 
Clearly, van Fraassen has in mind some special subset of those logical models. The 
domain of discourse is obviously not the world itself. The models must be known (or 
knowable) by the scientists who use them. – So, the questions above are not so funny 
anymore. What is the nature of these models? – Because van Fraassen vehemently 
eschews any kind of modal realism, the models are not possible words or possibilities in 
some ontologically similar, modal realism sense. It seems clear, models, in van Fraassen's 
sense, are not (at least essentially) physical things that we could keep in a bank vault. van 
Fraassen would not accept their being mental entities, since (a) he strongly rejects other 
accounts that have a great reliance on mental entities; (b) he rejects IBE, in part, because 
he construes it as a psychological rule, so I'd guess he wouldn't want his account of 
models to depend on our actually having to think of each and every one (or conclusions 
being drawn from what we imagine about such models); and (c) in his subsequent book 
Scientific Representation (2006), he urges that representations (appearances) and theories 
must be public things, that there is “no room for the notion of mental images or mental 
representations" (2006:24). In fact, he gives (or, one can read from the text) three sorts of 
(non-exclusive) characterizations of models: (1) In his initial introduction of models, he 
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concludes with: “I will continue to use the word 'model' to refer to specific structures, in 
which all relevant parameters have specific values” (1980:44) (in contrast to van 
Fraassen's characterization of the use of models in science where certain parameters are 
left unspecified, and so are more properly model-types). 'Structure' is still ambiguous 
between mathematical structures and concrete (though not necessarily material) 
structures. Because van Fraassen's first example is an actual, drawn geometric figure (and 
to form a contrasting interpretation with my next point), I will regard this passage to 
indicate the concrete structure. (2) In his discussion of probability, van Fraassen applies 
his semantic view to solve the puzzle of precisely detailing what relative frequencies are. 
He says: “Such a [probability] space, and the model as a whole if it involves more, is a 
mathematical entity” (196). And, indeed, there are other passages, earlier, where his 
examples are ambiguous between mathematical and concrete objects. So, in this case, 
let's read this passage as indicating a mathematical object. (3) At the conclusion to the 
book, short of the epilogue, van Fraassen performs an astonishing feat (or shell-game) 
with modality. He asserts (openly acknowledging it is “at first blush inconsistent”) that 
“probability is a modality,” that “science includes irreducibly probabilistic theories,” and 
that “there is no modality in the scientific description of the world” (198). This apparent 
inconsistency gets resolved when modality is collapsed to a linguistic convention adopted 
by science for pragmatic ends. (van Fraassen is perhaps overly fond of this technique: 
identify a context-dependent concept in the opponent's assertion which cannot be 
deployed univocally; then, charge the asserted thing is therefore conventionally based). 
Says van Fraassen (I take the space for this quote because it encapsulates a boilerplate 
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approach for van Fraassen, including his treatment of explanation as this chapter 
canvasses):  
 
[The correct diagnosis of the problem] is that modality appears in science 
only in that the language naturally used once a theory has been accepted is 
modal language. This relocates the problem in philosophy of language. So 
if anyone asks: 'What more is there to look at in science besides the 
models, the actual phenomena, and the relationships between them?' we 
can answer 'The structure of the language used in a context where a 
scientific theory has been accepted.' And the problem of doing justice to 
modality will have been solved to an empiricist's satisfaction if we can 
explicate the use and structure of language without concluding that anyone 
who does use it is committed to some sort of metaphysical beliefs such as 
that alternative possible worlds are real. (198) 
 
A page earlier, van Fraassen discusses how modal realism and theoretical entity realism 
are more or less the same thing and dealt with in similar ways, viz. by understanding such 
realist talk as actually being about the non-empirical-substructures (aka 'internal 
structures') of models. – So, how does this all this add-up? On the surface, it seems safe 
to read van Fraassen as allowing any model to take the form of either a concrete object or 
a mathematical object, though he overwhelmingly favors the mathematical model for 
science. (1) Yet, neither of these objects, especially the mathematical one, has an 
empirical substructure of the sort described earlier. So, clearly, it must be the case that the 
mathematical object is only appointing models that do have the required substructures. 
Yet, this only brings us back to our original questions: Where are these models and what 
are they made of?  (2) Supposing the actual models to exist in some fashion, and some 
theory (in some language) which these models satisfy, the next question is: What role is 
the actual world (observable or otherwise) to play in this picture? Typically, theory and 
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models complete that picture, without dragging in any further players. What is the 
relation of model to world? Representative? van Fraassen will speak much about 
representation in SR, but not in this respect. In fact, he argues in SR for the (beatified) 
theory itself to have (or ought to have) no representational capacities at all. So, even 
assuming a match-up between model and world, what makes the model about the world? 
(3) Finally, we are told it is very important that at least one model have an empirical 
substructure isomorphic to all appearances. Why is this important, or any more important 
than just saying: 'We would like to have a complete accounting of every observable 
thing'? Why drag-in all this complex machinery if it amounts to little more than than this 
wished-for accounting? And, there's nothing here to indicate an incomplete accounting 
will produce any further match-ups. Yes, van Fraassen will argue for a frequentist basis to 
probability as inductive grounds on which to support judgments of regularities in 
phenomena, but that is a relationship between probabilities and the world, not model (in 
van Fraassen's sense) and world. – So, as we look past van Fraassen's rhetoric, making 
sense of the details becomes an exasperating task. And, all in vain, apparently, since it is 
all slated for absorption into van Fraassen's grand pragmatics scheme.  
 
Note 2:   
 
Does a theory's determining the limits of its own empirical substructure (i.e. what 
is or is not to count as empirical for that theory) introduce any serious issues, such as (i) 
Is it a problem that a theory should determine its own evidence?, or (ii) What role does 
background/collateral theory play in placing selection/other constraints on some scientific 
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theory T under consideration?, or (iii) If each theory carries with it its own system, 
criteria, features for (self) appraisal, then does this commit van Fraassen to the 
incommensurability thesis (and, if so, is that a problem for van Fraassen)?  
 
Note 3:  
 
In order to tease out the interdependence among theories, let us consider more 
carefully a claim that T would remain EA after its extension with T'. I counter that this 
will only be the case under ideal conditions, not generally. I do not dispute the set-
theoretic guarantee of EA for T as van Fraassen has characterized it, but rather, I dispute 
that this characterization correctly captures what it purports to. In the case of explaining 
the failure of EA for some statement S,  we saw that a set of models consistent with S, 
that would be EA with respect to T, would no longer be EA if with respect to T', where T', 
e.g., conflicts with the internal structure of S's models. Now, in this discussion about 
extension, van Fraassen has us focus on T, has us suppose it EA, has us notice that 
nothing about T is added or taken away in the attempted extension with T', and then has 
us conclude that, if T is unchanged, then it must still be EA (and all EE alternatives to T 
would remain likewise EA). We would thus naturally conclude, in the circumstance of a 
'total defeat,' that we should just dispose of the interloper T' (and van Fraassen's example 
does not discourage this conclusion). As in all cases of magician misdirection, we are 
counseled to 'watch the other hand,' and in this instance, that means we should think 
about T', about background theory, and about the internal structures of the models 
involved. But, what if T' and T are both equally supported by the background theory such 
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that we cannot dispose of either? We must make them work together (that is, if we hold a 
unificationist view). Holding T' fixed, if the internal structures of its models conflicts 
with all other EE alternatives to T, but is consistent with T, then we would be compelled 
to select T and eliminate all the EE alternatives to T.  – This is exactly the imagined 
scenario that van Fraassen considers when offering an apparent counterexample to his 
view (1980:49). Let TN(vi) be a version of Newtonian physics that also posits the 
velocity of the center of the universe is vi , and so, under the right circumstances, EE with 
all the other TN(vk).  If  TN(vi) is conjoined with Maxwell's theory of electromagnetism 
E(0), whose internal structure dictates that two charged particles in motion will attract 
with absolute force F, this will render all but one of the TN(vk) theories no longer EA. 
That is, by E(0), if the two particles attract with a force greater than F (ceteris paribus), it 
would follow that the center of the universe is traveling at velocity greater than 0. van 
Fraassen argues that we may reject this apparent counterexample once we consider that E 
is underdetermined, since any E(vk) conjoined with TN(vk) will be EE to TN(0) with 
E(0). – While I would agree that underdetermination is a genuine problem, it is distinct 
from the issue of whether a theoretical extension/conjunction can eliminate contender 
theories from among a series of EE alternatives. In the example, the internal structure of 
E(0) is such that it sweeps clean the intersection between itself and every other TN(vi ≠0). 
By van Fraassen's own criteria, only (E(0) & TN(0)) is a victory whereas every other 
(E(0)&TN(vi ≠0)) is a defeat. – We could have saved all this trouble had we simply 
extended any of the TN(v) theories to the theory satisfying: 'Any velocity other than 0 is 
impossible for the center of the universe.' Not a very compelling extension, but it 
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illustrates the point (once we unmoor from the separate issue of underdetermination). – 
The important point here is that van Fraassen can't generalize from the example.  
 
Note 4: 
Prior Attempts at Reductive Accounts of Explanation 
 
In building towards his own explanationist account, van Fraassen first reviews 
some history of the attempts by (mostly) empiricists to account for explanation by 
attempting to reduce to 'those features and resources of a theory that make it informative 
(that is, allow it to give better descriptions)' (154). Hempel defined 'A explains B' as: 
knowing A gives good grounds for believing B (where 'giving good grounds' can mean 
P(B|A) is better than 50%). However, counterexamples are easy to come by. Giving good 
grounds does not always indicate a cause, e.g. as a falling barometer gives good grounds 
for an impending storm but does not explain the storm. Conversely, we can have a good 
explanation that does not indicate having given good grounds: P(having paresis | having 
latent syphilis) is a very small probability yet latent syphilis explains the paresis. – 
Salmon diagnosed the problem as a failure to involve relevance, which, when it is absent, 
renders a non-explanation, regardless how high the probability, as e.g. P(not getting 
pregnant | being a man and taking birth-control) = 100%. Salmon instead suggests 
identifying 'giving explanation' with 'giving sets of statistically relevant factors,' 
maintaining that the factors' imparting high probability is not necessarily important. 
However, Cartwright's famous counterexample challenges Salmon's view. Suppose we 
spray defoliant on a set of plants and 90% perish. It will then be the case that P(this 
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plant's being alive) ≠ P(this plant's being alive | it was sprayed with defoliant), yet we'd 
never say that being sprayed with defoliant explains the plant's being alive. – van 
Fraassen concludes from a long review of similar attempts that these views all fall short 
in two important respects: (a) they have trouble accounting for asymmetries; (b) they 
have trouble accounting for relevance and rejection78.  
 
Along the lines of (b) relevance, van Fraassen undertakes a study of causal 
explanation, searching for a general account that solves the puzzle of 'salience' (being that 
particular cause, within a network of causes, which we take to be the relevant explanation 
for a particular fact (even though the salient cause is just one of many causes, the other 
causes not being able to similarly explain)). van Fraassen reviews some history in the 
philosophy of causality. The 'cause' of an event was traditionally thought to be the 
conditio sine qua non (the indispensable (essential) condition) leading up to and 
necessary for the effect. Yet, not every necessary condition is a cause (e.g. the existence 
of a knife is a necessary condition for its rusting, but is not the cause), and a cause may 
not be necessary (i.e. alternative causes could have had same result). – Mackie's INUS 
conditions (insufficient (non-redundant) but necessary part of an unnecessary but 
sufficient condition) also fall short of the mark: (1) even the necessary part of  INUS may 
not constitute a cause (as, again, the existence of a knife for its rusting); (2) there may be 
no sufficient preceding conditions to some phenomena (e.g., the existence of radium is 
what caused the Geiger counter to click, but there's a  better-than-zero probability that the 
Geiger counter will not click at all). – David Lewis' counterfactual account of causation 
                                                 
78   rejection meaning 'having warrant to reject a request to explain' 
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meets especially fierce resistance from van Fraassen. In particular, van Fraassen objects 
(1) that counterfactual causation carries implicit ceteris paribus conditions for which no 
invariant-exact content can be specified (for, argues van Fraassen, which conditions 
obtain depends on context) (e.g. counterfactuals do not in general obey weakening 
[(A>B) entails ((A&C)>B)], so <striking a match caused it to light> does not entail 
<(striking a match & dunking it in coffee) caused it to light>). (2) Lewis asserts: 
Whenever 'A causes B' is true, then also: 'if A had not happened, then B would have not 
happened.' van Fraassen responds that this is an insufficient criterion, giving a counter-
example: <D's alarm goes off> is the cause of <D's waking up>; but also: if D had not 
gone to sleep the night before, he would not have woken up. We do not, per criterion, 
want to say that going to sleep caused him to wake up. – So, three attempts at answering 
salience have failed, and salience remains a puzzle. 
 
van Fraassen construes these failures as due to the omission of a key element: 
“The discussion of explanation went wrong at the very beginning when explanation was 
conceived of as a relationship like description: a relation between theory and fact. Really 
it is a three-term relation, between theory, fact, and context” (156). van Fraassen goes on 
to assert that an explanation must be understood as essentially relative, relative to specific 
questions asked in a certain context and with respect to a certain theory. van Fraassen 
exclaims: “No wonder that no single relation between theory and fact ever managed to fit 
more than a few examples!” (ibid.). 
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Note 5:  
 
In the case of a causal theory, for example, the relevance relation picks out (maps 
to) exactly those salient factors relevant for the topic. So, if a theory is rich enough to 
have, say, 10 salient factors, then that same richness will determine 10 'respects in which 
the question is asked.' Thus, for any why-question with the proper theory-determined 
specificity (meeting the constraints of this interrogative logic), it will be a foregone 
conclusion that there shall exist a theory-determined specified answer (or explanation). 
(Another way to think of this: The answers determine the questions, not the other way 
around).  
 
The formalities: why-question Q is a triple <Pk,X,R> consisting of topic Pk, contrast 
class X={P1, P2.,...Pk,...} and relevance relation R. A proposition A is said to be 'relevant 
to Q' just in the case that A bears relevance relation R to <Pk,X>. A direct answer B to 
why-question Q is as follows:  
 
B is a direct answer to Q exactly where there exists a proposition A which is relevant to Q 








Salmon and Kitcher (1987) have objected to van Fraassen's account of 
explanation, arguing that the relevance relation is too liberal and would permit just about 
any answer to any why-question. They imagine the following counter-example: Suppose 
a theory of astrology that predicted the day on which JFK would die. The why-question 
is: 'Why did JFK die on 11/22/63?' Pk is 'JFK died on 11/22/63.' The contrast class X = 
{JFK died 1/1/63,..., JFK died 12/31/63}. The explanation is: 'Pk in contrast to X because 
A,' where A is a true description of the configuration of the stars and planets on JFK's 
birthdate. A therefore bears relevance relation R to the pair <Pk,X>. Salmon and Kitcher 
contend that this explanation meets van Fraassen's standards for a good explanation, since 
A is true; Pk is true; the other members of the contrast-class are false, and A counts as an 
answer to the why-question, relative to X, in picking-out those theory-directed salient 
factors relevant to the topic. Finally, on the evaluative side, assuming the particular 
astrological theory in question deliberately chose 11/22 vs. any other day that year, and 
assuming (for astrologers anyway) their background K is in cahoots with astrological 
theory, then that same theory and K (i) would probabilistically favor A; (ii) would 
probabilistically less favor other possible 'astrologically relevant' answers; and (iii) 
because A is an “astrologically complete” set of “initial conditions” which theoretically 
determines the facts to be explained, no other 'astrologically relevant' answer can render 
A irrelevant (Salmon & Kitcher, 1987). Thus, argue Salmon and Kitcher, van Fraassen's 
account comes to triviality since any suitably configured theory and background K can be 
made to 'explain' in accord with van Fraassen's requirements. – Many have critiqued 
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Salmon and Kitcher's critique, most of the defenses centering on the probabilistic side of 
van Fraassen's account, though I find these defenses just make maximum use of van 
Fraassen's parasitic exploitation of realism. Once the realist method delivers the goods, 
then a probabilistic rendering can as easily be milked out of it as a pragmatic one. The 
challenge to the antirealist is finding some way to accomplish what realists do (i.e. 
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